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# AMERICA'S RELATION TO THE WORLD CONFLICT AND TO THE COMING PEACE

## The Annals

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## CONTENTS

FOREWORD.....	vii
L. S. Rowe, President	
<i>PART I—AMERICA'S RELATION TO THE WORLD CONFLICT</i>	
THE WORLD CONFLICT IN ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY .....	1
Walter Lippmann, Editorial Staff, <i>New Republic</i> , New York.	
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR MISSION IN THIS WAR.....	10
Miles M. Dawson, LL.D., New York.	
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR.....	13
Samuel T. Dutton, LL.D., New York.	
PLANNING THE FUTURE AMERICA.....	19
Henry A. Wise Wood, New York.	
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY.....	23
Arthur E. Holder, Legislative Representative, American Federation of Labor.	
THE WAR IN ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND WORLD ORDER.....	28
Emily Greene Balch, Emergency Peace Federation, New York.	
PEACE WITHOUT FORCE.....	31
S. N. Patten, University of Pennsylvania.	
PAX AMERICANA.....	40
George W. Kirchwey, LL.D., President of American Peace Society.	
<i>PART II—AMERICA'S OBLIGATION AS THE DEFENDER OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHT</i>	
THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT AMERICA MUST CHAMPION..	49
Roland G. Usher, Ph.D., Professor of History, Washington University, St. Louis.	
NEUTRAL RIGHTS UPON THE SEAS.....	58
Frederic R. Coudert, New York.	
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.....	65
Chandler P. Anderson, New York.	
<i>PART III—ELEMENTS OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE</i>	
ELEMENTS OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.....	76
Philip Marshall Brown, Princeton University.	

THE BASES OF A JUST AND ENDURING PEACE . . . . .	83
Franklin H. Giddings, Ph.D., LL.D., Columbia University, New York.	
ON WHAT PRINCIPLES IS THE SOCIETY OF STATES TO BE FOUNDED? . . . . .	89
Henri La Fontaine, Member of Belgian Senate, Brussels, Belgium.	
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS PREREQUI- SITES TO A DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	92
James L. Slayden, Member of Congress from Texas.	
THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ISOLATION IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	100
John H. Latané, Ph.D., LL.D., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.	
 <i>PART IV—THE PROBLEMS OF A DURABLE PEACE</i>	
TWO EVENTS THAT PRESAGE A DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	110
Oscar S. Straus, Chairman, Public Service Commission, New York.	
A BASIS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND . . . . .	113
William C. Bullitt, Philadelphia.	
THE DISPOSITION OF CONSTANTINOPLE . . . . .	118
Talcott Williams, Columbia University, New York City.	
JAPAN, AMERICA AND DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	124
Toyokichi Iyenaga, Ph.D., Professorial Lecturer in Political Science, University of Chicago; Director, "East and West News Bureau," New York.	
FOUNDATIONS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN . . . . .	129
Hans von Kaltenborn, Assistant Managing Editor of <i>The Brooklyn     Daily Eagle</i> .	
NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF COMMERCE PREREQUI- SITES TO A DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	131
Stephen P. Duggan, Ph.D., College of City of New York, New York.	
THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AN ENDURING PEACE . . . . .	136
E. E. Pratt, Ph.D., Chief of Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Com- merce, Washington, D. C.	
INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ESSENTIAL TO A DURABLE PEACE . . . . .	139
David Lawrence, Washington Correspondent, <i>New York Evening Post</i> .	
 <i>PART V—RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS</i>	
SOVEREIGNTY AND RACE AS AFFECTED BY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . . . .	142
Theodore Marburg, formerly United States Minister to Belgium.	

THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF NATIONALITY.....	147
C. E. McGuire, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary, International High Commission.	
"A MESSAGE FROM SYRIA".....	153
Mrs. Layyah A. Barakat, Philadelphia.	
THE BOHEMIAN QUESTION.....	155
Charles Pergler, Cresco, Iowa.	
THE RIGHTS OF THE JEWS AS A NATION.....	160
J. L. Magnes, New York.	
THE RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS IN AMERICA: THE REPUBLICS OF THE CARIBBEAN.....	165
Oswald Garrison Villard, President of the New York Evening Post Company.	
THE RIGHTS OF SMALL AMERICAN NATIONS: NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA.....	172
Henry R. Mussey, Ph.D., Columbia University, New York.	
<i>PART VI—AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN A LEAGUE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE</i>	
"WAR TO STOP WAR".....	178
John Sharp Williams, United States Senator from Mississippi.	
A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE.....	185
Walter L. Fisher, Chicago.	
OUR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION TREATIES SHOULD BE AMENDED.....	200
George W. Wickersham, New York.	
A YEARNING FOR WORLD PEACE.....	208
James M. Beck, New York.	
MORAL INFLUENCES IN A DURABLE PEACE.....	216
Don C. Seitz, Manager, <i>New York World</i> , New York.	
EQUIPMENT FOR THE POST BELLUM PERIOD.....	219
Charles H. Sherrill, New York.	
DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE COMING PEACE CONFERENCE.....	222
Edward A. Filene.	
INDEX.....	227



## FOREWORD

It will be of interest to the members of the Academy to know that the Annual Meeting Committee had completed plans to devote the Twenty-first Annual Meeting to a topic quite different from that which was finally selected. The change was made immediately after the delivery of the President's momentous address to the Senate on the 22d of January, 1917. The international program, outlined by the President in this message, made it incumbent on a national organization such as the Academy to bring to bear on the vital issues involved the best thought of the country.

With the outbreak of the war there were some of our members who felt that the Academy should abandon the idea of holding a national conference on our foreign policy at a time when the United States was actively participating in the conflict. After the most careful consideration of the situation, the officers of the Academy and the Annual Meeting Committee reached the conclusion that the fact that the United States was engaged in the conflict made the obligation all the more clear to consider in a scientific and non-partisan spirit the great issues involved.

The expectations entertained have been fully justified by the widespread national interest aroused by the discussions of the recent annual meeting. The Academy is under obligation to those who participated in the sessions, not only for their valuable contributions but also because of the elevated spirit, free from prejudice and partisanship, which dominated all the speakers. The officers of the Academy also desire to take this opportunity to express a deep sense of appreciation to those who served on the several committees, as well as to the contributors to the special Annual Meeting Fund which made it possible to hold so momentous a national conference.

L. S. ROWE,  
*President.*





# THE WORLD CONFLICT IN ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

BY WALTER LIPPMANN,  
Editorial Staff, *New Republic*, New York.

## I

The way in which President Wilson directed America's entrance into the war has had a mighty effect on the public opinion of the world. Many of those who are disappointed or pleased say they are surprised. They would not be surprised had they made it their business this last year to understand the policy of their government.

In May, 1916, the President made a speech which will be counted among the two or three decisive utterances of American foreign policy. The Sussex pledge had just been extracted from the German government, and on the surface American neutrality seemed assured. The speech was an announcement that American isolation was ended, and that we were prepared to join a League of Peace. This was the foundation of all that followed, and it was intended to make clear to the world that America would not abandon its traditional policy for imperialistic adventure, that if America had to fight it would fight for the peace and order of the world. It was a great portent in human history, but it was overshadowed at the time by the opening of the presidential campaign.

Through the summer the President insisted again and again that the time had come when America must assume its share of responsibility for a better organization of mankind. In the early autumn very startling news came from Germany. It was most confusing because it promised peace maneuvers, hinted at a separate arrangement with the Russian court party, and at the resumption of unlimited submarine warfare. The months from November to February were to tell the story. Never was the situation more perplexing. The prestige of the Allies was at low ebb, there was treachery in Russia, and, as Mr. Lansing said, America was on the verge of war. We were not only on the verge of war, but on the verge of a bewildering war which would not command the whole-hearted support of the American people.

With the election past, and a continuity of administration assured, it became President Wilson's task to make some bold move which would clarify the muddle. While he was preparing this move, the German chancellor made his high-handed proposal for a blind conference. That it would be rejected was obvious. That the rejection would be followed by the submarine war was certain. The danger was that America would be drawn into the war at the moment when Germany appeared to be offering the peace for which the bulk of American people hoped. We know now that the peace Germany was prepared to make last December was the peace of a conqueror. But at the time Germany could pose as a nation which had been denied a chance to end the war. It was necessary, therefore, to test the sincerity of Germany by asking publicly for a statement of terms. The President's circular note to the powers was issued. This note stated more precisely than ever before that America was ready to help guarantee the peace, and at the same time it gave all the belligerents a chance to show that they were fighting for terms which could be justified to American opinion. The note was very much misunderstood at first because the President had said that, since both sides claimed to be fighting for the same things, neither could well refuse to define the terms. The misunderstanding soon passed away when the replies came. Germany brushed the President aside, and showed that she wanted a peace by intrigue. The Allies produced a document which contained a number of formulae so cleverly worded that they might be stretched to cover the wildest demands of the extremists or contracted to a moderate and just settlement. Above all the Allies assented to the League of Peace which Germany had dismissed as irrelevant.

The war was certain to go on with America drawn in. On January 22, after submarine warfare had been decided upon but before it had been proclaimed, the President made his address to the Senate. It was an international program for democracy. It was also a last appeal to German liberals to avert a catastrophe. They did not avert it, and on February 1 Germany attacked the whole neutral world. That America would not submit was assured. The question that remained to be decided was the extent of our participation in the war. Should it be merely defensive on the high seas, or should it be a separate war? The real source of confusion was the treacherous and despotic Russian government. By no twist of

language could a partnership with that government be made consistent with the principles laid down by the President in his address to the Senate.

The Russian Revolution ended that perplexity and we could enter the war with a clear conscience and a whole heart. When Russia became a Republic and the American Republic became an enemy, the German empire was isolated before mankind as the final refuge of autocracy. The principle of its life is destructive of the peace of the world. How destructive that principle is, the ever-widening circle of the war has disclosed.

## II

Our task is to define that danger so that our immense sacrifices shall serve to end it. I cannot do that for myself without turning to the origins of the war in order to trace the logical steps by which the pursuit of a German victory has enlisted the enmity of the world.

We read statements by Germans that there was a conspiracy against their national development, that they found themselves encircled by enemies, that Russia, using Serbia as an instrument, was trying to destroy Austria, and that the Entente had already detached Italy. Supposing that all this were true, it would remain an extraordinary thing that the Entente had succeeded in encircling Germany. Had that empire been a good neighbor in Europe, by what miracle could the old hostility between England and France and Russia have been wiped out so quickly? But there is positive evidence that no such conspiracy existed.

Germany's place in the sun is Asia Minor. By the Anglo-German agreement of June, 1914, recently published, a satisfactory arrangement had been reached about the economic exploitation of the Turkish empire. Professor Rohrbach has acknowledged that Germany was given concessions "which exceeded all expectations," and on December 2, 1914, when the war was five months old, von Bethmann-Hollweg declared in the Reichstag that "this understanding was to lessen every possible political friction." The place in the sun had been secured by negotiation.

But the road to that place lay through Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. It was this highway which Germany determined to control absolutely; and the chief obstacle on that highway was Serbia backed by Russia. Into the complexities of that Balkan

intrigue I am not competent to enter. We need, however, do no more than follow Lord Grey in the belief that Austria had a genuine grievance against Serbia, a far greater one certainly than the United States has ever had against Mexico. But Britain had no stake in the Austro-Serbian quarrel itself.

It had an interest in the method which the central powers took of settling the quarrel. When Germany declared that Europe could not be consulted, that Austria must be allowed to crush Serbia without reference to the concert of Europe, Germany proclaimed herself an enemy of international order. She preferred a war which involved all of Europe to any admission of the fact that a coöperative Europe existed. It was an assertion of unlimited national sovereignty which Europe could not tolerate.

This brought Russia and France into the field. Instantly Germany acted on the same doctrine of unlimited national sovereignty by striking at France through Belgium. Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation the crime would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalized state has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards coöperation. If it could not survive then no internationalism was possible. That is why through these years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the bases of faith at which the world must build or perish.

The invasion of Belgium instantly brought the five British democracies into the war. I think this is the accurate way to state the fact. Had the war remained a Balkan war with France engaged merely because of her treaty with Russia, had the fighting been confined to the Franco-German frontier, the British empire might have come into the war to save the balance of power and to fulfill the naval agreements with France but the conflict would probably never have become a people's war in all the free nations of the empire. Whatever justice there may have been in Austria's original quarrel with Serbia and Russia was overwhelmed by the exhibition of national lawlessness in Belgium.

This led to the third great phase of the war, the phase which

concerned America most immediately. The Allies directed by Great Britain employed sea power to the utmost. They barred every road to Germany, and undoubtedly violated many commercial rights of neutrals. What America would do about this became of decisive importance. If it chose to uphold the rights it claimed, it would aid Germany and cripple the Allies. If it refused to do more than negotiate with the Allies, it had, whatever the technicalities of the case might be, thrown its great weight against Germany. It had earned the enmity of the German government, an enmity which broke out into intrigue and conspiracy on American soil. Somewhere in the winter of 1915, America was forced to choose between a policy which helped Germany and one which helped the Allies. We were confronted with a situation in which we had to choose between opening a road to Germany and making an enemy of Germany. With the proclamation of submarine warfare in 1915 we were told that either we must aid Germany by crippling sea power or be treated as a hostile nation. The German policy was very simple: British mastery of the seas must be broken. It could be broken by an American attack from the rear or by the German submarine. If America refused to attack from the rear, America was to be counted as an enemy. It was a case of he who is not for me is against me.

To such an alternative there was but one answer for a free people to make. To become the ally of the conqueror of Belgium against France and the British democracies was utterly out of the question. Our choice was made and the supreme question of American policy became: how far will Germany carry the war against us and how hard shall we strike back? That we were aligned on the side of Germany's enemies no candid man, I think, can deny. The effect of this alignment was to make sea power absolute. For mastery of the seas is no longer the possession of any one nation. The supremacy of the British navy in this war rests on international consent, on the consent of her allies and of the neutrals. Without that consent the blockade of Germany could not exist, and the decision of America not to resist allied sea power was the final blow which cut off Germany from the world. It happened gradually, without spectacular announcement, but history, I think, will call it one of the decisive events of the war.

The effect was to deny Germany access to the resources of the neutral world, and to open these resources to the Allies. Poetic

justice never devised a more perfect retribution. The nation which had struck down a neutral to gain a military advantage found the neutral world a partner of its enemies.

That partnership between the neutral world and Germany's enemies rested on merchant shipping. This suggested a new theory of warfare to the German government. It decided that since every ship afloat fed the resources of its enemies, it might be a good idea to sink every ship afloat. It decided that since all the highways of the world were the communications of the Allies, those communications should be cut. It decided that if enough ships were destroyed, it didn't matter what ships or whose ships, England and France would have to surrender and make a peace on the basis of Germany's victories in Europe.

Therefore, on the 31st of January, 1917, Germany abolished neutrality in the world. The policy which began by denying that a quarrel in the Balkans could be referred to Europe, went on to destroy the internationalized state of Belgium, culminated in indiscriminate attack upon the merchant shipping of all nations. The doctrine of exclusive nationalism had moved through these three dramatic phases until those who held it were at war with mankind.

### III

The terrible logic of Germany's policy had a stupendous result. By striking at the bases of all international order, Germany convinced even the most isolated of neutrals that order must be preserved by common effort. By denying that a society of nations exists, a society of nations has been forced into existence. The very thing Germany challenged Germany has established. Before 1914 only a handful of visionaries dared to hope for some kind of federation. The orthodox view was that each nation had a destiny of its own, spheres of influence of its own, and that it was somehow beneath the dignity of a great state to discuss its so-called vital interests with other governments. It was a world almost without common aspiration, with few effective common ideals. Europe was split into shifting alliances, democracies and autocracies jumbled together. America lay apart with a budding imperialism of its own. China was marked as the helpless victim of exploitation. That old political system was one in which the German view was by no means alto-

gether disreputable. Internationalism was half-hearted and generally regarded somewhat cynically.

What Germany did was to demonstrate *ad nauseam* the doctrine of competitive nationalism. Other nations had applied it here and there cautiously and timidly. No other nation in our time had ever applied it with absolute logic, with absolute preparation, and with absolute disregard of the consequences. Other nations had dallied with it, compromised about it, muddled along with it. But Germany followed through, and Germany taught the world just where the doctrine leads.

Out of the necessities of defense men against it have gradually formulated the ideals of a coöperative nationalism. From all parts of the world there has been a movement of ideals working slowly towards one end, towards a higher degree of spiritual unanimity than has ever been known before. China and India have been stirred out of their dependence. The American Republic has abandoned its isolation. Russia has become something like a Republic. The British empire is moving towards closer federation. The Grand Alliance called into existence by the German aggression is now something more than a military coalition. Common ideals are working through it—ideals of local autonomy and joint action. Men are crying that they must be free and that they must be united. They have learned that they cannot be free unless they coöperate, that they cannot coöperate unless they are free.

I do not wish to underestimate the forces of reaction in our country or in the other nations of the Alliance. There are politicians and commercial groups who see in this whole thing nothing but opportunity to secure concessions, manipulate tariffs and extend the bureaucracies. We shall know how to deal with them. Forces have been let loose which they can no longer control, and out of this immense horror ideas have arisen to possess men's souls. There are times when a prudent statesman must build on a contracted view of human nature. But there are times when new sources of energy are tapped, when the impossible becomes possible, when events outrun our calculations. This may be such a time. The Alliance to which we belong has suddenly grown hot with the new democracy of Russia and the new internationalism of America. It has had an access of spiritual force which opens a new prospect in the policies of the world. We can dare to hope for things which we never dared

to hope for in the past. In fact if those forces are not to grow cold and frittered they must be turned to a great end and offered a great hope.

#### IV

That great end and that great hope is nothing less than the Federation of the World. I know it sounds a little old-fashioned to use that phrase because we have abused it so long in empty rhetoric. But no other idea is big enough to describe the Alliance. It is no longer an offensive-defensive military agreement among diplomats. That is how it started to be sure. But it has grown, and is growing, into a union of peoples determined to end forever that intriguing, adventurous nationalism which has torn the world for three centuries. Good democrats have always believed that the common interests of men were greater than their special interests, that ruling classes can be enemies, but that the nations must be partners. Well, this war is being fought by nations. It is the nations who were called to arms, and it is the force of nations that is now stirring the world to its foundations.

The war is dissolving into a stupendous revolution. A few months ago we still argued about the Bagdad corridor, strategic frontiers, colonies. Those were the stakes of the diplomat's war. The whole perspective is changed today by the revolution in Russia and the intervention of America. The scale of values is transformed, for the democracies are unloosed. Those democracies have nothing to gain and everything to lose by the old competitive nationalism, the old apparatus of diplomacy, with its criminal rivalries in the backward places of the earth. The democracies, if they are to be safe, must coöperate. For the old rivalries mean friction and armament and a distortion of all the hopes of free government. They mean that nations are organized to exploit each other and to exploit themselves. That is the life of what we call autocracy. It establishes its power at home by pointing to enemies abroad. It fights its enemies abroad by dragooning the population at home.

That is why practically the whole world is at war with the greatest of the autocracies. That is why the whole world is turning so passionately towards democracy as the only principle on which peace can be secured. Many have feared, I know, that the war against Prussian militarism would result the other way, that instead of



liberalizing Prussia the outcome would be a prussianization of the democracies. That would be the outcome if Prusso-Germany won. That would be the result of a German victory. And that is why we who are the most peaceful of democracies are at war. The success of the submarine would give Germany victory. It was and is her one great chance. To have stood aside when Germany made this terrible bid for victory would have been to betray the hope of free government and international union.

## V

There are two ways now in which peace can be made. The first is by political revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is not for us to define the nature of that revolution. We cannot dictate liberty to the German people. It is for them to decide what political institutions they will adopt, but if peace is to come through revolution we shall know that it has come when new voices are heard in Germany, new policies are proclaimed, when there is good evidence that there has, indeed, been a new orientation. If that is done the war can be ended by negotiation.

The other path to peace is by the definite defeat of every item in the program of aggression. This will mean, at a minimum, a demonstration on the field that the German army is not invincible; a renunciation by Germany of all the territory she has conquered; a special compensation to Belgium; and an acknowledgment of the fallacy of exclusive nationalism by an application for membership in the League of Nations.

Frontier questions, colonial questions, are now entirely secondary, and beyond this minimum program the United States has no direct interest in the territorial settlement. The objects for which we are at war will be attained if we can defeat absolutely the foreign policy of the present German government. For a ruling caste which has been humiliated abroad has lost its glamor at home. So we are at war to defeat the German government in the outer world, to destroy its prestige, to deny its conquests, and to throw it back at last into the arms of the German people marked and discredited as the author of their miseries. It is for them to make the final settlement with it.

If it is our privilege to exert the power which turns the scale, it is our duty to see that the end justifies the means. We can win

nothing from this war unless it culminates in a union of liberal peoples pledged to coöperate in the settlement of all outstanding questions, sworn to turn against the aggressor, determined to erect a larger and more modern system of international law upon a federation of the world. That is what we are fighting for, at this moment, on the ocean, in the shipyard and in the factory, later perhaps in France and Belgium, ultimately at the council of peace.

If we are strong enough and wise enough to win this victory, to reject all the poison of hatred abroad and intolerance at home, we shall have made a nation to which free men will turn with love and gratitude. For ourselves we shall stand committed as never before to the realization of democracy in America. We who have gone to war to insure democracy in the world will have raised an aspiration here that will not end with the overthrow of the Prussian autocracy. We shall turn with fresh interests to our own tyrannies—to our Colorado mines, our autocratic steel industries, our sweatshops and our slums. We shall call that man un-American and no patriot who prates of liberty in Europe and resists it at home. A force is loose in America as well. Our own reactionaries will not assuage it with their Billy Sundays or control through lawyers and politicians of the Old Guard.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR MISSION IN THIS WAR

BY MILES M. DAWSON, LL.D.,  
New York.

The part which the United States should play in the war, and in making the treaty of peace, should be determined by the things upon which this government rests, for which it stands and the practicability of which it has demonstrated.

These fundamental things, as is recognized throughout the world, with dread by beneficiaries of autocracy, with tears and thanksgiving by friends of freedom, are few, but most important to mankind. Our triumphant justification of them brought together, out of all the nations of Europe, this great people, enabled France to find her way to a stable republic, made all American states republican, liberalized all governments the world over and, as a lode-

star, drew the half-wakened peoples of China and of Russia along the road to freedom under institutions modelled on our own.

These fundamentals may be epitomized into five:

1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality.

2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union.

3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum.

4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state.

5. The right and duty to maintain the union.

The United States, though by tradition and on principle neutral as regards quarrels between European nations, is forced into this war to defend the lives of its own citizens, engaged in peaceful pursuits and protected by international law and solemn treaties. The crucial issue which has driven our republic into the arena is to champion what the fathers of the republic rightly termed the inalienable rights of man. It would be quite impossible for this nation to retrace the step which it has taken, were the central powers merely to offer to respect the rights of our citizens and to make amends; the issue now is that, as regards all neutrals peaceably attending to their own business, these inalienable rights must be respected. The other things for which this nation stands are not involved so openly; they are not directly at issue. But are they not likely, even almost certain, to be determined at the same time and by the same arbitrament and thus the principles which our nation has established by demonstrating their practicability, to be incorporated into the treaty of peace?

For instance, what else does the proposition signify that small and weak nations shall be protected and be preserved, but that states and their peoples shall enjoy the right of self-government? And that this is to be protected implies, in turn, that the union of states which is to protect it, shall, acting together, be granted authority to adjust interstate issues and to enforce the verdict. Is not recognition of this essential, if situations like that which arose regarding Serbia are to be dealt with otherwise than by war? Or if

violation of neutrality and destruction of small nations, such as in the case of Belgium, are to be avoided?

It is a long step toward the realization of the fourth principle, that each such state should be guaranteed a republican form of government; but it seems not unlikely that it will be taken. Casting off their shackles, the peoples of China and of Russia have shown not only that Germans, Austrians and Turks might do likewise, but also that, in order to avoid the loss of honor and a remnant of power, monarchs may be inclined to yield the real reins of government to representative assemblies. This may, and probably will, be as far as this principle will be realized at present in some of the countries; but even so, it could not be expected that the peace of nations would be preserved if each were to be exposed to the peril of overthrow of its constitution by a tyrant. No union of nations, whether formally so organized or not, could maintain itself, without defending each nation in the enjoyment of republican institutions. The guaranty must, in the nature of things, be given; whether openly or impliedly, while important, is not all-important.

The United States has found it unavoidable to accept the burden of this guaranty even as regards states with which it has no express or binding union. Thus it has had to protect Mexico against the overturn of its republican government by Huerta, and Cuba against a like overturn by Gomez, not to speak of intervention in San Domingo and Costa Rica. It will also be impossible to avoid such guaranty, when, through some sort of joint agency, the nations undertake to protect the sovereignty of individual states, *viz.*, a guaranty that the peoples are really represented—even though in some cases misrepresented—in the government of the states that compose the union of nations.

The fifth fundamental principle, that such union of nations must be maintained and that no nation will be permitted to withdraw, may seem yet further from realization. Indeed it is not probable that it will be included in any treaty. But one must remember it was not in the federal constitution; yet it was enforced when secession was attempted. Secession from the union of states, composing this nation, is thinkable, however; but is it even thinkable that, once a world union is established, any nation would be permitted to retire?

Consider that, if the other nations remained united and were

much the stronger, it would mean that the withdrawing nation would be subject to their discipline but without a voice in their councils. This, only to enable it to shirk the common burden! If it sought to withdraw, rather than submit to control for the common good, that could not be suffered; if it withdrew as an act of defiance, its challenge would have to be accepted or the union would fall apart. The logic of events would thus compel the maintenance of the union.

Even by men who give much attention to international subjects and the study of government, it is not always so clearly seen as it should be that this nation has demonstrated that all these five things of so great importance to mankind are actually realizable. Yet this is the crowning achievement of the United States! Fewer, no doubt, have appreciated that already several of these things have proved necessary as an extra-territorial exercise of this nation's powers. Yet this is evidence of the great service of the United States in showing the way and of the great need for the extension of these principles to all nations.

Out of this example set by our nation and out of its righteous participation in this war with these purposes in view, there should come the application of these principles to the solution of the world's problems as the practical way to guarantee liberty to all nations, all peoples, all men.

## THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR

BY SAMUEL T. DUTTON, LL.D.,

New York.

For nearly one hundred and fifty years we have been engaged in building a nation. At the bottom of all our endeavors there was a religious spirit and we have developed a tradition for honesty and fair dealing. We fought for liberty and for the preservation of the Union. As we review the history of those conflicts our conscience is clear. Great benefits have come to the world because liberty and union have triumphed on this continent. Other occasions where we have taken up arms we do not review with the same complacency. Our territory is vast and full of potential wealth and no longer can we say of different sections of our domain that the inhabitants are English or Dutch or Spanish. America is the home of all peoples

and our large cities are more cosmopolitan than were ancient Rome or Byzantium. Of some countries it may be said that there are more of their people in America than in the home land.

Never before has there been in any land such assimilation of diverse elements. The public school has done its full part and freedom of opportunity has done the rest. A great experiment in democracy has been successfully tried and we are one in spirit and purpose if not in blood. Witness how the people have responded to the President's call. Party lines have vanished. Democrats, Republicans, Socialists and Suffragists are all of one mind. There is a discordant element and it has made much noise but has probably done no serious harm. From the north, the south, the east and the west is heard the voice of patriotism and better than that is the calm and steady readiness of the people to do their full part in the great struggle. America with her forty-eight states and her wonderful variety in climate, relief and population is not heterogeneous as regards national character and ideals.

Her relation to the great conflict will be one of both cause and effect thinking of national self-consciousness and solidarity. War is a terrible curse but it has this virtue: that when the cause is a righteous one it unites all factions, promotes comradeship and draws into a common brotherhood persons differing widely in belief, rank, creed and vocation.

And what, let us ask, is the justification which impels a peace loving people to plunge into a struggle the most terrible the world has known? The answer is found partly in the political principles underlying our common welfare and partly in the constituent elements which make up our population. To put it bluntly we are friends of the Allies either through kinship or political belief, or else because of the outrages committed by the enemies of mankind.

This is no ordinary war. The issues at stake are profound. It is evident that there can be no safety for free institutions, much less for lasting peace, unless this hydra headed monster of militarism is destroyed. Here then is one most important relation which America bears to the war. It is that of a nation desiring world peace summoned by the voice of honor and humanity to join other peace loving nations in suppressing a gigantic evil.

Another relation of America to the war is that of our relative unpreparedness. In the eyes of many this is to be deplored and some

have thought it to be a national crime. I cannot agree with that point of view. If Great Britain and France had been prepared as Germany was it would have been difficult to say who caused the war. France was only moderately prepared and did not wish the war. Russia wished to avoid it. The communications of Sir Edward Grey to the Central Powers during the few days preceding the war show conclusively that Great Britain earnestly sought to prevent the war. The preparedness of this country as compared with that of Germany was far below the requirements of the modern war. Ten years ago Colonel Roosevelt as President was clamoring for six battleships per annum. Some of us pacifists (the term pacifist was then in less disrepute than at present) thought that two were enough. We deprecated having our government act as though it were preparing to fight Japan. I now thank God that we built battleships only moderately. We have far less old junk on hand now and our friendship with Japan has been growing year by year in spite of Captain Hobson and the yellow press. Furthermore, ships built ten years ago would be of very little use now. Naval defense has been revolutionized by the present war and we do not know today what will be required two years hence or five years hence. We do know that we will have to build a different type of ship from those demanded two or three years ago. Of the three hundred war vessels listed in a recent journal many are out of date; like automobiles warships must be of 1917, 1918 and 1919.

Our army has been too small, everybody knew it, but in prosperous times it is hard to get enlisted men. I wish to say that while I believe there has been a lack of efficiency in the administration of the departments of war and navy, I am glad that we have thus far maintained the reputation of not fearing our neighbors and have not needed to heap up great armaments. Moreover, I believe that when this struggle has reached its logical conclusion we can then adapt a policy of greater moderation in expenditure for the enginery of war.

Now that the great conflict has drawn us into its eddying currents the whole nation must think and act in terms of war. Our young men must now be trained as rapidly as possible. The office, the factory and the university must all contribute their quota. Young women also will be needed as nurses and helpers. Vast stocks of arms, munitions and food are to be provided and trans-

ported. Lessons of efficiency and economy are to be learned by all the people. There never was a more righteous cause for the issue affects the welfare and destiny of all living and of countless generations yet unborn. God grant that when the war is over there may be an end of deportations, atrocities, outrages and cruelties such as have never blackened the pages of history.

The great conflict is bound to disturb our economic balance. Some industries will be highly expanded, others will suffer. Submarine warfare is disturbing foreign trade and will no doubt bring enormous losses. There will be the greatest displacement of labor from one field to another both for men and women that the nation has ever seen. During the period when we were introducing labor saving machinery we saw the working out of this process. Then it was gradual; now it will be abrupt, dramatic and even tragic. So in entering the war we have to deal with problems of industry, commerce and taxation such as have not vexed us before. Two great evils are impending. First, lavish expenditure by those suddenly made rich and the sudden collapse which is likely to follow the war when the account of the world's losses is made up. Nothing but some great calamity will waken the torpid minds of our people to the economic dangers which are wrapped up in such a world tragedy.

Another relation is seen in the demand that the United States take a more active part in world politics and diplomacy. If this means that she is to become a military nation and help to maintain an armed peace, the idea is discredited by our history and ideals and should be resented by all loyal minds. If, however, it means that we are to join in a league of nations to establish international government founded upon justice, with equal rights for all states, using all sanctions such as public conscience and good-will, the sacredness of treaties and if necessary international police power, then America must play her full part.

There seems to be another supreme reason for our action. While democracy has succeeded in the western hemisphere, there is reason to hope that all states in the eastern hemisphere may be transformed and uplifted under its benign influence. China is awaking to a new life. Schools and colleges, many of them inspired and supported by Americans, are models for a universal system of education and better material out of which to make self-governing citizens has never existed. Considering how many of her young



leaders have been educated in the United States we may well take pride in China's progress. Then there is Russia. There are no words adequate to portray the things that are in store for that northern empire. It is the subtle spirit of democracy working silently year by year until the moment arrives for the nation's redemption. Surely America may well rejoice in the hope that the onward march of freedom may not be halted until all tyranny and oppression are relegated to the dark abyss from which they sprang. Here then is the most interesting of all of our relations to the great conflict, namely, our attitude to nations struggling for relief from the oppressor. Belgium, Poland, Serbia and Armenia all need our sympathy and our aid. As the President stated before Congress we have no ends to serve except those of humanity and democracy; but our relation to those impoverished and suffering states after the war should be close and salutary. America desires that all nations which have been deprived and defrauded of real freedom may in the crucible of war be refined and transmuted, and made fit to be members of the society of nations radiating the love of democracy and permanent peace.

There are countless bonds which in the past have bound the world together, educational, social, economic and scientific. America is involved by all these whether she will or not. As during the war, she has poured out her wealth to feed and clothe innocent sufferers and has now taken her place as an ally of those who are fighting for freedom, so, after the war, she must continue her ministrations until hunger, pain and distress shall have vanished from the earth. There is also the world of thought and aspiration, of sympathy and of high-minded altruism. These are to be quickened and enhanced by the war, and afterwards it is to be expected that all nations will be drawn more closely together than ever before, and will come to hold in higher appreciation the things of the spirit and the great verities which give to man a high place in the kingdom of God.

What can America do to aid in establishing international government dedicated to durable peace? That is a great question and one will hesitate to give a categorical answer. I trust that whatever we undertake will be based upon the expectation of a new world order. There is considerable prospect for a federation of democracies when universal suffrage, justice and humanity will

be great words in the international conference. President Wilson has been disposed to state principles rather than advocate specific measures or remedies. The League to Enforce Peace has done a good work in calling the attention of the people of this and other countries to the possibility of a concert of nations with pacific means of settling all differences. The name of the league is not happy and undue emphasis has been placed upon force as the most important factor. At present the United States is joining with the Allies in the enforcement of war. When the war is over it is to be hoped that the need of force will largely cease. Democratic nations will not wish to look each other in the face and say we will compel you to do this or that. The suffering, humiliation and sorrow of the war will so chasten the nations that moral forces will come to the front as never before in history. The World Court League, which accepts all the proposals of the other league except one, is basing its hope upon the establishment of an international court and other subsidiary institutions, as well as upon the increased power of public opinion in favor of such agencies. The same public opinion which has caused the overthrow of autocracy in Russia and is threatening to undermine the Prussian tradition, will be strongly felt at every stage of the reconstruction period. The two leagues to which reference has been made and other organizations working for durable peace should not fail to hear the many voices in all parts of the world demanding that war should cease. There is good hope that an international executive may be developed and there must of course be a constabulary, or police force large enough to keep order and to represent the power and majesty of the united nations of the earth. And there will be no more suggestion of war in this than there is in the existence of municipal or state police. The United States will perform one of her greatest services to the world in helping to work out this beneficent plan. She may well take the lead in establishing a league of nations based upon justice and conciliation.

So we may say in conclusion that the relation of America to the great conflict is one of understanding and appreciation. Joining in the war she expects to suffer, but her suffering and her losses will bring her into closer sympathy and fellowship with other peoples who in blood and in tears are battling for the welfare of mankind. All other relationships to the war seem less important than this. To

have a share in freeing the world of oppression and cruelty is an undertaking worthy of America. With malice toward none and with good-will to all, we may see to it that in every land the principles of democracy and humanity are dominant. As our President has pointed out: we have no ends to serve but the good of mankind, but, if the adventure is successful, America will have a commanding influence and will rejoice eternally in having done her part.

## PLANNING THE FUTURE AMERICA

BY HENRY A. WISE WOOD,

New York.

One of the chief faults of our happy-go-lucky America is its complete absorption in affairs of the moment. It lives wholly in the present, thinking little of its past and not at all of its future.

A huge, good-humored, industrious but untrained multitude, it wanders contentedly along without thought of a destination. Having neither a consummate leader, nor a chart, nor a goal, its pain and its pleasure are almost the sole directors of its course.

If things go well, it believes itself to be upon the right path; if they go ill, its members rush hither and thither in pained confusion until a more comfortable path is found, when it moves off along that course with no eventual objective in view.

When the guiding force of a people is compounded of the thought of all of its members, that people must necessarily move and develop by a succession of loosely related experimental steps. A people must grope or be led. Democracies usually grope, with occasional periods during which, having fallen under the influence of men of foresight and strength, they are directed along preconceived routes towards clearly defined objectives.

There are times when a people have become so preoccupied by their local affairs that they are deaf to suggestion, however beneficial, which calls for a change of thought and action. In such a state of inertia were the American people at the beginning of the present war, and until the aggressions of Germany grew to be intolerable. There are other times when a people, having been aroused out of intellectual lethargy into a state of acute cerebration, are mentally mobile and

may easily be led into new paths, if those paths meet with their approbation. In such a state of intellectual fluidity are the American people at the present time.

A critical moment, therefore, in the life of the nation is at hand, a moment during which the nation will change its mind; during which it will abandon old and embrace new purposes and choose a new pathway into the future.

This then is the opportunity of the dreamer of dreams; of the man of vision who believes he can serve his country by pointing out to it the highway to a great national destiny. To such a man time is as nothing, obstacles are as nothing, the labor, the sweat, the pain of the builders are as nothing. To him the goal, the goal only, is reality. That end achieved, and he knows the memories of the struggle will grow golden and become the traditional glories of the nation.

Need an American be ashamed to confess that he wishes his country to become the great empire of the twentieth century, democracy's greatest empire? That he covets for it a power great as was that of Rome, beneficent as is that of the British Empire, youthful, creative, and altruistic as is that of buoyant America? That he believes this end may be achieved, not by the acquisition of additional territory, not at the cost of his nation's friends among peoples, but at their gain by rendering the world such service as the world never has had?

In the United States we have the largest group of educated members of the white race to be found anywhere in the world. They constitute the only great two-ocean nation and are astride the temperate zone; they are industrious, ingenious, enterprising. They possess an aptitude for the farm, the forest, and the mine, the laboratory, the factory, and the sea, and occupy a territory rich in every natural resource. They are peace loving and benevolent.

What shall such a people do with their future? Shall they permit it to develop haphazard; shall they advance without plan or direction to an unforeseen destination? Shall they not, instead, determine their future, make of it a carefully thought out enterprise, and create and organize the means necessary for its accomplishment, as a definite national undertaking?

Being among those who believe that the future should be the

result of design, not of chance, I make bold to point out what in some respects I believe to be America's future place among nations.

America has long been one of the world's greatest producers of foods and raw materials. This advantage we must not surrender; we must not permit our growing industries and increasing tendency towards urban life to lead us to curtail our output of natural products. On the contrary, we must strive by better methods of cultivation, conservation, replenishment and working, to increase vastly the output of our natural substances, and to reduce their cost in the world's markets.

Having at hand the necessary raw materials, a populace unequalled in ingenuity, of high technical skill in the arts and easily taught new processes of manufacture; having a home market so vast that standardization becomes possible to an extent not possible elsewhere, and having the world's largest accumulation of free capital, there lacks nothing but the undertaking of the project to make of our country the foremost workshop of the world.

This we may easily do if we but set our industrial house in order, if we but hasten to learn and apply to our needs the lessons of class coöperation that the warring nations are teaching us, and turn our government into a great industrial warder and schoolmaster. The industrial armies of the other peoples have been drained by the war, and for more than a generation will be without the vigor that once was theirs. We shall be required to supplement their efforts, and supply to their own peoples and to the other peoples who have depended upon them that which they no longer will be capable of producing. If we but grasp these, our opportunities, we shall become the world's foremost manufacturing nation.

We must recover our maritime supremacy, and become the world's chief sea carrier. Once again must the American flag be the flag oftenest seen upon the waters of the earth. During the year 1914 only 9.8 per cent of our foreign trade was carried in American bottoms; in 1830 it was 90.3 per cent. It is inconceivable that we should not instantly abandon the policies which have been making for our maritime suicide, and adopt others which will restore to us our birthright of sea use, which we have so recklessly tossed into the laps of other nations. The sea strength of Germany against which we are now so lavishly building in self-defense was largely paid for by ourselves.

Germany's profits upon the sea carriage of our own goods and people have built her merchant fleets, have helped to develop her shipyards, and have gone far towards the creation of her only-second-to-Great Britain's naval power. We are now rendering a similar service for Japan. To carry our own exports, imports, and passengers, whether in the Atlantic or Pacific, must henceforth be our inexorable purpose. American ships for Americans and their goods, this must be our slogan.

In order to become the world's foremost manufacturers and merchants, we must become the world's chief bankers. Where foreign enterprises may borrow, there will they trade. The American banker and American salesman must go abroad hand in hand. We must assist and encourage them as the pioneers of the new world-drawn industrial life into the enjoyment of which America is about to enter.

The nation's surplus capital must be set to work for the nation wherever beyond the seas good returns in interest and trade are forthcoming. And selected youth must be especially trained for the handling of America's banking and commercial interests abroad, trained in the languages, manners and customs, tastes and prejudices, of all foreign peoples. For this work there should be created a great national institution, subsidized by the government, with training field stations in all countries. Such an institution could provide us also with consuls, so that trained Americans would replace our untrained consuls, many of whom are of foreign citizenship and their loyalty not always to be depended upon. Thus we shall be made able to satisfy at our profit the needs of all nations, and draw an ever increasing income from the industry of other peoples.

In planning the future it must not be overlooked that security is an essential condition of over-world trade, the security of the individual American and of his property. Unless the pioneers of American commerce be safe in life, money, and goods their enterprises are but houses of straw, subject to the cupidity or passion of those in whose midst they are.

Under insecure conditions American over-world trade can neither take firm root, nor prosper. Therefore, if we wish to create a great world-serving industrial democracy we must lay down and inexorably maintain the principle that wherever an American hap-

pens rightfully to be there his government will insist upon the security of his life and property. The injury of an American upon the high seas or abroad must once more become the concern of all our people, and be resented by all our people with all their might.

We must accept and vigorously act upon the age old saying: Fast bind, safe find. We now see that no nation can carry the commerce of the world in one hand and an empty blunderbus in the other. That commerce can no more be safeguarded by treaties than can a treasure by a copy of the Eighth Commandment pasted upon the door of the vault which holds it. We now know that no one but the well-intentioned respects treaty or commandment; that the ill-intentioned respects only superior power. We therefore must hold superior power. We must be respected not only because of our intellectual and material usefulness to our neighbor nations but also because of our ability, our readiness, and our determination, everywhere and upon every occasion, to support with force if need be the rights even of the humblest of our people, be those rights assailed by a nation little or big. The aegis of America must protect the American, as did that of Rome, the Roman. Upon no other terms can a nation win either the respect or the trade of the world. We must have both.

## GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

### MACHINISTS AS PEACEMAKERS

BY ARTHUR E. HOLDER,

Legislative Representative, American Federation of Labor.

This great national question that we are face to face with is one that the laboring men of the United States are meeting calmly, but with supreme confidence. We are neither pacifists nor jingoes, and we don't propose to become hysterical. We are going to do what we can to coöperate with our neighbors, whether they be capitalists or scholars, to mobilize the good-will of all our people, to mobilize our genius, our skill, and every variety of service we may be expected to render. We realize that those who come under the broad class of "labor," will suffer most from the human sacrifice.

Labor, during this trouble, will even stand some imposition. But we will not forget. And we now furnish warning that if any attempt to impose is made, there will be a reaction, and labor will have its say when the balances are cast.

A day or two ago, while in Bridgeport, Connecticut, I was reminded very forcibly of a remarkable expression given by the Prince of Peace wherein He said: "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" The reason this thought which He so beautifully expressed came to my mind was because I had personally come face to face with petty autocracy, which has been needlessly established in that beautiful city of clever artisans. I could not speak in public as an American citizen to my fellow American citizens without having before me, with his baton unsheathed, one of the police officers of that town. One of my friends who recently returned from Pittsburgh, Youngstown and Cleveland informed me that the same situation existed in those great industrial centers. He said it was a physical impossibility to hold a public meeting before shop gates, and it was becoming more difficult to be able to lease or rent a hall to discuss economic questions of a domestic nature that are absolutely foreign to the trouble across the water. Thus the city fathers of Bridgeport recently enacted an ordinance by which the great first amendment to the American Constitution, guaranteeing free speech, is stricken out and taken from the people without so much as asking "by your leave." Therefore the thought has come to me most forcibly, "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" and what shall it profit us Americans, as citizens of the highest grade, if we undertake to fight for democracy for the world and then allow petty autocracy to arise in our own land and dictate to us what we shall do and what we shall not do? Labor proposes to resist to the utmost every encroachment on our common rights: we will maintain all the personal, inherent and constitutional rights for which our fathers fought.

Let me refer to what may happen after this world war terminates. It would be a bold man to undertake to make a prophecy, but I have had wide experience in this world. I know something of human character. I have some suggestions to make and no better place can be afforded. First, let me drop this hint as to international coöperation in political matters. I have



traveled in Europe, as a working man. I know the Europeans first-hand and I have found that they have no idea whatsoever of the political organization of the United States. They have no proper understanding of our dual system of state and federal government. When once we inform them how smoothly and how equitably we manage our local and national affairs, it would not be a difficult matter to explain to the German, the Austrian, the Hungarian, the Frenchman, the Belgian and the Briton that they can have a United States of Europe if they want it, and it will work just as smoothly there, with all of their nationalism, as it has worked here in this great melting pot. Here with men of all races, all creeds, and many handicaps which tend to hold men back, we have blended into a common whole and built up this great, grand republic. Let us tell our European neighbors how we do things, and when once they know, they will learn the true meaning of those inspiring words "democracy" and "efficiency."

I have some information to convey to you with which you are, perhaps, not familiar. During the Sixty-fourth Congress, some exceptionally revolutionary industrial legislation was enacted. You have been busy people. You have been unable to pay strict attention to Congressional details. You have had to make a living and follow your daily pursuits, and the public press—who own and manipulate news service—has apparently made up its mind to a conspiracy of silence on real information. It has not informed Americans as to what was incorporated in the Army Appropriation Law of the last Congress. It contains a confiscatory clause investing the President of the United States with authority to take, for federal use, any factory that may be needed for national use. The man or men who own it, if they dare to place any obstacles in the way, are subject to exceptional penalties! In the Naval Law of the last session, a commandeering clause was included, authorizing the President to take possession of any private plant that may be needed to build naval vessels or merchant ships. In that act the penal clauses are not as severe, but the power is there. The National Defense Act contains the nitrate section, No. 79. I hope you will all examine that particular piece of legislation and read carefully the most far-reaching industrial legislation ever enacted by Anglo-Saxons, either in the United States or the United Kingdom. There was much debate in the United States Senate

about it because one southern gentleman feared—"it was a step toward socialism." And oh, how scared he was of that awful word; he didn't want the United States government to enter private business, and manufacture fertilizers for the agriculturist! No, indeed! He was perfectly willing that the proposed plants should manufacture nitrates for munitions, but he didn't want to interfere with private fertilizers' rights! Nevertheless, the bill passed over his protest.

When committee and individual amendments were being considered a senator from the far west succeeded without debate, in getting four simple words inserted in that act. They give the power to the United States government in nitrate plants to manufacture fertilizers for agricultural use, nitrates for munitions, "*and other useful products.*" You see the significance of that? Why, we can now, as a people, compete with private monopolies. We can make shoes, manufacture furniture, steel rails, locomotives or refine crude oil products. We can do anything now that Uncle Sam wants with full legislative authority. No senator objected to those four powerful, all-embracing words, and they are law.

The possibilities contained in the nitrate section will help us to solve some of our economic difficulties after the world war is over. It is really a fundamental, bed-rock proposition that will enable us to start a real coöperative industrial democracy which Mr. Lippmann has so eloquently portrayed.<sup>1</sup>

I want to tell you what labor suggested to the House of Representatives as a means of raising added revenue instead of issuing bonds. We recommended that the postal savings bank system should be extended for readier deposit by the people of the United States of immense sums of money. We want to mobilize those great financial resources that are in the pockets of millions of our people who have never dared to be bondholders but who would never hesitate at all to go to Uncle Sam's own depository in the post office and bank their savings. We asked that the limitation of deposits to a thousand dollars should be withdrawn and that people could freely deposit all they possess. We asked that the rate of interest should be increased from two per cent to three per cent on the grounds that, if we have to have bondholders to carry this debt either for this generation or for some future generation,

<sup>1</sup> See page 8.

then all the people should be given an opportunity to coöperate and be the bondholders. We asked that the income tax should be substantially increased and graduated. We asked that the inheritance tax should be materially increased, and that these two latter resources should be made to bear the largest proportion of the financial needs of the government. We also proposed what probably some people will feel pleased to know. We proposed that Congress should levy a tax on land values, not only as a war emergency measure, but also for a permanent means of raising public revenue for all time.

I am a working man, a machinist. I must apologize for the lack of forethought and foresight of my trade. We are the ones who are really responsible for this war—our trade, the machinists—throughout the world. If we had been blessed with foresight, if we had possessed sufficient intelligence to have seen what was coming, if we had coöperated and united our forces with those of our fellow machinists in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, France and Russia, we could have said to kaisers, emperors, kings, princes and potentates, "If you want to fight, you make your own weapons; we machinists will not do it."

If I live, I am going to devote the balance of my life to seeing that, when this awful struggle is over and the butchery is ended, there will be a delegation of trade unionists representing the machinists of the United States, who will visit their fellow machinists in the several European countries and say to them,

Let us unite in behalf of peace and brotherhood. In the skill of our hands lies the destiny of the world. We can control it for peace and happiness, or for death and destruction. Let us put an end to machine butchery. Let us refuse to make weapons of war. We can if we will and for humanity's sake we will be, we must be, the great peacemakers in the future, so that the world shall never again be torn apart in the awful way that it has been during the three years, 1914 to 1917.

THE WAR IN ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND  
WORLD ORDER

BY EMILY GREENE BALCH,

Emergency Peace Federation, New York.

America enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order. I will say briefly something as to two points: first as to democracy, and secondly, as to world order. But through all I have to say there will run, as a unifying thread, the question which confronts us all (not only now, but before the war and after the war and always), a question to which no simple answer is possible, the question of the place of coercion.

I suppose we are all ready to grant, whatever our opinions, that coercion is a thing of which we desire to have as little as may be, that the quality and effect of any moral act are better, in proportion as they are free of the element of coercion; that economic action is more effective and in every way more desirable in proportion as it is free of all element of coercion; that political action, the action of the citizen, is higher in proportion as it is clear of the element of coercion.

## COERCION IN DEMOCRACY

How far can democracy be forced upon others or given them? If a people are free or democratic in their purpose and desire, but externally coerced, the external coercion may be removed and freedom allowed to express itself, but democracy and liberty, which are all ideas, all states of mind, must spread by contagion or imitation or whatever you want to call this divine tendency of mind to kindle mind and purpose. They can neither be presented to nor imposed upon others. A war for democracy and liberty faces this limitation.

We must remember always, in dealing with others, the peculiarities of human nature, and we can best understand human nature by the rule, which is as scientific as it is good, of believing that others are likely to act as we should act in a given situation. How far will a threat of outside force lead a nation to change its political customs and institutions, and how far will it act as a riveting and

consolidating force upon those elements of self-will which are so powerful in us all?

Must we not conclude that a country serves democracy principally and chiefly by being democratic, that it cannot enforce democracy? The same is true of liberty—liberty which is a part of democracy, though not all of democracy, as freedom from coercion is a part of liberty, though not all of liberty.

Where, in war time, with all the strains and stresses of war time, should tolerance and freedom cease? A bill, let us say, is before Congress, approved by a committee of the Senate, disapproved by a committee of the House. At what point is it illegitimate for citizens to discuss this legislation? Is it desirable in the interests of our country that it should be impossible to get a hall in which to discuss a piece of pending legislation? Is it desirable that ministers of the gospel and lawyers and reputable citizens up and down the land should feel themselves not only exposed to moral and social coercion, but to actual violence, if they discuss a piece of pending legislation in which they are interested and which they believe to be contrary to the welfare of the country?

Let us hold ourselves in control, let us be willing to have all points of view discussed in proper ways at proper times, with that freedom which is the pride and safeguard of our country, the salt in the dish of our national life.

We have read much during the last three years of the dangers of secret diplomacy. Now, vigilance is indeed the price of liberty, and it is very necessary that the public opinion of this country should intelligently and consistently acquire a knowledge of the details of the government's policy. I do not mean, obviously, the details which it is necessary, for executive purposes, to keep secret. No sane person would desire to have such details made public. But this country is entitled to be informed (and must continuously demand that it be informed) of every commitment, direct or indirect, by treaty or inference or gentlemen's agreement, of anything binding us, anything that we cannot throw off afterwards, because the course of events has been allowed to commit us to it without our having so intended.

Without arguing as to whether conscription is either wrong or unwise, I want to ask you to think it through.

Take the case which is least favorable to the opponent of

conscription. Consider the case of a young man who is not a conscientious objector in the sense of having religious scruples, a young man, let us suppose, who in the first place does not believe that this war is desirable for the country. There are intelligent persons and right-minded persons who held that view before the war and who, perhaps, have not changed it since. You require this young man not only to expose himself to the most intensive and prolonged suffering of which a human being is capable, endurance carried absolutely to the furthest limit (for endurance is, after all, a small part of what you ask of him), you ask of him to use his will-power, his intelligence, his personality unreservedly to further ends in which he disbelieves.

Now, suppose, further, that this man not only believes that the war is useless, but that he feels, as many religious young men do feel, that it is the last horror to go out and deliberately inflict injury on one's fellowmen. I think that when we make up our minds on this, we ought to try to see the vision from the inside as it presents itself to the individual, perhaps a boy too young to make his will, too young to marry without his family's consent, too young to vote, for whom this momentous decision is made by others.

Too often we conceive of an end of all war, of a world order, in a merely negative sense. We conceive of it primarily, too often, as a coercive league to prevent any of the partners breaking out into the use of violence for the achievement of an individual national end. Surely this is a most deformed and inadequate conception of the goal. Surely what we want is a free society of nations, with active, deliberate and interested coöperation for the great common ends. I do not desire so greatly a world in which we shall all, somehow or other, checkmate one another's desires to make war as I desire a world in which we stand shoulder to shoulder, all peoples working for those great ends which interest all people alike, and to which the native differences of different peoples are the greatest possible contribution, and which would lose by the stagnation of uniformity. We want the harmony of a symphony employing every conceivable type of instrument, not the dullness of similarity.

The constructive genius of the race must work out such a plan for proposing to all nations that you could not possibly force the Central Powers to keep out of it. I believe that it is a perfectly

practicable thing to offer them such a new world partnership that they will only be too eager and glad to come in.

There is an old fable which is always new, the story of the traveler and his cloak and the sun and the wind. The wind laughed and said, "See me take that man's cloak off," and he blew hard and whistled sharply, and the man wrapped his cloak about him as closely as he could. The sun smiled and said, "See me do it," and before he had done smiling the man had the cloak over his arm.

The nations desire nothing better than to throw away their armies and get rid of them. They are the most burdensome cloak that a people has ever had. But as long as we are in a world of imperialisms we shall all cling to them. It is only when we enter upon another plane that we shall find our armies a vast and unnecessary expense and a vast and hideous moral shame.

The time is to come somehow, sometime, when the ruling type of our civilization will be a coöperative world order in which the element of coercion will be shrinking more and more and in which the element of free, spontaneous, joyful fellowship will be ever greater and greater.

## PEACE WITHOUT FORCE

BY S. N. PATTEN,

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The program outlined by the President in his address before the Senate on January 22 seems to be a break in national traditions. In reality, however, there has been no break, but a fulfillment. What Washington said, what Monroe said, what Lincoln said, is said again by President Wilson more clearly and more in harmony with the actual trend of events. The thought of the fathers should be perpetuated but we should not be slaves to its formal expression. What they wanted we want, but new conditions force us to adopt an attitude in harmony with the closer relations in which the world now stands. Berlin and London are not so far from us now as Charleston and Boston were from Philadelphia a century ago. If we needed state unity then we need world unity now to attain the ends for which our constitution was formed. Carried along by

international forces, we have become aware of cosmic emotions but we dread the changes involved and fear to trust ourselves in untried waters. The transition has been made more difficult by the presence among us of false prophets who, under the pretense of an advance, would in reality drag us back into a preceding epoch from which we have fortunately emerged. Today these reactionaries are thinking of fighting, of coercion, of elimination, of peace with victory and other slogans which make the shuddering citizen thankful for the protection which wide seas afford. If the world is a seething turmoil, the more our isolation the better.

Beside these would-be warriors who would drag us into partisan struggles there is a group more modest, more peaceful and yet I believe a greater cause of the present confusion of thought than the advocates of war. The League to Enforce Peace seems an organization to promote harmony and doubtless this is the earnest wish of the promoters. But the average citizen thinks of the difficulty it would create. If we are to have an "enforced peace" America must enforce it. Who can tell what millions of men and billions of money will be needed to impress our standards on the world? All conquering races have worn themselves out in vain endeavors to enforce peace. Why should we try anew to do what other races have failed to do? Never was the world larger or more diverse than today and is not diversity more important than unity?

I do not mean to argue the issues involved. At bottom I agree with the doubting citizen rather than with our new group of social philosophers. If we are to convert the world to our view I prefer to send missionaries rather than soldiers. If ideas cannot cement the world even the hugest armaments will fail. Guns may bring victory but they never bring peace. An armed peace is only an interlude between wars. Enforced law is hated law. Peace without victory abides through the spirit of brotherhood it engenders.

The advocates of peace with victory and peace without victory differ in their concept of human nature and of the motives that control men's actions. Doctrines about enforced peace take their rise from the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. He regarded the passion for war as a fundamental human trait. In a natural state each man is at war with every other man. Security comes from the suppression of the natural instincts. The king, some ruling caste, some delegated body, must make decisions and enforce them against



the natural inclinations of the unruly masses. Peace thus means submission, not choice. This philosophical view is buttressed by the doctrine of depravity that for ages dominated the theological world. It is firmly held by those who believe in an aristocracy or a cultured class to control the discordant tendencies of the public. Only by hardship and discipline can the waywardness of men be kept under control. When these fail as a basis of coercion there is the theory of backward races to invite aggression and to excuse the dominant races when they impose their will on subject races. All these views are the expression of the same philosophy and carry with them the same need of "enforced law." Is it any wonder that the American people should hesitate to enter a league of enforced peace if the mass of the people beyond their borders have the natural inclinations of the savage and can be kept in subjection only by the impressment of superior force? It may be a very moral task to hold a world in subjection, but the history of many failures of imperialistic ventures shows that enforced peace is a waste of blood and treasure. Why is not isolation better than domination if the hearts of men are as black as has been pictured? Is it not better to be in a happy oasis than to be engulfed in an eternity of strife and brutality?

I see no satisfactory answer to these questions except in another view of human nature. Is Hobbes right that war is in our souls and that peace comes from without or does peace dwell within us while war, crime and vice are externalities imposed on men by the crippling power of supermen? Are the defects that make for war in men or in social institutions? Only as we discover what is external and thus imposed and what is internal and thus self-evoking can we know what plan to follow when we seek to improve either men or the conditions under which they live. To reach a higher state we must alter conditions if men are naturally good. We must alter men if they are by heredity bad. The two alternatives have little in common. Our institutions and behavior must conform to one ideal or the other and as we decide will we seek war or peace; will we rely on brotherhood or force.

It would take a book to discuss these problems but it should not take many pages to determine what behavior is called for by each plan. Either men love badness or are unwillingly bad. Government is coöperative good will or an inhibiting force just as war and

strife, vice and crime are within or without. Either man is a brute vainly striving to rise or he is a rational being depressed by overpowering circumstances. If men are pure they need not the enforcement of peace but the displacement of external causes of conflict. Every depressing factor we remove makes a more normal man, a better adjustment, less friction and stronger bonds of brotherhood. Our problem is therefore to search for the disturbing factors that depress and through their removal secure the peace which by nature men crave. War is an acquired attitude; peace and sympathy are the natural expression of our emotions.

The external factors making for war come under three heads: repression, restriction and exploitation. The principal repressions are due to race, religion and language. Restrictions lie mainly in the sphere of economics and are designed to give some region or class a greater superiority of income and welfare than nature would give them. There is a long bitter history of these repressions and of the evils that flow from them. No nation or class is free from attempts to gain economic advantage at the expense of its neighbors nor is there any group who have not felt the force of imposed restrictions and resented the resulting evils. No nation is a unit of equal men. The few dominate at home as the more brutal dominate the world at large. With such a commingling of evils and misunderstandings is it a wonder that war becomes the expected state and that peace seems to be the dream of enthusiasts?

Repression and exploitation not only take from the injured the objective equality on which their happiness depends, but they lead to psychic degeneration. The loser in position also loses in character. All virtues are dependent partly on objective conditions and fade with depressions. Even the physical traits are weakened or disappear. And to these we must add disease, poverty, filth and starvation as causes of still other abnormalities than the original repressions create. It is not difficult, therefore, to account for the race and class antagonisms nor for the abnormality and degeneration that accompany them. What the spirit wills, objective evils prevent. Visions of beauty are transformed into the dross of the street; truth keeps us counting our woes instead of seeing the firm basis on which progress rests.

Our evils are not in a depraved human nature but in defective political institutions. The individual is protected against state

aggression; the people against the king, but there is no protection of the masses against the ruling class. We think of ourselves as a democracy and yet our traditions keep the masses from an immediate control of their destinies. Should we go to war today,<sup>1</sup> the decision will be made by people elected on other issues and not by popular assent. I find no fault with our President, but can we call ourselves a democracy when one man may plunge us into a war whose evils may weigh on us for a hundred years? If this be true of us, what can be said of Europe where millions of lives and billions of property have been sacrificed to the whim of the ruling class? No government asked its people if they wished to fight; nor has a single national election occurred since the outbreak of the war to test popular sentiment. Not only is the war carried on without popular approval, but the conditions of peace will be determined and the distant future fixed before the people have an opportunity to express themselves. It is this distrust of democratic decisions that creates the barriers preventing world harmony. What evil from democracy could equal the failure of each ruling class to reflect the welfare of their own nation? We assumed an aristocracy would at least protect the interests of property but where has a mob shown itself so ruthless in its destruction? We have thought that the educated class would prove a barrier to passion only to find that the higher up we go the more vigorously has the flare of emotion expressed itself. Passion today comes not from the street but from the newspaper; its readers are not the despised mob but the arrogant rich and the reactionary bigot. If we want peace it is not human nature we must alter; nor is it mob rule we should fear. It is our tradition and antiquated class opinion that must be revised. We have changed the rule of the lawyer for the rule of the editor, the spoken word for the printed word, only to find that the passion of the reader exceeds that of the assembly. A demagogue as speaker can at most reach a few thousand hearers while an emotional editor can make a nation insane.

We do not reach the heart of the situation, however, until we realize that protection lies not in written constitutions and binding traditions but in clear ideas. We see today through yesterday's glasses and not in its own light. We might as well expect that the ideals of the Middle Ages would suffice to build a modern state as to assume that the ideals of the last two centuries suffice to create a

<sup>1</sup> This article was written prior to the declaration of war.

present solution. Our great need is a self-enforcing peace—a group of principles that will work as successfully in world affairs as our constitution works in our internal affairs. We do not keep armies to maintain internal peace. It is not force but principle that keeps the Texan from destructive adventures. If he can be restrained by ideals that have no objective embodiment why cannot the same become true of Germany or Japan? What are these self-enforcing principles?

How can we build a supernational code that will be accepted as the moral code is accepted—a code that appeals to self-evident principles as does the Declaration of Independence. It will thus be the code of the school, the church and the press and be as unquestioned as is the multiplication table? The violations will thus become like theft or murder, the sporadic outbursts of individuals suffering from some abnormality. Where they happen we must educate, not punish. If we treat the violators of the super code as wronged and right the wrong before we strive to punish fewer violations of this code would happen than of the civil law. It is the failure to see how great principles would work in practice that creates the present confusion and thus makes for race antagonisms.

1. The first principle of a code of peace is that all decisions should be made by popular vote. The western world claim to be democratic and yet in no nation is democracy trusted. The result is that we have arbitrary decisions made by a class and often by a single person that the people are forced to carry out against their inclinations. Should declarations of war be delayed until ratified by popular vote they would not occur. Popular decisions appeal to human nature and it is the same the world over. It is class decisions that differ and these we must avoid by taking from every class its power to override popular decision.

2. The second principle is equally important. Home rule must accompany popular suffrage to prevent national majorities from oppressing minorities. The antagonisms of race, culture, religion and language could thus be avoided and at the same time the peculiar exigencies of localities would be provided for.

3. The third principle is the freedom of the seas. The ocean is a common heritage that should be in the control of no nation or group. This freedom must be so limited as to enable every nation

to protect its own shores. The recognized three mile limit will not enable this to be done. The controlled zone should be one hundred miles rather than three. Whatever the limit agreed upon, it alone should be the recognized area for warfare either offensive or defensive. If England extends her blockade of Germany one hundred miles from the German coast Germany should be allowed an equal area about England to establish her submarine blockade, and we should claim the same zone for our coast defense. But other parts of the ocean should be open to all on equal terms.

4. The fourth principle is that no nation should be allowed to enact export taxes on raw material. The natural advantages are so unequally distributed that a virtual slavery can be maintained if some world necessity were controlled by one nation or if a group of nations should conspire to control world commerce. Manufactured goods do not come in this class as they can be made anywhere with slight differences in cost.

5. The fifth principle demands a fair distribution of tropical areas among commercial nations. All nations need a tropical region to complement their home trade. Perhaps a third of foreign trade will be of this class. But there is ten times the quantity of tropical land to meet this condition. Cuba could supply the sugar of the world and either Java or Brazil its coffee and spices. Nations now monopolize land they will never use. When land hunger ceases a potent cause of war will be removed.

In regard to these canons of a super code, two questions arise. Would they, if adopted, suffice to uphold world peace and what means have we to encourage their adoption? It must be admitted that sporadic violations of the international code will occur just as lynching takes place within our country. It can, however, be questioned whether these violations would be of grave enough a character to necessitate intervention. All Americans recognize that lynching is a serious evil but most of them also think that the evils of lynching are less than the evils its suppression would impose. Not only would a standing army be necessary, but all our institutions would have to be altered to make such coercion possible. The League to Enforce Peace would find itself in the same position that the suppression of lynching would impose. Without it we should have some local disorder but with it would come a coercion involving far greater evils. Most disorder could be avoided by

the full application of the principle of home rule. What remains better be ignored than suppressed. The evolution of cordial relations may be a slow process but it is the only cure of local antagonism.

The world acceptance of any view can come in one of two ways—progress by influence and progress by struggle. We have had many attempts to bring world unity by force: all of them have failed. America is a great nation, but it is far from that supremacy that would ensure world domination. Should we strive to dictate we merely follow the example of other world empires, waste our resources in useless wars and then sink to the economic impotence that has been the fate of nations greedy for power. No nation can rule, no group of dogmas fit the whole world. Peace must come through the recognition of difference and through the growth of the spirit of toleration. This means progress by influence and example and not by struggle. The world needs not a dictator but some nation that lives up to the super standard and thus shows the possibility of a peaceful progress. Should America become such a people, avoiding the degradation that suspicion and hatred engender we would have a host of imitators. It is our misfortune if not our fault that we no longer hold the high position our fathers held of leading democratic movements. Our sympathies have overridden our reason. Only clear thinking can restore the lost. Fair dealing must replace the growing partiality that recent events have promoted.

The war spirit is an instilled attitude due to the wrong education and not to the natural emotions men inherit. Recent evolution has changed all else but has not yet brought our national ideals in harmony with new conditions. In public affairs we have yet a class rule even in the nations where democracy is nominally supreme. Until the middle and lower classes question the supremacy of the upper class our government will not be a model for world imitation. There is degeneration above to offset the uplift below. When this anomaly is removed peace, good will and coöperation will displace international entanglements.

Our ancestors were aggressive, but it was the aggression of a spontaneous vitality. No outlets for energy were available but in the crude conflicts that revealed personal superiority. Today intense activity has a dozen outlets all superior to that of war.

Achievement, wealth, science and social service drain off the energies and furnish the satisfaction that in cruder ages only combat gave. The effect of war on survival has also changed. Personal strife left the best and removed the incompetent. Gunpowder changed this survival value of war. The personal combat which the sword favored is displaced by long range fighting in which size and vigor are penalized. Corresponding to this change in evolutionary values is a change of motive. Our forebears fought because they loved fighting. They glorified in aggression. Today nations war not for a love of fighting, but for fear of invasion. It is interesting that every nation in the present war regards itself on the defensive. The appeal is to fear and not to glory. Our wars are not therefore a mark of super energy but of the growth of fear motives. And what is fear but degeneration?

This thought leads to the essence of our situation from a physiological viewpoint. We are all familiar with the action of toxins on our system, but we are less familiar with the blood content that increases vigor and thus makes us aggressive and dynamic. As our vitality increases we go out of ourselves in bolder ways and meet our fellows either in coöperation or conflict. Toxins in the blood destroy this aggressive hopefulness, replacing it with depression and fear. When the motive for war becomes fear instead of joyful aggression we may be sure its source is not with an element of normal human nature but with a species of degeneration that affects particular groups. Fear is a class phenomenon, which is transformed into a national attitude by the control which class has over public opinion. Good vigorous blood flowing in the veins of everyone might bring industrial evils through the personal aggression it excites but it would remove the degenerative fears that now overpower our upper class. We can thus cure war even if we cannot remove personal aggression. The one rests on a physical depression which may be avoided while the other has its seat in an imperfectly developed human nature. Heredity has its faults some of which it will be difficult to cure. But the insanity of war is not one of them.

The main thought of this paper is to make clear the difference between two plans to secure world peace: *Peace through force and peace without force*. Peace through victory must of necessity be an enforced peace. The vanquished must be ruled at our expense.

Peace without force means a yielding of the strong, not the submission of the weak. Wrongs must be righted before enforcing claims even though these claims be just. Can we yield to a nation in the wrong and yet promote world justice? This is the test of a peace without victory, of a world not coerced by force. It is not the insistence on our rights but on our neighbors' wrongs that makes for world betterment. Nations are often unruly, emotional and stubborn, but they need forgiveness more than punishment. In local affairs we may let the majority dictate, but liberty should be our guide in world decisions. Toleration is more moral than right, more luminous than truth, a sounder principle than justice and more divine than retribution. Without it no democracy can exist. Its basis is a peace that endures because it is loved. Battleships and machine guns cannot do what simpler forces do through the radiating influence of comradeship and good will.

## PAX AMERICANA

BY GEORGE W. KIRCHWEY, LL.D.,

President of the American Peace Society.

The League to Enforce Peace has sprung full-armed from the brain of Woodrow Wilson. While the immediate occasion of our entry into the world war is "the reckless and lawless submarine warfare" which the German government has been waging against American commerce and the lives of our citizens, its purpose is declared by the President to be

to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

And again, in the same noble utterance from which this declaration is taken, he says:

We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.



Now it would be a mistake to interpret these declarations and, with them, all the other notable utterances of the address to the Congress, in a literal sense. The President is in expression distinctly a man of letters, and, as Matthew Arnold says of the Bible, "to understand that the language" employed "is fluid, passing and literary, not rigid, fixed and scientific, is the first step toward a right understanding." But it would be a greater mistake to dismiss the whole matter as "mere literature" and to assume that the war to which we were committed on the evening of April 2 has any but a historical connection with the defensive program launched on March 4. To say, as we well may, that the one is the germ of the other, does not limit the war that is, either in scope or purpose, to the war contemplated a month earlier. It is clear that the President's purpose enlarged portentously in the few weeks that intervened between the two events—not as the result of external happenings (there had been no new "overt act" of special significance; the German submarine warfare was neither better nor worse than it had been) but as the result of a new orientation of the President's mind. During that fateful month the long roll of wrongs suffered by us and by other neutral powers presented themselves no longer as individual acts of aggression, reluctantly committed under the lash of necessity, but as the unfolding of the hostile purpose of an autocratic military power waging "warfare against mankind." "Peace without victory" is now seen to be impossible. Our country must "exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German empire to terms and end the war."

To what extent this growing purpose of the President has been shared by the American people, it would be vain to inquire. It had long been held by a small but influential section of the community, the majority of the "intellectuals," the professional classes and the leading newspapers. The great mass of the population, indifferent or reluctant from the beginning, has probably remained unconvinced to the end. But the end has come and it is safe to assume that the President's purpose is today the nation's purpose and that we are in the war not merely to protect our commerce and the lives of our citizens, but also to end the war which the German government is waging on mankind and, by coöperation with the governments now at war with Germany, to bring that government to terms.

In saying this I am not unmindful of the fact that the Congress,

clearly representing the weight of public opinion of the country at large, has accepted, not willed, the war, and that only a small minority of either House put the seal of its approval on the wider purpose declared by the President. A considerable number of the members who voted for war emphatically repudiated any motive but that of vindicating American right against German aggression and a large majority gave this as their only reason for so voting. But when the war-making power has once been placed in the President's hands it is certain that its course will be determined by his purpose and not by the reserves and hesitations of those who entrusted it to him. Indeed, as every reader of history knows, wars have a way of taking their own course without much respect for the intentions of those who set them in motion. If there is anyone, in or out of Congress, who still believes that Germany's submarine warfare is today the vital issue between the two countries and that the Imperial government could still by abandoning that warfare make peace with the United States, the course of events in Washington during the past two weeks<sup>1</sup> should undeceive him. We are not waging a separate warfare against Germany. Whether, as a people, we willed it or not, we are in the war and we are in it to the end. The only peace that we can now consider is a general peace that will make the world safe for democracy. For better or for worse, Woodrow Wilson has given the United States a new world policy.

If I am correct in this interpretation of the situation, two facts of momentous significance in their bearing on our national life and well-being as well as upon the future course of world-history come into view. The first is this: that for the first time in human history a great nation has gone to war, has pledged all its power and resources, has staked its very existence for a purely ideal end. As the President has truly said, "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nation can make them." I say this is an unprecedented event, and for that reason bound to be misunderstood. We may well believe that the German government was taken by surprise, when her inspired organs cry out, "Never before has a nation gone to war without cause or for such a cause."

<sup>1</sup> Written in April, 1917.

In the second place, our entry into the war "for such a cause" marks the abandonment of our traditional and cherished policy of isolation and independence of world politics. Not at the close of the Civil War, not as the result of the Spanish War, but today has the United States become a part of the international system. No American will undervalue the advantages which that policy of proud isolation has conferred on humanity, or will see it pass wholly without regret. It has given security from foreign aggression to half a world. It has quarantined us against the fatal disease of militarism. It has made possible the growth to plenitude of power and prosperity of the greatest and most pacific democracy that the world has ever seen and has thus fitted it for the greater rôle which it has now assumed. But it has been a selfish policy, not less selfish—if less mischievous and hateful—than the predatory policy of the powers from whom it has kept us aloof. It has given us peace, but it has been the peace of Cain—"Am I my brother's keeper?" We have kept out of war ourselves, but we have done nothing to keep other nations out of war. We have generally observed justice in our dealings with other nations, but we have been unperturbed and undismayed by the spectacle of injustice under which other peoples have been made to suffer. We have kept ourselves free from entangling alliances, but we have made no effort to substitute for the fatal balance of power in Europe and the Orient a true concert of nations based on mutual respect, forbearance and good-will. In those fatal days when Europe was hastening to her doom, when Belgium was meeting her unmerited fate, we raised neither hand nor voice to stay the outrage. Alike in our commercial and in our foreign policy, we have claimed the advantages, while repudiating the responsibilities, of the coöperative commonwealth of the nations. Worst of all, this policy of aloofness has bred in us a certain complacency and unadventurousness which has led us to conceive of international peace as a negative, static condition, a kind of Nirvana, to be attained by folding the hands over the navel and keeping the eyes closed in contemplation, rather than as a high constructive policy to be achieved in danger by infinite effort and sacrifice.

At this point grave questions, sharp as the spear of Ithuriel, thrust themselves upon us. Is the issue between autocracy and democracy, between civilization and barbarism so clear in the present struggle that we could not refuse to take up the gage of battle?

Is war the only way, is it the best way, for our great, pacific democracy to champion the imperilled rights of mankind and strive for a better world order? On these questions, on which the sentiment of our people is so passionately divided, I express no opinion. They belong to a past which is already beginning to seem remote, and cannot be heard in the House of the Interpreter. But the Interpreter may surely be heard to say that if war is ever justifiable it is doubly justified when waged not for selfish ends but for the common weal, and that it is unworthy of a great people to withdraw itself in monkish isolation from a wretched world struggling in the twilight of the gods toward order, peace and justice. There is something that tells us that, for nations as for individuals, when great issues are at stake, it is better to live dangerously yet fearlessly than to live safely; that in a world in which lawless violence is rewarded with power, "Right forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne," it is shameful to avoid the struggle and live at ease.

Thus far our commitment is only for the present war. The President, indeed, makes us partners in a "League of Honor," and declares that we shall fight "for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." But may we not say that this is the language of aspiration, not a definite, political program to which we are asked to commit ourselves? What it points to is not a formal League of Nations pledged to maintain peace among themselves, such as is outlined in the Bryce plan in England or in the program of our own League to Enforce Peace, but "a partnership of opinion," "a concert of purpose and of action amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world." In so far as the purpose here adumbrated transcends the issues of the present war, it seems to call rather for a spiritual partnership of the democratic peoples than a league of democratic powers committed to joint action against an aggressor. To such a "league of honor" we should be glad to commit ourselves even though it should in some fateful hour again offer us the dreadful choice of war to vindicate the principles of peace and justice against selfish and autocratic power. Further than this we are not likely to go until true democracy rules the nations from the Baltic to the Golden Horn.

Limiting our view, then, to the present war and its issues, what

is the service that the high and disinterested purpose which we have avowed demands of us?

It requires, in the first place, that we shall wage the war nobly, generously and without bitterness. As the President has said, "We act without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them." As we are without fear, we can afford to leave the foul and corroding passion of hate to "the lesser breeds without the law" or to those who fight blindly and madly for national existence.

In the second place, as we fight only for the security of the nations against lawless aggression, our fight will be over as soon as that security has been attained, whether by crushing victory or by the voluntary submission of the enemy. We have not gone to war to serve the purposes of the Allies save in so far as those purposes are ours. It would be a kind of madness as well as a betrayal of our democracy for our government to become a full partner of the Entente Allies and bind itself not to make a separate peace. There is no danger that the President will propose or that the Senate would ratify such an arrangement.

In the third place, our government should not only withdraw from the war but should use all its influence to bring the war to a conclusion as soon as, in its opinion, a just and durable peace can be secured. We are fighting for a world-peace, not for a world-truce, and we cannot lend ourselves to terms of settlement which, because of their harsh or oppressive character, will have in them the seeds of future wars. It is clear that our purpose to bring peace and security to the world will not be achieved until Belgium, France and Serbia have been completely emancipated from foreign dominion and restored to the condition in which they were before the storm of war was let loose on them, but is anyone bold enough to assert that we should fight for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, or to establish the Russians in Constantinople, or to place Albania under the heel of Italy, or to force a democratic régime on the Central Empires? It is not thus that the incubus of autocratic militarism that now rests upon the world can be destroyed.

In the fourth place, we should insist now, as the price of our active participation in the general war, that the Allies shall bind themselves to join with us in the creation of a true society of nations, from which no power, small or great, whether now friendly or hostile,

shall be excluded, and which shall be based on the general acceptance of the "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations" adopted by the American Institute of International Law, January 6, 1916, and of the principles of peaceful adjustment and judicial settlement of international disputes, as set forth in the "Recommendations of Havana," adopted by the same body of international jurists, January 22, 1917. What may well be regarded as a minimum program on which we shall insist is:

1. The convocation of a third Hague Conference immediately after the close of the war—the conference to assume a permanent character, meeting at regular, stated periods, under general regulations having the force of international law.

2. The formation of a judicial union of the nations by a convention pledging the good faith of each of them to submit their justiciable disputes to a permanent court of the union and to submit to the findings of such court.

3. The creation of an international council of conciliation to which the nations shall bind themselves to submit such questions of a non-justiciable character as may not have been settled by negotiation.

Whether the nations shall go further and establish a League to Enforce Peace by military power either among themselves or against the insolent pretensions of aggressive powers not of their number, must, I conceive, be left to the future to determine. Personally I do not believe that the world is yet ripe for such a consummation.

And, lastly, we must wage the war for democracy and the security of peace and justice at home as well as abroad. For the enemy, the selfish spirit of autocracy that lives by force and aggression is here in our midst as well as in Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople. As Galsworthy has recently reminded us, "The Prussian junker is but a specially favored variety of a well-marked type that grows in every land. And the business of other men is to keep circumstances from being favorable to its development and ascendancy." But this statement, true as it is, is not the full measure of the danger that menaces our democracy. A latent junker sleeps in most of us, and war is the congenial climate in which he thrives and, in an evil hour, takes command over the better, the more humane and reasonable, the more democratic part of us. We enter upon the war with the loftiest aims that ever inspired a nation in arms. The spirit of nationalism which makes us a united people and therefore capable both of feeling deeply and of realizing nobly those aims, is at the same time the opportunity of the autocrat, the jingo, of all

those incapable of fighting for an ideal loftier than self-interest or national power or the glory of conquest. It is against these in our own land, in our own blood—that we must strive in order that we may preserve and bring to prevail America's unique contribution to the welfare of the world.

And here we reach the height of the great argument. I have spoken of the high spirit of disinterestedness that has carried us into the war. But that should not surprise us nor anyone, friend or enemy, that knows us. As a recent writer has said:

The truth is that the United States is the only high-minded Power left in the world. It is the only strong nation that has not entered on a career of imperial conquest, and does not want to enter on it. If the nations of Europe had entertained purposes as disinterested as those of the United States they would not now be engaged in this butchery. There is in America little of that spirit of selfish aggression which lies at the heart of militarism. Here alone exists a broad basis for "a new passionate sense of brotherhood, and a new scale of human values." We have a deep abhorrence of war for war's sake; we are not enamored of glamour or glory. We have a strong faith in the principle of self-government. We do not care to dominate alien peoples, white or colored; we do not aspire to be the Romans of tomorrow or the "masters of the world." The idealism of Americans centers in the future of America, wherein we hope to work out those principles of liberty and democracy to which we are committed. . . . This political idealism, this strain of pacifism, this abstinence from aggression and desire to be left alone to work out our own destiny, has been manifest from the birth of the republic. We have not always followed our light, but we have never been utterly faithless to it.<sup>1</sup>

When such a people goes to war the act presents itself either as a great betrayal or as a sublime fulfilment, and the nations today and history tomorrow—not by our words but by our deeds—will judge us. What will be required of us is not victory—though for victory we must mightily strive—but fidelity to the principles that have made us a name among peoples. Victory achieved through the defeat of those principles will itself be defeat, however great the material triumph.

Shall we be able to keep our ideals unimpaired in this new old-world—this world of storm and stress, of militant wrong and triumphant power—in which we have now elected to play our part? To make war only when we must and then not for selfish ends but only for the common weal? To keep and strengthen justice and democracy at home even while we strive for democracy and justice abroad? To dream no dream of empire, to see no alluring vision of

<sup>1</sup> Roland Hugins, *The Possible Peace*, New York, 1916.

power but the vision of a world made safe for democracy and secured against outrage by the united will of enfranchised peoples? I do not know. But this I know, that the days of our cloistered virtue are well lost and that we cannot refuse the great adventure even though we gain the whole world and lose our own soul. And this, too, I know, that the greatest disaster that could befall mankind is not the sum of human misery which such a war as this brings in its train, nor yet the shameful legacy of hate and fear and mistrust that it leaves behind it, but the loss to humanity of those ideals of democracy, justice and peace which our Republic has represented in an evil world. And this, too, I know, that it rests wholly with us to keep our democracy true to the line marked out for it in Washington's farewell address:

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . It will be worthy of a free, enlightened and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.



## THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT AMERICA MUST CHAMPION

BY ROLAND G. USHER, PH.D.,

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The question of America's obligation to defend international right raises no less significant an issue than the cause of the war between the United States and Germany and its justifiability. It is a question either of the utmost simplicity or one of almost insoluble complexity, a subject upon which a difference of opinion is hardly conceivable or one upon which agreement becomes almost improbable. While I do not labor under the delusion that many people believe this question to be simple, I know that many people do regard it as relatively easy to decide and that they reach a decision in the light of what I believe to be prejudgments, preconceptions, and even prejudices. Our chief obligation in the study of international right and of the measures necessary to be taken by the United States in its defense is to study it from the point of view of American interests.

Our conclusion, indeed, will be no better than our premises are valid. If the vital element in our supposed judgment be a profound dislike for Germany, an unspoken and unconscious attachment for France, horror over the invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the *Lusitania*, we shall project into the issue of international right the question of the right and wrong of the war itself, of the validity of Pan-Germanism, of Schrecklichkeit. Immediate and positive conclusions we shall produce but conclusions not to be confused with logic, evidence and history. With such impulses, the immense majority in this country seem to me to approach the question of America's obligation to defend international right, and upon such grounds they affirm or deny the justifiability of our entrance into the war. America's obligation to beat Germany, America's obligation to express horror for Belgium and the *Lusitania*, America's obligation to preserve a technical neutrality by exporting no more munitions, America's obligation to compel England as well as Germany to observe international law—none of these proceeds from

a real investigation of America's obligation as the defender of international right. Each and all assume the conclusion as the premise. They prejudge the issue on the basis of other circumstances than those of law, history and diplomacy. I trust that I shall escape the designation of pro-German as the result of these statements. I once wrote a book not too well liked in Germany and have advocated constantly coöperation between the United States and Great Britain, which I hope is already a reality, but I have sought always to advance definite reasons based upon a study of American history, American democracy and American economic interests. We must see the war in the light of American interests, not define American interests in terms of the European struggle, if we are to understand the true significance of our entry into the conflict.

From another point of view a large body of well-intentioned, but I am afraid zealously misdirected people, prejudge the issue. Theoretically the internationalist is a cosmopolite, a citizen of the world at large. In his vocabulary there is no such word as patriotism; for him nationality has no meaning; he is the true man without a country. I will yield to no man in the firmness of my conviction of the blessings of peace and of the horrors of war; I believe strongly that international organization is desirable and that international tribunals and courts can achieve at present valuable results, but I am not yet ready to place peace before patriotism, nor an international court before my devotion to the creed of Washington and of Lincoln, to those intangible impulses which beat within me at the sight of our flag on the docks at Liverpool in August, 1914. America's obligation must be couched for me in terms of patriotism or it has for me no meaning, no obligation. We must attain internationalism and peace through patriotism and nationality and not at their expense.

The question, indeed, of America's obligation as the defender of international right is to me less one of evidence than of logic, less one of immutable facts than of principles. What we mean by international right depends upon our conception of international law which itself must be the logical result of our conception of the international world. That in turn involves our notion of sovereignty and dependency, which can themselves be made concrete and practical only by discoverable tests whereby the reality of sovereignty may be ascertained in particular cases. Our notion of obligation

necessarily depends upon our conception of ethics, of morality, of crowd psychology, upon our opinions regarding the justifiability of war, the necessity of peace, and the character of international organization needed to achieve it. Nor shall we reach any understandable conclusion without delving deep into the relation between individualist ethics and the ethics of nations, without in some way defining ethics itself and its relation to history, diplomacy and law. This question is no hard and fast legal abstraction consisting merely of the application of admitted legal premises to a definite ascertainable set of facts, but an issue whose terms are as yet vehemently discussed and which is itself partly historical, partly diplomatic, partly juristic, partly ethical; an issue as broad as the field of human learning, as deep as the past of the race, as significant as its future.

The true difficulty of the question seems to lie in the disagreement of statesmen, diplomats, historians and lawyers in different nations, and in the same nation, upon the facts which underlie the situation and upon the meaning and validity of its most fundamental postulates. Diplomats and statesmen on the one hand and international lawyers and textbook writers on the other disagree widely upon no less significant and basic conceptions than the character, nature and scope of international law. The former deny that in a proper sense of the words there is any such thing. The latter more vehemently affirm its existence. The definite precepts of such a law naturally emerge from the hands of the two schools in very different condition, while the interpretation and application of the few precepts apparently acceptable to both have caused wide divergence of opinion.

The great powers of Europe apparently admit the existence of a certain international code in theory, but seem to proceed in practice upon a widely different code. International rights are in controversy between the belligerents themselves, and neutrals are not entirely agreed as to what they are. Belligerents disagree with neutrals; some with all neutrals, others with most. Great Britain and France, our new Allies, to say nothing of Germany, dissent from basic propositions upheld by the United States and declare their version to be demonstrable by our own diplomatic practice and from the decision of our own admiralty courts. The controversy, indeed, ranges over so wide a field and the points controverted are so exceedingly

fundamental and the controversy about them is so very general as to demonstrate beyond all peradventure the fact that, if there is any truth about this subject, men are not agreed as to what it is.

The controversialists not unnaturally take widely different views of history and of diplomacy. The American interpretation of rights on the high seas which the President has championed rests quite obviously upon the assumption that the seas were free in time of peace and were free in time of war until the German submarine warfare closed them. The Germans retort that this is the English view, that the freedom of the seas is a fiction and neither exists nor has existed in time of peace nor at any other time. Merely because the British have seen fit to allow most nations to use the seas with considerable freedom does not in the least demonstrate that those nations possess privileges guaranteed by international law. They receive them from Great Britain and do not retain them longer than Great Britain is willing to concede them. The facts of the war prove to the Germans that the British themselves closed the seas, that their action was unwarrantable, and that the Germans are protesting against it as much in our interest as in their own. It will be obvious that the question of fact whether or not the seas were free at any time is vital to a decision as to their present condition and the responsibility of Germany in regard to it, and to the obligation of the United States as a defender of international right. The issue here is not one of law but one of history and comprehends not merely the history of the last three years but of the last three centuries.

But we shall be blind if we deny that what men believe to be facts is as potent as the truth itself in governing men's actions. The popular attitude and decision upon these great issues is one of vital consequence which must not be forgotten in an inquiry of this sort. Part of our task is to learn whether or not the popular decision proceeds from sentiment, prejudice, preconception, or self-interest. We must seek to understand it because it may not be within our power to control it. It seems to be true that the popular mind in the United States accepts practically without hesitation or reservation the international law espoused by the more radical theorists as a law of superior obligation which no nation may break without incurring a penalty which the nation injured has a right to exact and which is expressly sanctioned by the law itself. While sovereignty is in the popular mind a vague conception, there is no real hesitancy

in admitting that Great Britain, Turkey and Denmark are all sovereign nations, all equally sovereign, entitled to equal rights under the international code. There is again a general feeling that the defense of weak and small nations must be led by the United States at all costs, because we are better situated to defend the integrity of international law than are the nations of Europe. Of our power to achieve something of moment if we choose, the popular mind has not the slightest doubt. It thinks of the United States today apparently as the world's money power and, therefore, indispensable and all important, as the world's chief industrial nation, as the world's richest nation. Our invulnerability, our military prowess, our naval power, the public accepts as beyond dispute.

This view of the situation does not seem to me sustained by the more conservative and accurate study of history, diplomacy and jurisprudence, if the men whose reputations as scholars were great before the war broke out are to be depended upon as authorities. It seems to me further to be widely at variance with what the great powers of Europe find practicable to observe or possible to concede. These seem to consider the international community to be composed, not of some fifty odd nations, but of the six European powers and Japan, who are not themselves sovereign but very nearly so. The other so called nations are either actually sovereign like the United States and the South American countries, but not integral parts of the international fabric, or they are semi-dependent and dependent nations which are ruled by the great powers in conference. International law as observed and practiced consists of the privileges which the six European powers mutually extend each other and of the obligations which they recognize as binding between themselves, and, in addition, of all such privileges and immunities as they voluntarily extend the other nations and of the practices and concessions which they exact from them. It is above all a voluntary code, exceedingly flexible, brief, practical, and not in the least regarded as a law of superior obligation so far as the six powers are concerned. It is obligatory definitely enough upon the semi-dependent and dependent states.

This international system furthermore is primarily a law of peace in the sense of a law binding so long as the six powers are at peace with each other. A war between them suspends its operation and brings into prominence a very different set of privileges and obli-

gations, much more elastic, much less charitable. The great powers definitely maintain that the circumstances of war do alter international relationships, obligations, duties, rights and privileges for all members of the international community, whether belligerents or not. The practical basis of this conception lies in the difficulty and practical impossibility of assuring each other in time of war the courtesies and concessions common during peace, and of insuring neutral nations in practice the privileges which the powers are entirely willing to yield them in time of peace. Privileges in international law are treated by the great powers at all times not as questions of right or of law but as questions of feasibility and expediency.

We must as scholars be clear upon the point that if we have gone to war with Germany to achieve recognition of certain technical rights at sea, of certain technical rules about visit and search, to obtain certain guarantees for the protection of American lives on the high seas, or even to maintain a certain view of international law which has continually found expression in our diplomatic papers, we have gone to the assistance of powers who decline quite as firmly as Germany to accept these general principles and their specific application to their own relations with the United States. We shall be apparently accepting the system itself and be losing what we are fighting to win. Let us as scholars again acknowledge what most European diplomats believe to be true.

The result of this system is to define America's rights and America's obligations in the terms of European interests, and to place the decision in the hands of the six European powers acting in concert. We have in practice enjoyed such privileges as they have voluntarily yielded us. We have, with objections more or less violent and with protestations more or less loud, been compelled to accept their version of our obligations toward them. Some points they have not felt it worth while to insist upon, others they have demanded and secured. Some concessions we have felt worth war, but we have usually failed to make our point. Nevertheless in time of peace we have had little to complain of. They have sought to be magnanimous; they have even succeeded in being generous. The Monroe Doctrine they have never explicitly challenged and its general spirit they have voluntarily observed, though we have never at any time been in a position to compel its observance. Specific rights at sea, such as are at present in question, we have

commonly enjoyed though we have never been in a position to exact them. Our specific difficulties are merely the concrete evidence of the fact that we are not represented effectively in the councils in which the real decisions are made and that we are not yet sufficiently indispensable as an economic factor of the world, not even with all the changes the war has produced, to make concessions vital to us vital for them to grant.

If we entered the war against Germany purely on technical grounds, we have stultified ourselves. But we did nothing of the kind. We entered the war to change the system itself which has produced the technicalities and disabilities from which we have suffered. We have entered the war against the power which proposes to continue the old order, the old logic, the old ethics and the old diplomacy, and we have joined hands with those powers who have striven in arms for three years to create a new international order based not upon autocracy but upon democracy, upon the rule of armies and of diplomats by the people instead of by kings. We have entered the war in a fight for principles not for technicalities or details.

The international right America must champion is the right to be consulted, the right to be considered in deciding the basic and fundamental elements in the international problem, the right to insist that the international horizon shall be so broadened as to include not only the affairs of Europe but those of America, Africa and Asia. We are insisting that the definition of international right shall be international in scope and international in purpose; that it shall attempt to advance the interests of all nations so far as is mutually advantageous. It will define international interests in general in terms not exclusively European, nor governed by considerations based upon the European balance of power and the exigencies of European national policies. The principle itself is the vital thing; that the United States is a necessary element of the international community to be consulted in all affairs of significance. This fact we must maintain and this fact we must defend.

The immediate obligation of the United States then is to achieve something practical, effective, immediate toward securing some admission by the great powers that the affairs of the world will no longer be decided primarily on the basis of European politics. But we shall be entirely unwise to insist upon the recognition of this

principle in any particular way or upon the formation of any particular type of new international organization to replace the old. To achieve the theoretical end at least of the present system, to unmask it and show it in all the nakedness of its fictitious internationalism will be an achievement of extraordinary moment. With that, at present, the United States may well rest satisfied. To insist that the six great powers shall abdicate in some formal way is to demand that they humiliate themselves, recognize publicly that they have been living in sin; publicly impose a stain upon their honor. To expect again to secure the recognition by the great powers of the equality of all the apparently independent states of the present world is to ask a change so sweeping that it has no chance of acceptance, to sacrifice a great scheme by attaching impossible conditions. What kind of an international council is created after the war, what type of court, how much of the theorists' code of international law will be conceded to be of practical application, are all matters of relative indifference. We should be more than satisfied with the explicit pledge of a new order given by the British Premier at the American luncheon in London on April 12, 1917.

I also say that I can see more in the knowledge that America is going to win a right to be at the conference table when the terms of peace are discussed. That conference will settle the destiny of nations and the course of human life for God knows how many ages. It would have been a tragedy, a tragedy for mankind, if America had not been there and there with all her influence and her power.<sup>1</sup>

But it is essential that the foundations of the new order should be laid in democracy and the rule of the people, in humanity, justice and right, as those great words have been understood by centuries of Christians. For the cause of the German people there is much to be said; their difficulties and troubles during the régime of the old diplomacy were certainly many and grievous. But the United States cannot admit that the international balance can today be adjusted by the continuation of the old disregard of morality and of law or accept the dictum that patriotism justifies brutal and inhuman acts and policies. A certain clearing of the ground upon which the new order is to be built has become essential. Autocracy, secret diplomacy, Schrecklichkeit, cumber the new site and must be removed. To assist in that task we are now pledged that the work of America in the defense of international right may be effective and

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd George, April 12, 1917.



permanent. For the future, for our posterity, for that greater majority of Americans yet to be born, scarcely any work could be more essential, more glorious.

But the only effective guarantee of a new order will be the prompt, efficient, decisive participation of the United States in the world conflict. We are now to demonstrate our equality, to prove our title to consideration as a sovereign among sovereigns. International status, as the great powers have observed it, has depended primarily on the ability of a nation to cast a decisive influence into the international scale. That we would some day be capable of far-reaching influence was appreciated in 1823; but that the new world is now able to redress the balance of the old has not yet been conceded in Europe. In Germany they sneer and dare us to do our worst, confident in the tradition of our unpreparedness, isolation, impotence; in Great Britain and France, they believe and trust and hope but with the fear that perhaps as yet we may not be able to demonstrate that we are capable of that type of sustained organized effort expected of first-class powers. Upon our decisive influence, upon the war itself depends our international status in the immediate future; upon the demonstration of our equality of status depends the creation of a new international order truly international and non-European, for the new state must contain at least one non-European power whose efficiency and power is beyond dispute equal to that of any of the older powers—the United States must achieve that the new internationalism may be realized.

What then becomes the bounden duty of the United States in the defense of international right? The prompt and successful prosecution of the war, efficient and decisive aid to the Allies, achieved by a great army based upon universal service, by a new merchant marine of small wooden ships, by an extension of the munitions industry, by the mobilization of our agricultural and industrial resources. America's defense of international right is no longer an academic question of law, history and diplomacy. The days of the diplomat are past, the day of the soldier, of the sailor, of the skilled machinist, of the farmer has come. We have followed the counsel of Washington. We have raised a standard to which the wise and honest can repair.

## NEUTRAL RIGHTS UPON THE SEAS

BY FREDERIC R. COUDERT,  
New York.

Mankind is ever prone to be the victim of phrases, and as the march of democracy progresses and the rule of the newspaper is substituted in the non-Teutonic world for the rule of the sword, men ever grow more susceptible to word formulas.

Since the beginning of this war much has been said about the "Freedom of the Seas." No one has defined the term with precision and nearly everybody seems to have been content to discuss it without a definition. It is not a technical phrase. It has never been defined either in law or in politics, and like all phrases relating to freedom, the latitude of interpretation is a wide one. It appears to have conjured up different images at different epochs. When Grotius wrote *Mare Liberum* the freedom which he contemplated was the freedom from the dominion of the Portuguese who claimed to exercise sovereignty over great portions of the ocean. The Portuguese claim died a natural death with the evanescence of Portuguese power. The declaration of Alexander VI dividing the world between Spain and Portugal now seems grotesque, but had its value in lessening conflicts on land and sea. Like the Portuguese claims it has passed away as one of the curios of history.

In the eighteenth century, restrictive navigation laws preventing trade by foreigners with Spanish, French or English colonies were the subject of considerable international discussion. These laws then seemed to men to interfere with the natural course of foreign trade and the term "Freedom of the Seas" as then used must be read in relation to them. With the American Revolution and the destruction of the domination of Spain in South America these old navigation laws disappeared, and possess today mere historic interest. During the War of 1812 the American slogan was *free trade and sailors' rights*; free trade not meaning absence of a protective tariff, but rather freedom of the neutrals to trade upon the high seas subject only to the usual exercise of belligerent rights and unmolested by visitation of their ships for the removal of alleged British subjects.

The open sea is now free to the vessels of all nations. In times of peace, Germany, which now clamors so loudly for the freedom of the seas, found markets the world over and successfully competed with Great Britain and France in every port of the world, building up in an incredibly short time a great merchant fleet.

The phrase in the minds of international lawyers really means but one thing. In time of war it has always been recognized that belligerents possess certain rights to interfere with neutral goods and neutral ships upon the high seas. These rights, with the lapse of time, and with the growth of nations, became more or less definitely fixed. It was in defense of neutral rights that the War of 1812 was fought and it was in defense of neutral rights that the series of reprisals between France and the United States from 1797 to 1800 took place.

The general principles of the freedom of the seas used in this, the only accurate sense in which it can be used, are simple. The belligerent has the right to blockade all the ports of his enemy, thus cutting off egress and ingress. Such blockade must not be a mere pretext enabling him occasionally to seize vessels on the high seas, but must be really effective. This is a rule of common sense, as a paper blockade would be vexatious and indecisive. Sea commerce is necessary to the life of enemy countries. Nations possessing sea power would be at a great disadvantage were it not possible to use this power to cut off the trade of those nations having preponderant military power. Thus, in addition to blockade, there is the law of contraband. A belligerent may visit and search neutral ships in order to discover whether they are bringing to the enemy materials useful or available for war purposes. The principle was ever simple; the application difficult, for there was no general consensus as to the list of articles constituting contraband. Early treaties between France, Great Britain, Spain and Holland endeavored, but always unsatisfactorily, to agree upon the list; provisions were sometimes included; gun powder, guns and things immediately useful in war were always included. Lists rapidly became obsolete with changes in warfare and there being no international body capable of fixing definitely such list, each nation declared contraband that which it wished to prevent being carried to the enemy. The neutrals naturally opposed the extension of the list, the bellig-

erent as naturally desired to extend it. This conflict in interests is inevitable.

The Declaration of London endeavored to fix a happy solution. The list contained the three classes:

1. Those things useful in war.
2. Things useful in time of both peace and war, and
3. Things only useful for peaceful purposes.

The declaration was not adopted by the nations and Germany and the Entente Powers have kept adding to their list of contraband until almost every article is included. The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has, owing to the militarization of total populations, broken down in practice. Old principles have been applied to new situations, and the result has been admittedly vexatious to the neutrals. These changes in conditions have justified the application of the old principles to cases in which they would formerly have been inapplicable. It would have been absurd to have allowed goods to pass freely from Holland or Scandinavia into Germany on the ground that these ports were thereby blockaded. To have so held would have been a practical abrogation of the right of blockade. Precedent was found in the practices employed by the United States during the Civil War and sanctioned by the supreme court notably in the cases of *The Springbok*, *The Peterhoff* and others.

Of late years there has been a movement to establish freedom of private property on the high seas and to prescribe that enemy property shall no longer be the subject of destruction. None of these plans, however, contemplates the abolition of blockade and contraband; hence, they are really of little more than academic value or interest. While the belligerents may extend contraband lists at will, it is useless to discuss the immunity of private property on the high seas.

Recent events have demonstrated how little value attaches to private property in districts occupied by an enemy. Aside from intentional and lawless destruction, requisitions made upon the hapless inhabitants quickly destroy all value that their property may have. The inhabitants of northern France and Belgium may still have a theoretical right to the lands upon which they live, but this right is little more than academic; they have been ruthlessly

cut off from all means of livelihood, and in many cases they themselves have been deported.

Until the nations can reach some definite agreement, like the Declaration of London, and provide some force back of it, the conceptions of blockade and contraband will seriously interfere, as they have always done, with neutral rights. There will always be irreconcilable differences of opinion based upon divergence of interest between belligerent and neutral.

There are, however, certain other limitations upon even the freedom of the seas as understood by the law of nations. These limitations are of a humanitarian character, and up to the present conflict have been very generally respected. The destruction of ships without preliminary visit and search is without basis in law and can have no justification. The plea of a nation employing it that it is battling for the freedom of the seas is not devoid of elements of humor.

But what of the future? What does the President of the United States mean when he speaks of the "Freedom of the Seas"? Is it an almost impossible iridescent dream, or may something be done so to safeguard future rights of neutrals that the seas will be open to trade free from blockade and contraband? This will depend upon whether some sort of world reorganization takes place. So long as the existing situation continues it will be impossible to obtain satisfactory guarantees for neutrals, nor am I sure that this is desirable. Modern invention has brought the nations of the world so close together that none of them can afford to remain indifferent to any great conflict; such conflict must now too deeply affect their interests to permit of an attitude of aloofness.

The present rules of the sea in times of war are derivatives from the existing system of independent nations, each theoretically equal and subject to no higher law. I believe this system to be in gradual process of disappearance. Some great combination of the nations will take place, and provision will be made for declaring outlaw the nations violating the world's peace. In that event, there will be a trusteeship of sea power, and the enlightened nations of the world forming some combination will deal with the offending nation as the police deal with the burglar. No question of belligerent rights can then arise.

This day may not be so far distant as we now think, for the world war is largely changing the mental outlook of vast masses

of people. America will doubtless wish to take part in some great movement which, by creating a better world system, will eliminate the old differences and dangers to the peaceful neutral and will lead to a new "Freedom of the Seas," guaranteed not by phrases without force, but by the trusteeship of the sea power of the great enlightened democracies of the future.

It is, perhaps, such a "Freedom of the Seas" that the President of the United States had in his mind in his eloquent address to the Senate on a League of Peace designed to create a new and a better international condition.

The United States will be forced by circumstances out of its supposed isolation and must take active part with the great powers of Europe in establishing the world's destiny. Some arrangement with the democracies of France, Great Britain and, perhaps, Russia for the settlement of the innumerable international disputes growing out of trade rivalries and undeveloped territory must be made. This is the work of the immediate future. Some trusteeship of land and sea power, for the promotion of peaceful relations among the nations of the world, must ultimately be found, as existing law does not and cannot furnish the basis for the settlement of future controversies; such a combination or super-alliance must busy itself with the formulation of a policy. This policy must include the recognition of the duties as well as the rights involved in the *Monroe Doctrine*, and proper provision for the maintenance of the *Open Door* in the East and elsewhere among economically and politically inferior people. The attempt made by European powers after 1815, which resulted so unfortunately in the Holy Alliance, must be renewed on a broader, sounder basis. In such an arrangement, America must willingly, and for the protection of its own interests, play a great, if not a predominant, part.

Freedom of the seas has been talked about by a great many people, mainly by the people who apologized for making the land free for spoliation and assassination. The gentle Prussians who so amiably shoot civilians right and left in France and Belgium and who deport women are quite given to talking of the freedom of the seas and of arraigning so-called British navalism. Of course, these arguments do not carry great weight. What the German advocates really object to is the great naval power of Great Britain, and they will object still more when our own naval power, pretty effec-

tive in its own way, is added, and takes upon itself the task of restraining a great war-mad autoocracy which, if left free on the sea to obtain needful supplies from the neutral world, would after half a century of preparation have been able to exterminate all the populations that they did not like and thus Prussianize the world. That is what they meant by a free sea—one upon which their plans cannot be frustrated.

And so, indeed, they might have carried out to completion their procedure in France and elsewhere in the world if their idea of a free sea, a sea on which maritime powers like Great Britain and the United States could not possibly act effectively, had been the law. Fortunately, it was not the law. Men have decreed a long time since that war might be carried on upon the sea as upon the land, and so, indeed, it has been; and if there be any real Americans remaining in the United States to whom the spectre of British navalism, so fostered by the German propaganda, means anything, I would like them to judge the matter intelligently, not from the standpoint of prize court decisions, but rather from the standpoint of history.

On two great occasions in the last hundred years or so, British navalism has saved the continent of Europe. In the first place from the domination of Napoleon. In many respects I sympathize with the aspirations with which Napoleon began on his career, and we must not forget that wherever the eagles went he carried his great code. But, as Seeley says, after 1807 the aspirations of the revolution were satisfied in France, they had run their natural limit in Europe, and Napoleon's ambitions had become personal and selfish. Then it was that British navalism prevented a despotism that might have crushed out national life in Europe. Again, history seemingly repeating itself, it was the great British fleet—I happened to see it in the Channel, I remember, in late July, 1914, drawn up there as it were, almost by a miraculous accident—that saved England and, in fact, civilization, from the monster system that so ruthlessly destroyed Serbia, Montenegro and Belgium, and is in the process of blighting and destroying everything that the human mind and human soul has heretofore held dear.

Now, as to the future. If it may be said that it is not safe to leave the great sea power in the hands of one nation, even though history indicates that that nation on the whole has carried out its trusteeship well and in accordance with freedom and the betterment

of mankind, then indeed we must change the whole world system. Instead of nations being isolated units, we will have to have a combination of nations.

I have advocated from the beginning of the war, although I am in no degree an "Anglomaniac," an understanding—call it a combination if you wish—it is not necessary or advisable to enter into a formal alliance—between the English-speaking democracies of the world who have such similar institutions and a common language, although the latter is sometimes a disadvantage, because they can read each other's newspapers which often creates irritation—people who look to the same common law while their lawyers talk in the jargon of Blackstone and have the same fundamental postulates of liberty, right and decency. Today this is about to be realized, although a year or two ago it might have seemed an almost hopeless aspiration.

Today the English-speaking commonwealths and the French republics drawing to themselves the other democracies of the world, just as the magnet attracts the iron filings, must stand together and may in time create something in the nature, to use a much-abused and perhaps misleading term, of a super-state, which super-state can act as the interpreter of those common aspirations for peace and justice of the world; and then the freedom of the sea will mean that kind of freedom which we enjoy in the streets of Philadelphia and in the streets of New York, that freedom which a regulated community maintains because the police are there to repress by law, without hatred but with the maximum of celerity and effectiveness, those who would break the law; the great Anglo-French-American combination, commanding the spiritual and material forces of those nations, would insure a freedom of the sea which would mean a free sea for all who wished to travel and trade thereon, but when any nation attempted to interfere with the orderly life of other communities, it would have to reckon with that great democratic force, which would try it and finding it wanting would suppress not its freedom, but its lawlessness.

That may be something of a prophecy, but today we have ceased from a miserable, pusillanimous neutrality that seemed immoral and that was rapidly becoming dangerous for our future; we have stepped out from a selfish isolation into coöperation with the great progressive forces of the world; there is now every reason to believe that we will tend to realize the dream of old-time idealists



and philosophers and create a new order out of which minor incidents, such as the freedom of the seas, will naturally flow to aid mankind in his efforts for the only real peace, that which is based upon law and justice.

When we abandoned neutrality, we struck a great blow for the existence of law, not any particular law, but all law. We did not haggle about rules that lawyers had made as to ultimate destination and continuous voyage; the lawyers could wrangle about that forever. In the Civil War we took one view because it was to our interest and we sustained it by the action of lawyers before an arbitration board; we might do it again if proper counsel was retained. We recently took another view as to our relations as neutrals because our interest dictated something different. We did not do it with any real heart in it. We did not mean to fight over it. There was no necessity for doing so. We distinguished between mere rights that could be paid for in money and adjusted by a court, and the sacred rights of human life; those rights which ordinary people call "God-given rights" and scientists call by some other name but which means exactly the same thing.

## FREEDOM OF THE SEAS<sup>1</sup>

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In this discussion "the freedom of the seas" will be considered in relation to the general subject of "America's obligations as the defender of international right," and will be treated as relating to the obligations of the United States, while a neutral in the present war, to defend international right in regard to the freedom of the seas.

It should be noted in passing that although the phrase "freedom of the seas" has played a prominent part in discussions relating to the essential conditions for an enduring peace, there has been no controversy in recent years about the freedom of the seas in time of peace. Under peace conditions in modern times all the waters of the earth, which, by reason of their geographical situation, can properly be regarded as parts of the high seas, have been free to

<sup>1</sup> Prepared before the United States entered the war.

the mercantile marine of all nations without discrimination or preference, and without restraint except against acts which, by universal custom and consent, are prohibited as unlawful.

It is a curious circumstance that the phrase "the freedom of the seas in time of war" is self-contradictory. In time of war the almost unlimited freedom of the seas enjoyed in time of peace is subjected to certain theoretically well-defined and universally recognized limitations and restraints. In so far as the vessels of belligerents are concerned, the freedom of the seas ceases to be a question of the right of law and becomes a question of the right of the strongest, subject always to the overruling restraint of the principles of humanity and civilization; and in so far as neutrals are concerned, their rights under peace conditions are seriously impaired in war time by the rights conferred upon belligerents under the laws of war, which impose extensive limitations upon neutral commerce and communications with the enemy.

The freedom of the seas for neutrals in time of war, therefore, means, from the belligerents' point of view, nothing more than the freedom permitted under the limitations imposed by the enforcement of belligerent rights, and conversely from the neutrals' point of view, it means immunity from belligerent interference beyond the limits which the rights of neutrals imposed upon the enforcement of the rights of belligerents.

It is well to bear in mind that the rights and interests of neutrals are not superior to or more privileged than the rights and interests of belligerents. Judging by experience in the present war, neutrals may expect to be treated by belligerents with no greater degree of consideration than is demanded by the exigencies of the situation. The policy which the United States has so long and consistently urged of making private property, except contraband, immune from capture at sea, would be a step in the right direction, but it is now evident that the exception of contraband would destroy the importance of this policy since practically everything destined to an enemy country is liable to be classed as contraband under the modern method of organizing the entire resources of a nation for war purposes. So long as sea power is unequally distributed among nations, there is but little prospect of a settlement of this problem by international agreement. The only certain way of regulating the freedom of the seas in the interest of neutrals in time of war

would be by replacing national sea power by international sea power, and that involves the question of disarmament and international police, which looks to the prevention of war rather than the freedom of the seas in time of war, and therefore is outside the scope of the present discussion.

In the present war, in addition to the familiar questions affecting the freedom of the seas arising from the law of blockade and of contraband, involving the right of seizure and incidentally the right of visit and search, and interference with the mails, the rules laid down in the Declaration of Paris and the establishment of war zones, the United States has also been concerned with the novel questions arising from the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, and the special regulations for immunity from seizure and condemnation adopted in the treaties of 1795 and 1799, as revived by the treaty of 1828 between the United States and Prussia, the obligations of which have since been accepted as binding upon the German Empire.

Apart from the laws invoked against the use of submarines as commerce destroyers, none of these laws and regulations is, strictly speaking, based on fundamental principles, but in each case they represent a compromise between neutral and belligerent interests as sanctioned by international custom and agreement. The inevitable conflict between the interests of neutrals and belligerents necessarily leads to differences of opinion as to their respective rights under these laws and regulations, and the rights of each class are unceasingly threatened with encroachment and impairment by the extension of the rights claimed by the other.

In so far as this conflict of interest is confined merely to differences of opinion as to the meaning of recognized laws and the interpretation of treaty stipulations, and so long as the conduct of belligerents is admitted to be controlled by the obligations of international law and agreements, the questions of difference can readily be dealt with by the usual methods of diplomatic discussion and international investigation and arbitration.

In accordance with the traditional policy of the United States, and by virtue of its general and special arbitration treaties, questions of a legal nature, which do not involve vital interests or national honor, and which cannot be settled by diplomacy, must be referred to arbitration; and by virtue of a series of treaties for the

advancement of peace, which practically all of the principal belligerents except the Central Powers entered into with the United States shortly after the outbreak of the present war, disputes arising between them of every nature whatsoever shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be submitted for investigation and report to a permanent international commission, postponing the commencement of hostilities meanwhile for at least a year.

So far as these questions are concerned, therefore, the obligation of the United States as the defender of international right was clearly defined and could easily be fulfilled.

Unfortunately, however, the interference with neutral rights on the high seas has not been confined in all cases to the mere question of the adjustment, within legal limitations, of the conflicting interests of belligerents and neutrals. There have been frequent occasions when the limitations of international law and the obligation of treaties have been deliberately and admittedly disregarded and violated.

Where these acts of lawlessness were no more than breaches of international good faith, even when they amounted to the violation of conventional or customary law, they might still be dealt with by diplomacy when pecuniary compensation would repair the resulting damages, or by the adoption of measures of retaliation or the imposition of such penalties as non-intercourse and loss of credit among reputable nations. But where these acts of lawlessness extended into the realm of barbarity violating the fundamental laws of humanity and civilization, what then was the obligation of the United States as the defender of international right?

Although, as above stated, the laws and regulations governing the respective rights of belligerents and neutrals in the freedom of the seas are founded on consent, rather than on principle, nevertheless, no rights can be admitted and no practices can be tolerated which are inconsistent with the principles of humanity and civilization, upon which all international law is founded, and this is a limitation which depends for its enforcement not upon any proceedings of international diplomacy or arbitration, but upon the force which humanity and civilization are prepared to exert for their own salvation.

The choice is between the preservation and the degradation of

American standards, and on that question, just as in this war, no American can remain neutral.

This brings up for consideration one specific point which I wish to discuss on the general subject of the obligation of the United States while a neutral in the present war as the defender of international right in relation to the freedom of the seas.

A pertinent question is the extent of our own responsibility for the failure of the belligerent nations to govern their conduct toward each other during this war in accordance with the requirements of international law. This is a question to which the American people, as neutrals, seem to have given but little thought.

Obviously we are not without responsibility for the conduct of the belligerent nations toward ourselves, and that is generally recognized, but it seems to have been lightly assumed that our neutrality did not require or permit us to concern ourselves with the treatment by belligerents of each other, or of other neutrals, and that the responsibility for determining whether or not the rights and obligations of international law should be observed rested primarily with the belligerent nations.

The question of what could or should have been done, more than has been done by our government, to compel the observance of international law by belligerents in their relations with each other and with ourselves and with other neutral nations, is a question of governmental policy involving political considerations and legislative and executive action which I do not feel called upon to discuss here. The point to which I wish to call attention is that every neutral nation, and especially the United States as a neutral nation in the present war, was not less, and perhaps even more, interested than the belligerents themselves in requiring that nations at war shall treat not merely neutral nations, but enemy nations as well, in accordance with the approved practices and usages of international law in time of war.

This doctrine of neutral responsibility was expounded by Senator Root in an address delivered by him at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in December, 1915, from which the following extract is taken:

International laws violated with impunity must soon cease to exist, and every state has a direct interest in preventing those violations which, if permitted to continue, would destroy the law. Wherever in the world, the laws which should

protect the independence of nations, the inviolability of their territory, the lives and property of their citizens, are violated, all other nations have a right to protest against the breaking down of the law. Such a protest would not be an interference in the quarrels of others. It would be an assertion of the protesting nations' own right against the injury done to it by the destruction of the law upon which it relies for its peace and security. What would follow such a protest must in each case depend upon the protesting nation's own judgment as to policy, upon the feeling of its people and the wisdom of its governing body. Whatever it does, if it does anything, will be done not as a stranger to a dispute or as an intermediary in the affairs of others, but in its own right for the protection of its own interest.

Applying this doctrine to the freedom of the seas, the United States has been brought into contact at several points with lawlessness on the seas in this war in a way which from the beginning threatened serious consequences, and chiefly by reason of the German method of submarine warfare against commercial vessels. This policy was adopted avowedly as a measure of reprisal, and its justification has been attempted solely on that ground. It will be observed that this ground of justification would be wholly unnecessary if the retaliatory measure did not in itself violate the law.

I am not going into the law of reprisal further than to point out that it imposes certain limitations which must be insisted upon to give it the character of a law. It is sufficient to say that nowhere in our diplomatic correspondence with Germany on this subject has the German government denied the assertions in the notes of the United States that the German method of submarine warfare is contrary to the rules, practices and spirit of modern warfare, and a departure from the naval codes of all nations, including its own.

In denouncing Germany's retaliatory measures, the United States government did not base its objections on the technical ground that the war measures of the Allies did not furnish just cause for retaliation. The reason assigned was that the German measures of reprisal violated the requirements of international law. If they had not been illegal, or if, in spite of their illegality, they could have been justified by describing them as reprisals, our government would have had no legal ground for complaint. Neutrals on merchant ships of belligerents have no higher or different right to protection than enemy non-combatants on such ships. If, therefore, the methods employed by Germany for the destruction of non-combatants on enemy merchant vessels had not been pro-

hibited as unlawful even between belligerents, our government would have had to acquiesce in Germany's suggestion that American citizens be warned that they traveled on belligerent vessels at their own risk. The government of the United States took the comprehensive ground that by reason of the inherent unfitness of submarines for use as commerce destroyers, they could not be used for that purpose without violating not only the universally accepted rules of international law, but the underlying principles of humanity as well, and, therefore, refused to recognize any justification for such lawlessness in the guise of retaliatory measures. As stated in the American note to Germany of May 13, following the destruction of the *Lusitania*:

the objection to their [Germany's] present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the imperial German government frankly admit. We are informed that in the instance of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

In that statement of the law, the United States, although speaking only for American interests, made it clear that the destruction of enemy non-combatants on belligerent merchant ships was just as unlawful as the destruction of neutral passengers on those ships.

It thus appears that the destruction of American citizens on belligerent merchant ships in consequence of German submarine warfare against British commerce brought the United States face to face with serious responsibilities imposed upon it by reason of a violation of the obligations which international law imposes upon belligerents in their treatment of each other.

But this destruction of American lives was not the only evil consequence affecting the United States which grew out of this lawless method of attack by one belligerent upon another. Having

drawn the United States into contact with the conflicting interests of the belligerents, Germany promptly seized upon this situation as a favorable opportunity for imposing upon the United States the entire responsibility for its solution.

An examination of the diplomatic correspondence will show that Germany offered to abandon her submarine warfare against commerce if Great Britain would abandon her blockade.

It will be remembered that the United States disputed the validity of this blockade in some of its aspects, and demanded its abatement, but without success. Germany admitted frankly that the question of the observance or non-observance by the United States of this blockade was a question to be dealt with solely between the United States and Great Britain. This was distinctly stated in the German note of February 15, 1915, as follows:

The German government have given due recognition to the fact that as a matter of form the exercise of rights and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals is limited by their pleasure alone and involves no formal breach of neutrality.

But, although as here admitted the German government was not justified in holding that the neutral nations in submitting to an interruption of their trade with Germany were unneutral or unfriendly, and although the rights of neutrals, and not the rights of Germany, were being interfered with, for the restrictions imposed by the law of blockade are imposed in the interest of neutrals and not of the blockaded enemy, nevertheless Germany proceeded to call the neutrals to account for acquiescing in the blockade and assigned this interruption of neutral trade with Germany as the justification for the German reprisals against the Allies.

In view of these considerations and of Germany's attitude toward neutrals in this controversy, it is evident that Germany's measures of reprisal were in effect reprisals against neutrals for acquiescing in Great Britain's interruption of neutral trade with Germany, although, as stated above, the German government itself has admitted that neutrals are under no obligation to engage in trade with Germany, and that they may acquiesce in its discontinuance without a breach of neutrality.

Yet the German government in its diplomatic correspondence with the United States has frequently asserted that its chief purpose in using submarines as commerce destroyers was to maintain the



freedom of the seas, and this assertion has been put forward ostensibly on the basis of protecting neutral rights.

Obviously Germany could not have expected that its ruthless submarine warfare against commerce, involving the destruction of neutral lives and property, would serve as an inducement to the neutrals to renew their trade with Germany.

Germany's real position was that if Great Britain was unwilling to agree to abandon the blockade, the United States could not object to Germany's measures of reprisal without first bringing effective pressure to bear upon Great Britain to abandon the blockade. In other words, that objections to illegal measures of reprisal could not be urged by a neutral government which had submitted to the alleged illegal acts in consequence of which the measures of reprisal were adopted.

The stoppage in our trade in war supplies for the Allies has been the chief purpose of German diplomacy in this country ever since the establishment of the British blockade shutting out all supplies from Germany, and that purpose has been their guiding star in their controversy with us about submarine warfare.

The plan was simple and adroit. If it could be made to appear that Great Britain's blockade was the responsible cause of Germany's submarine warfare, then, in order to settle that question, it might be possible to arouse the United States to resentment against the British blockade, which the United States had characterized as unlawful. It was anticipated that Great Britain would refuse to abandon the blockade, and it was hoped that a refusal by Great Britain to do this would result in the adoption by the United States of an embargo against the exportation of war munitions to the Allies, which was the result chiefly desired by Germany.

This plan failed, but the purpose underlying it persisted, and the outcome serves to show how easily and how deeply the rights of a neutral nation may be affected in consequence of the violation of the rules of international law by belligerents in their treatment of each other.

It will be remembered that the government of the United States refused to consider Germany's suggestion that submarine warfare on commerce should be contingent upon securing relief from British interference with neutral trade with Germany, and

that when this suggestion was renewed in the Sussex correspondence the final reply of the government of the United States was that:

it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

Germany made no reply at that time, and by reason of their inaction gained the credit for acquiescence. It now appears that they were waiting only because delay best suited their convenience. The German Chancellor said in March of last year that "when the most ruthless methods are considered as best calculated to lead to victory, then they must be employed," but they were not ready then—they were merely biding their time—and it was not until January of this year that they considered that the time had come. All this was frankly stated by the German Chancellor when on January 31, he officially announced that the moment for which they had been waiting to renew ruthless submarine warfare had at last arrived. He said:

Last autumn the time was not yet ripe, but today the moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake this enterprise. We must, therefore, not wait any longer. Where has there been a change?

In the first place, the most important fact of all is that the number of our submarines has been very considerably increased as compared with last spring, and thereby a firm basis has been created for success.

And further:

The military situation, as a whole, permits us to accept all consequences which an unrestricted U-boat war may bring about, and as this U-boat war in all circumstances is the means to injure our enemies most grievously, it must be begun.

He seems to have made the German theory of the freedom of the seas sufficiently clear.

The usages and customs of war which have been worked out through centuries of development, and which at the beginning of the present war represented the enlightened thought of civilization as to what should be the rights and duties of belligerents toward each other and toward neutrals, seem to have been based for the most part on the theory that war is a game which must be played according to rules. Most of these rules have been wiped out by the vastness of the scale on which a war involving more than half

the world must be conducted, and by the destructiveness and frightfulness of the methods which have been introduced, producing an upheaval in the stability of things very like a tremendous process of nature which no man-made law can govern, and which is not amenable to the principles of morality or humanity. The only restraining influence is force against force.

## ELEMENTS OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE

BY PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN,  
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To talk of peace in times of peace is an agreeable form of speculation. To talk of peace in times of war is a solemn obligation. There must be preparedness for peace as well as for war.

Peace propaganda and discussion in the United States, while the world was at peace, or this country merely a neutral with the rest of the world at war, has been more or less academic and unprofitable. Sentiment has played a larger part than reason. There have always been earnest souls longing for peace—both spiritual and temporal. The horrors of war have accentuated these longings. The demand for the prevention of war, however, has become so fervid as to be hysterical. The cause of world-peace has been discredited, in part, by irrational denunciations of war, or ill-considered proposals for its elimination.

Now we are at war we should have a clearer mental vision. War is a marvelous stimulus to thought. It demands that we face honestly the great realities of existence. It does not allow us to linger in a fool's paradise. It compels us to test preconceived theories in a fiery furnace. They must undergo "ordeal by battle."

We have had too much academic discussion, not only concerning peace, but in regard to almost every other field of human interest. In law, education, sociology, politics and religion, we have indulged in arguments, subtle distinctions, and intellectual refinements that have obscured the most elemental, primal truths. We have been in danger of losing that primitive power—shared by savages and children alike—the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, justice and injustice. We have ignored the profound truth expressed by Montesquieu, that: "The sentiment of justice was created in man before reason itself." And war comes as a supreme corrective to this insidious academic anaemia. It hurls us into the center of the stupendous problems of the world. We are no longer onlookers and critics. The question of world-peace is now our own practical problem. It has ceased to be a

matter for academic discussion. We have a right to be consulted and to be heard. We are bound to discover, if we can, the final goal of all this horror and heroism.

What, then, are "the elements of a just and durable peace?" The very phrasing of the subject is in itself illuminating. What do we mean by *peace*? What is international justice? What is *durable* in human affairs? What are the *elements* that guarantee peace, justice and permanency among nations?

First of all, we should recognize that peace is not the supreme aim of society. Like pleasure, contentment, character and virtue, peace is only a by-product. It is a result. It comes to the individual and the community alike when men live honestly and justly; when they have fought with the beasts at Ephesus, and conquered the forces of evil. Peace comes through warfare with vice and injustice. The supreme aim of society is not peace itself, but the triumph of justice. And men often know peace only when they are actually engaged in the fight for justice.

Nothing could have been more infelicitous than the choice of the name of "The League to Enforce Peace." The enforcement of peace would be as abhorrent as it would be futile. The idea is as offensive as the so-called "pacification" of peoples by the armies of tyrants or conquerors. There can be no enforcement of peace, no true pacification where wrongs remain unavenged, and justice does not prevail. The true aim of all who desire peace should be, not the enforcement of peace, but the enforcement of justice.

Justice, then, being the final goal of society, how is it to be attained? In any association of men for mutual benefit, the first aim is to determine their interests and rights. They then seek to find the most effective way to protect their rights.

In order to determine rights, it is essential that men should share common conceptions of rights and obligations. They must think fundamentally alike. In order to protect their rights, they must have a direct control over the making of law, its interpretation and enforcement. Men are unwilling to abdicate entirely their rights into the hands of any absolute, final authority. The sentiment of justice is, indeed, a primitive instinct. Though torrents of blood must flow, men will never cravenly surrender the cause of justice for the cause of peace.

If this be true within a nation, how much more significant is

this same truth within the community of nations! We must never lose sight of the rightful aims of nationalism. Why do men group themselves in various national communities if not for the pursuit of justice? Nations, like men, demand the utmost freedom to attain this end along their own lines of preference. Is not the world vastly the richer through the intellectual, political, economic, artistic, ethical and religious contributions of free, independent nations? The basis of international peace must of necessity consist in the utmost respect for the right of nations to the fullest amount of freedom required by their legitimate national aspirations.

How, then, are international rights to be determined? We ought at once to recognize the profoundly significant fact that all nations do not share common conceptions of rights and obligations. It is lamentably true, as Maximilian Harden has pointed out, that the rest of the world is against Germany "because they do not think as we Germans think." Before we may attempt to determine the simplest rights of nations, Germany, Japan, the United States, Nicaragua, Spain, Russia and all the other nations of the world, must learn to think alike in fundamentals concerning right and wrong, privileges and duties, justice and injustice. Until men in free democracies are permitted to indicate clearly their national preferences, we cannot rightfully pretend even to draw the boundaries of nations with any certainty of justice. Witness Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, and other disembodied national spirits—not to fail to mention Ireland.

If it has been impossible as yet to determine even the elemental rights of nations, how fantastic it seems to attempt solemnly to discuss the means of *enforcing* their rights! I do not mean to imply that there is no well-defined body of international rights entitled to protection. There are, of course, many such rights consecrated by usage, judicial decisions and treaties. In times of peace, these rights are universally respected and automatically enforced by the courts or the executives of civilized nations. Diplomacy, in ordinary times, pays unostentatious homage to these rights. There exist facilities for international justice through arbitration, commissions of enquiry, etc., though these agencies need to be perfected and augmented. It still remains true, however, that, until the basic rights of nations are clearly determined by their active, intelligent, mutual consent, it is folly to talk of coercion. There can be no just

coercion of men or of nations where there has been no clear definition of their rights. This is the bed-rock of international justice. This is the sure basis of international peace; rights must first be determined before nations may be subjected to restraint by international police or leagues of nations.

It would seem clear that the determination of the rights of nations is a matter of mutual agreement. They may not be determined arbitrarily by any one nation or by any group of powerful nations. This means, in concrete terms, that the victor in war must take care that he does not impose conditions of peace which violate the essential national interests of the vanquished. Arbitrary annexations of territory, and the subjection of alien peoples can only lead to other wars. Witness the criminal wrongs of the Treaty of Berlin whose baleful effects we are still beholding today! The utterly vicious principle of the balance of power which hitherto has dominated and devastated Europe must definitely be abandoned. Enduring peace can be laid on no such shifting foundations.

The participation of the United States in the great war warrants our insisting that it be ended in accordance with sound principles which shall guarantee the future law and order of the world. We cannot assume direct responsibility for all the complicated adjustments which must take place in Europe at the end of the war. We are bound, however, to determine clearly in our own minds, and vigorously to support those principles which should be obeyed in the making of peace.

These principles would seem to be, in brief, the principles of nationalism, self-government and freedom of trade. The instinctive desire of men to group together in accordance with their distinct national preferences, whether of race, language, religion, political traditions, social customs or economic needs, must be respected. This is fundamental. It is directly opposed to the archaic principle of balance of power. If men object that certain nations—Russia, for example—may be a menace because of their size, it must be conceded that greater harm has already come through the denial of nationalistic aspirations. Idealists, as well as statesmen, would do well to cease their opposition to the just claims of nationalities. The spirit of nationalism is a dynamic force which may not be repressed with safety. It need not be in opposition to internationalism, if respected. It will disrupt the world, if not respected.

The right of men to govern themselves is the second fundamental principle which must be respected in order to encourage enduring peace. If it should not prove feasible in every instance to resurrect dismembered states, and draw anew the map of the world, at least the right of men to govern themselves in autonomous communities must be conceded. Complete independence, though supremely desirable, is not an absolute *sine qua non* of nationalism. The concession of autonomy in local government, in Poland or Ireland, for example, as in Bavaria or Canada, would go far towards the contentment and peace of nations.

The third principle which should be observed, is that of freedom of trade. Tariff fortresses constitute a menace as well as standing armies. Economic strangulation, as in the case of Serbia at the hands of Austria, may be as insidiously effective in the long run as open warfare. The threat of the Entente Allies to continue an economic warfare against Germany at the end of the present conflict should be viewed with alarm by all friends of world-peace.

Nations will be compelled some day to come to a mutual understanding concerning the exchange of products. They cannot tolerate cut-throat competition. In many cases, such as Serbia and Poland, for example, freedom of trade with neighboring countries would be a necessary corollary to their right to exist as separate, or autonomous national states. One dislikes being classified as a radical. The logic of the situation, however, should lead us to recognize that nations, sooner or later, must not merely destroy their economic barriers; they must also come to definite understandings concerning the very basic questions of production and distribution. They cannot abandon protective dikes against the flooding of their markets by the products of cheap labor unless they first reach an agreement concerning the production and the distribution of these products. If this understanding is not realized, then protectionist wars will continue; nations will suffer; discontent will ensue, and then hate and war itself. There is a danger, of course, of giving too much weight to the influence of economic factors, in history, morals and politics. But we cannot afford to ignore, it seems to me, the profound significance of the principle of regulated freedom of trade as a necessary element in the peace of the world.

Most of the writers on the law of nations have placed great



stress on the so-called absolute, inherent, fundamental rights of states. Much of this discussion—particularly that relating to the sovereignty and equality of nations—seems academic. The right of a nation to exist, however, is the basic principle of international law. But this does not imply the consecration of an iniquitous *status quo*. Certain nations built up in flagrant denial of the rights of nationalities—Austria-Hungary, for example—can claim no absolute right of existence. National boundaries in many instances must be completely retraced before international law may properly be invoked in defence of an alleged right to exist.

The object of a great war like the present should be an enduring peace. And an enduring peace cannot be found unless it be based on sound principles. Such principles would seem in the main to be: the recognition of the rights of nationalities; the right to self-government; and regulated freedom of trade. If warring nations are not prepared to make peace in a spirit of equity and in obedience to sound principles, they must inevitably face the necessity of future wars. In such an event, it would be both futile and unpardonable to talk of perpetual peace.

To summarize briefly, the essential elements of a just and durable peace would seem to be the following:

*I The necessity of common conceptions of rights and obligations, of justice and injustice among nations.*

*II The clear determination of the fundamental rights of nations in accordance with the principles of nationalism, self-government, and freedom of trade.*

*III The clear determination of all the other rights of nations by mutual agreement.*

*IV There shall be no collective coercion of nations by international police, or by any disguised form of international executive, before their rights shall be clearly determined.*

*V The protection of such rights must be accorded in such a form that there shall be no menace to the freedom of men to pursue their legitimate national ends.*

Having faced squarely this stupendous problem that now confronts the United States, we should try to outline our immediate and practical duty in behalf of enduring peace. As regards the present war, we ought by every possible agency of speech and press

to make perfectly certain that the United States does not become partner in any peace settlement made in defiance of the principles of international justice. If we are permitted to make sacrifices for the cause of international law and order, we must be permitted also to insist that the final goal of all this sacramental sacrifice shall be international justice. We are bound to oppose with all our might a peace imposed on the vanquished to gratify the desire for revenge, for territorial aggrandizement or power. May we not consider the entry of the United States in this war as a sacred opportunity to mediate between ancient enmities, and to inspire in the belligerents of the Old World confidence in new invigorating principles of world-peace? May we not through the horrors of war thus accomplish the ideals for peace which we had vainly hoped to accomplish through peace?

Considering the problem of a just peace in its general aspect, irrespective of the present war, our duty would seem primarily to be that of helping all nations to understand each other. They must learn to sympathize and think alike before they can lay the foundations of durable peace. This is a gigantic task of education and conciliation. The agencies for this conciliative function are many, however, and include, especially, international conferences at The Hague and elsewhere to discuss the common needs and rights of nations. They include the various international unions such as the Universal Postal Union, the Red Cross, the Agricultural Institute, the Brussels Office of Customs Tariffs, the Interparliamentary Union and the Bureau of Arbitration at The Hague.

But we in America should be particularly interested in the upbuilding of so promising an agency for international peace as the Pan-American Union at Washington. Admitting the supreme difficulties in the way of world-peace, we can at least, as practical idealists, turn our attention to the immense problem of bringing about the reign of justice and peace on this hemisphere. Let us try first of all to bring about an understanding between the twenty-one nations of this portion of a distracted world. Let us induce them to gather together to discuss, recommend, and to legislate in regard to their common interests. Having found a way to determine their rights, we may then properly proceed with the other difficult task of securing the most effective agencies for the interpretation and the protection of such rights. We have in the Pan-American Union the

very agency for so magnificent a work. There would seem to exist no insuperable difficulties in the way of invigorating that institution, and giving it such increased powers of investigation, discussion, recommendation, and even of legislation, that it may become the prototype of that greater world clearing house for the advancement of the mutual interests, the rights and the peace of nations which all men desire.

In conclusion, we would do well to be on our guard lest the realization of the horrors of war should create an atmosphere of hysteria around this supreme problem of international justice. Horrible as this war is, it must not prompt us to recommend expedients for peace which might involve any fundamental denial of justice. We must remember that there are horrors of peace as well as of war. Where vice and wickedness flourish, where injustice reigns unrestrained, it is criminal to insist on enduring peace.

Furthermore, we must recognize that, humanly speaking, nothing is permanent. There can be no perpetual peace. It may be striven for only through eternal conflict with wrong. And to secure the triumph of justice between nations, men, at times, must be willing and eager to fight.

By an extraordinary paradox, then, war itself must sometimes be accepted as a righteous and an essential element of a just peace. Militarists, pacifists and all good patriots alike should fervently unite in the firm determination that so grim an element shall not have been employed in vain.

## THE BASES OF A JUST AND ENDURING PEACE

BY FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, PH.D., LL.D.,

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Peace at any price would be the abject surrender of justice and the abandonment of morality, and could never be an enduring peace. Peace at any price means the surrender of civilization, liberty, responsibility and self-respect. It means the exchange of a freeman's birthright for a villain's broth. In shame and humiliation we have to take an inventory of those individuals in our population that would make such surrender and would so barter. Rela-

tively, however, they are not numerous and never can be. They are among those extreme variates from human normality, which range from persons of low intelligence and grotesque criminality at one end of the frequency curve, to mad geniuses and martyrs at the other end. All such variates, the good and the bad, the desirable and the undesirable, get crowded to the wall and exterminated when the struggle for existence is really severe, but when life is as soft as it has been in England and the United States for fifty or more years past, they are able to live and to propagate. Fortunately, they have never controlled public policy on a large scale, or for a long time, and they never will control it. Least of all will peace at any price men control. The normal man wants peace not as an end but as a means. He wants peace because he wants to feel that his wife and children are safe while he does his day's work. He wants peace if therewith he can enjoy liberty and a good conscience; otherwise he wants to fight, and fight he will, with a joy pure and undefiled. This is not mere argument. It is statistical fact which happens to fix and to define the possibilities of enduring peace. Variates from type are minorities, normal men are a majority. The normal majority will not accept peace at any price. They will fight. For the purposes of peace propaganda that hope to get somewhere the peace-at-any-price man is obstructive.

There can be no just and no enduring peace between absolutism and democracy.

The American Revolution was not taken seriously in the throne rooms of continental Europe. A desperately impoverished population of less than three million souls, dwelling three thousand miles from anywhere, could safely be let alone to indulge itself, for a time, in the odd conceits of republicanism. The experiment would probably fail, and, if it did not, Europe could at any time curb its power for mischief.

The French Revolution was another matter. That upheaval sent chills down royal spines. The guillotine in the Place de la Concorde was near enough to be seen and heard when one lay awake in the night. Also, it was known to be inexpensive, making no impossible demands upon the financial resources of a third estate, and was understood to be practical. It cut off two Bourbon heads of the first class and plenty of others only less respectable; and yet, and this was the worst of it, its operations were only an episode,

as monarchical statesmen from Westminster to Moscow quite well apprehended. The real revolution had been half accomplished before sensational occurrences began; it proceeded quietly and was relentless.

An entire people had awakened, and in coming to consciousness of itself had discovered that it was strong enough to throw off intolerable burdens. Then it found a way to put forth its strength. Ancient privileges of rank and class that had been looked upon as eternal verities of the constitution were not merely abolished; they were annihilated, with characteristic French thoroughness, and the ground was cleared for a republican scheme of rights, liberties and laws.

From the confiscation of the properties of the nobles and the church in 1789 until the invasion of Belgium in 1914 there never was an hour when, so far as the human mind could see, any derailing of the train of events which was headed for the battle of the Marne, would have been possible.

The monarchs of Europe perceived that unless the revolution could be stopped in France it would extend throughout Europe and sweep all the dynasties away together. Therefore, they attacked France. That attack discovered Napoleon Bonaparte and put him in power.

Bonaparte knew that his fortunes must be built upon the substantial results of the revolution, and he therefore, in settling the estate, saw to it that those results were embodied and defined in the Code Napoléon. In conquering Europe, however, and building an empire he gave rein to his own ambition, thereby imperiling the liberties for which, presumably, he never had cared save in so far as he could use them for his own purposes. His overthrow was the destruction of a personal but dangerous military absolutism, but it was also the triumph of reactionary monarchism. Democracy could not have made its way if the first empire had survived, but from the moment that the Emperor was retired to St. Helena, the war was on again between popular politics and the dynasties, all superficial appearances to the contrary, notwithstanding. The Chartist disturbances in England, revolutionary activities in France in the thirties and forties, and the abortive revolution in Germany in 1848 were the futile outbreakings of democratic forces ever increasing in strength, but not then strong enough for so tremendous a task as they had attempted.

The rest of the story is brief, and relatively uncomplicated. The human animal and his interests being what they are, the Napoleonic wars made inevitable the Prussian aggression of 1870-1871; and the creation of the German Empire by successful Prussia made inevitable the monstrous Prussian arrogance which, from the accession of William II until Verdun, fed itself upon dreams and plans of world empire. The boastful proclamation of this purpose, and the systematic creation of the most tremendous militaristic system ever seen or imagined, with declared intent to use it aggressively, made inevitable the alliance of Great Britain with France (her foe of a century ago) against Germany, her ally then against Napoleon.

So, at last, the giant democracies of western Europe and the giant absolutisms of central Europe confronted each other on the fields of France and Flanders in life and death grapple. The issue, that had been more or less confused, became sharply defined. Democracy or dynasty will be sovereign, from this time on.

The case of Russia is not less clear than the issue between France and Prussia. The man who until a month ago denied that this war is a conflict between democracy and dynasty because, forsooth, Russia was fighting as the ally of France and of Great Britain, was one of those publicists described in holy writ who darken council by words without knowledge. The Russian dynasty, Teutonic in sympathy and more than half Teutonic in blood, would have fought with Germany if it had dared. It did not dare because the Russian people, including the business classes, were ripe for revolution, and were in sympathy with the aspirations of the democratic peoples.

Therefore let the blazing truth about this war be repeated, emphasized, driven home, to every mind. This war is the life and death fight of dynasty at bay. It is the most portentous as it is the most gigantic and the most dreadful conflict in all human history, because it is the last stand of the massed and organized forces of despotism against liberty, enlightenment and progress. If it is won by the democratic peoples it is won forever.

If the democratic peoples are defeated, what then? Then fighting will continue. All the work of centuries must be done over again. Insurrections, rebellions, revolutions must once more be the chief interest of men worthy of the name. Whoso talks of peace will deserve and will get only the scorn of the brave and the just.

Here, again, it is fact, not argument, that is presented. Mankind has not tasted self-government and individual liberty for nothing. A major number of human beings in western Europe and in America will not submit tamely to the absolutist rule from which they have for a hundred years believed themselves to have escaped. Less than ten years before the war began everybody was predicting that the existing generation would see liberal constitutional government established over the entire earth. Turkey, Persia, China, would be republics at least in name and under the stimulus of self-respecting liberty would rapidly become republics in fact. Perhaps this forecast was a dream, but if it was, it will be dreamed again.

There is one more possibility to consider. If the war ends in a peace without victory, what may we expect? There are only two things that can happen, and therefore only two things that a reasoning mind can expect. The forces of democracy will more quickly recover and set about the business of preparing an adequate defence against the next onslaught of absolutism, or the forces of absolutism will more quickly recover and set about the business of preparation for the next war of aggression. The two sets of forces will not long remain in equilibrium. Peace without victory will be an armistice, nothing more.

The problem is now fully before us. We may look at it from any angle. We may turn it inside out and outside in. The issue remains specific, unalterable. There can be no enduring peace on this earth until absolutism is destroyed. A peace program that does not squarely face this fact is a pipe dream.

If we do face it squarely we shall think straight about the possibilities and practicalities of all proposed leagues to enforce peace.

A universal league, including all the sovereign nations would be nothing more or less than the existing state of affairs under another name. It would be the most absurd perpetual-motion machine ever yet experimented with. The relations of the nations to one another, as defined and regulated by the international law of the world as it stood on July 31, 1914, constituted a world league of peace, neither more nor less, and it went to smash. A league to keep the peace presumes that its component nations will honorably keep faith with one another. A league to enforce peace must be composed of nations that will both keep faith with one another and

practically act in coöperation with one another against the law breaker. Practically, these requirements can be met and will be met only if the component nations of the league share a common civilization, hold a common attitude toward questions of right, liberty, law and polity, and share a sense of common danger threatening from nations whose interests, ambitions, moralities and politics are antagonistic.

Practically, therefore, there are now only two possibilities open to the would-be makers of the leagues to enforce peace. There can be no universal league. That would be nothing but the adoption of a sounding name and a platform of pious resolutions. There can be no coherent, workable league made up of both democratic and dynastic nations. Fellowship of the wolf with the lamb has not yet been invented. Peace between the hyena and the dog does not endure, and wild, or domesticated, asses have not ceased to be the prey of lions in the wilderness. But there can be a league of democratic nations to safeguard republican civilization in the world, and there can be a league of dynastic nations to perpetuate dynastic authority and power.

These two leagues exist now, and into one or the other of them every nation in the world will inevitably be drawn. One is a league to enforce peace, because peace will come and will endure when the other one of these leagues is crushed.

Happily the United States has dropped the fatuous belief that it could stand aside and, from safe isolation, watch the titanic struggle between liberty and despotism. In the moral order of the universe it is not permitted to a nation, any more than it is permitted to an individual, to be neutral upon the great fundamental issues of conduct. He who does not dare to stand for what in his inmost soul he believes to be right must surely die the second death of those who become the craven slaves to what they once held to be wrong. The United States will worthily play its part in the league of the democratic peoples to safeguard those political principles which the league of the thirteen original American states was the first power to proclaim. Pacifists, like the givers of indiscriminate alms, whom they mentally resemble, we may always have with us, but the American nation will not be a partner and accomplice of dynasty.



## ON WHAT PRINCIPLES IS THE SOCIETY OF STATES TO BE FOUNDED?

BY HENRI LA FONTAINE,

Member of Belgium Senate, Brussels, Belgium.

Belgium is indeed the symbol of the violation of international law. The integrity of Belgium was in the hands of the big powers. Neutralization was guaranteed to her in 1839. It was certainly a favor for Belgium, and it permitted my country—small as it was, with its population at that time of three million people, nearly eight million now—to become, in the commerce of the world, the fifth among the nations and to enjoy the biggest exportation and importation with the exception of France, Great Britain, the United States and Germany.

But Belgium was neutralized, not because the peoples had some sympathy for this country, but because it was necessary to create a buffer state between the three then most powerful empires of Europe, namely, Great Britain, France and Prussia, and permit both the latter ones to leave their frontiers facing Belgium unfortified. There were no fortifications either in Germany or in France near the Belgian border. This was the cause of our misfortune. It was because those frontiers were open that Germany invaded Belgium; it was the easiest way for her to get to Paris.

Now this situation, I hope, will be changed after this war. We have the confidence that Belgium will be restored and restored forever; there is no doubt about it. But to this end it is necessary, for Belgium and for all the small nations, that their existence should be guaranteed no more by some big powers, but by all the powers of the world. But something more is wanted if a lasting and durable peace is to be secured: the nations of the world ought to agree about some principles, precisely those principles which have been since more than a century advocated by the pacifists. I am one of such pacifists which were despised, which were criticized, but I am not an ultra-pacifist; and I claim to remain a pacifist even in saying that in this world, unfortunately, some force is to be used during some time more, perhaps during a short time, perhaps during some centuries, but force submissive to law and the guardian of law.

Now, what are such main principles which should be recognized by the Society of Nations, League of States or Union of States which were so much spoken of during these last two years? The first one should proclaim that the independence and the territorial integrity of all nations are guaranteed by all nations. That means that the Monroe Doctrine, as Mr. Woodrow Wilson said so clearly in one of his speeches, should become the doctrine of the world; instead of having the Monroe Doctrine applied to the nations of the western hemisphere alone, it should be applied to every nation on earth. It is only by a mutual protection that the world will be safe.

The second principle is the right of the peoples to dispose freely of themselves. There should be no more subservient nations but by their own will. The difficulties in the European situation derive largely from the fact that so many peoples in Europe were subjected to nations and to governments which did not get their just powers from the consent of the governed. Germany has under her rule, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Polish provinces; Austria is the hated master of Galicia, Bohemia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Trieste and Trentino; and Turkey, before the last Balkan War, was the oppressive owner of a part of Serbia and a part of Roumania, of a part of Greece and of Albania, and Armenia and Syria in Asia Minor are always under her sanguinary domination.

Is it not interesting that precisely the three central powers, now united against mankind, were indeed the powers which had the largest number of foreign peoples under their abhorred domination? It is exactly that which ought to be changed. If it isn't changed, the world will be placed, after some years, in precisely the same unsettled condition out of which it was vainly trying to escape during the last years of the last century and the first years of this century. The acceptance of the principle here advocated by us and its drastic application are the basic conditions of a lasting Society of States.

The third principle is the solemn recognition of the equality of states, not a material equality, of course, but an equality of right, as we have introduced it in our national constitutions; as every citizen is equal to any other citizen, be he small or large, rich or poor, so should it be among the states. That principle was an undisputed one in international law and applied in all international and diplomatic gatherings. It was, namely, maintained at the two Peace

Conferences at The Hague, but during the second Peace Conference, behind the scenes in discussions among diplomats, the question of a change was raised and it was proposed to grant to the big powers in the world a preëminent position; but at once and with full reason, all the small nations objected, of course. I claim that the principle of equality should be rigidly maintained, because it is as important in international intercourse as it is in private intercourse. The small states have the same interest in having their rights vindicated and guaranteed by the Society of States as a powerful state, just the same as a citizen of small means has the same interest that his rights be guaranteed and vindicated as the rights of the rich man.

The fourth principle is that the states should be obliged to submit all their disputes to some judiciary or conciliatory process. There should be no more differences among nations considered as unable to be settled by some peaceable means. That of course excludes war.

This brings me to a fifth principle which should be introduced in international law. It is a very revolutionary one, but in the speech of Lloyd George, quoted by Mr. Slayden for a moment, he confessed that war is a crime. Now the principle I advocate is that war should no more be considered as a legal institution, because it is a crime, and should consequently be treated as such. This principle is a new one and therefore was not discussed till now among professors or experts in international law. Professors and experts in international law—I am myself a professor of international law—have always contended that war is a legal process, as duel was during centuries, as torture was. Torture as a legal institution was admitted not long ago by every state in the world, despite all its horrors, as slavery was, as serfdom was; but these things: slavery, serfdom, human sacrifice, torture, duel, have gone, and the world should now be able to get rid of war as a legal institution, as a legal process!

If that is done, and it can be done, the whole conception of the relations between states is changed. The basis on which international law would be established would be completely different, and the nearest consequence of such a rule would be to compel the states to create an international machinery.

The international machinery should consist of institutions like

those you have established in your own United States. They should be alike, but not similar. There should be a law-making body, not necessarily a parliament or congress, but a body with legislative powers. There should be a law-applying body. In that direction more is already done: we have already a Court of Arbitration, and in principle the states agreed to create a Supreme Court of the World or Court of International Justice, which it is proposed to complete by a Council of Conciliation; these three bodies would form the judiciary part of the administration of the world. Finally there should be not a proper executive, but an administrative body, in charge of the general interests of the world; a vast compound of the already existing offices and unions as the Postal Union, the Railroad Union, the Telegraphic Union. The work done and the work to be done in behalf of mankind should be systematized so that international coöperation in the world should become a part of the life of every day in every nation, changing the mind of all peoples by bringing them in constant touch one with another and showing that their own interests harmonize with the interests of humanity.

## DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS PRE-REQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE

BY JAMES L. SLAYDEN,

Member of Congress from Texas.

Four, five, or possibly six years ago I read a great speech by the member of the House of Commons for the division of Carnarvon, Wales. It was an eloquent plea for arbitration and the settlement of international disputes by the method of courts, and a specially strong and convincing argument for an agreed reduction of national armaments. That great democrat and advocate of peace is now the Premier of the British Empire. His wonderful speech in London recently shows that he holds the same views still. I shall refer to them later.

I am not one of that class of pacifists which believes it possible to prevent war entirely, at least not just yet, and refuses to discuss it except from the point of view of its absolute and immediate ending. But I do believe that it is possible, by arrangements between

governments that now thoroughly appreciate the cost of wars and are beginning to understand their stupidity and futility, to make them comparatively harmless.

#### PULL THE FANGS

Out in the Southwest I once knew a man who called himself a snake merchant. His chief article of trade was that dangerous and repulsive reptile, the rattlesnake. He would handle his merchandise in a way that made the onlooker shiver but he knew, what they did not, that he had made the snakes harmless by pulling their fangs. Now, that is precisely what I would like to do to aggressive and belligerent governments that covet the lands and sovereignties of other nations. I would pull their fangs by taking away from them nearly all the military forces that foolish and confiding people have put at the command of kings. Ambitious monarchs can be made comparatively harmless by reducing the size of armies so much that they will cease to be anything more than a police force. Then they will serve a useful purpose at home and cease to be a menace abroad.

One soldier to each thousand people in any country is enough to keep internal peace in a just government, and if governments are not just the sooner they are overturned the better. But if one soldier to each thousand isn't enough two surely will be, and international agreement should prevent any government from going beyond that.

#### HOW IT WOULD HAVE FARED WITH BELGIUM

Suppose the federated German Empire had only controlled an army of 75,000 men in 1914 or, taking the larger figure I have suggested, 150,000, would there have been an invasion of Belgium, whose chief offense was that she lay on the highway between Berlin and Paris? Would Liege, Louvain, Dinant, Ypres and Rheims now be in ruins and their priceless treasures of books, pictures and architecture forever lost to the world? Armies of the size I suggest could not have done all that mischief, yet they would be large enough to keep the criminal classes under control while utterly unable to thwart democracy's right to break the shackles of oppression which is always imposed from above by the aid of the autocrat's military arm.

Thomas Jefferson, who lived in a less democratic era than ours, believed, and declared his belief, that revolutions were necessary once in a generation if the people were not to lose their blood-bought liberties. We may not think them necessary as often as Jefferson suggested but we will all agree, I assume, that the opportunity to assert the right to liberty and independence should not be denied by a huge army at the command of an autocrat. The way to peace, to a just and durable peace, is through democracy, and it is absolutely necessary to peace and democracy that the preponderance of power should never be taken from the people and given to the soldier. My faith in the people and in their supremacy in the domain of government has been greatly strengthened by recent events in Russia.

#### GRATITUDE TO NICHOLAS, THE CZAR

Russia and the world may well spare Nicholas Romanoff from the field of political activity, but justice to his memory compels the admission that during his reign he did one thing for which he is entitled to the gratitude of the whole world, which we now know may be drawn into disaster by the machinations of a few men.

Whether the inspiration of an aroused conscience or the difficulty of financing military projects caused it we may never know, but the great, epochal fact remains that governments began the serious consideration of reducing armaments on his motion. It is one of three or four good and statesmanlike deeds of an otherwise commonplace and inglorious reign. The historian of the future may in charity emphasize this great reform that Nicholas proposed and give only passing attention to pogroms, Siberian exiles and other things that damn the political administration of Russia. If I may be permitted indulgence in slang I will say that when Nicholas, the last of the autocrats of the House of Romanoff, called the first Hague Conference to disarm the nations in the interest of peace he "started something."

#### WILL GOVERNMENTS CONSENT?

Can we ever get the consent of governments to a general disarmament? I believe so, and I furthermore believe that never in the history of the world has there been such an opportunity for this greatest of all reforms as we will see at the close of the war in Europe.

The cost of modern war will plead for it and will finally compel it. Great Britain is now spending ten million dollars more each day in the prosecution of war than the army of the United States cost in any one of the twenty-four years from 1875 down to and including 1899.

The belligerent powers of Europe are spending more money each day than the average annual cost of the whole government of the United States between 1800 and 1861.

In 1865 the total cost of our government, outside the Post Office Department, was \$1,295,099,290, and the cost per capita in that most expensive year of the Civil War was \$37.27.

Last year when we were at peace with everybody but Pancho Villa, and, perhaps, on occasions with Carranza, our taxes per capita were nearly fifteen dollars.

Contrast that with the \$4.43 per head paid during Cleveland's administration for all expenses outside the Post Office Department and contrast it with the \$85.00 per head you will have to pay for the next year and charge the increased cost to war and excessive preparation for war.

We in America may stand such burdens a few years more but Europe cannot. All these vast sums, both in Europe and America, must come out of the sweat and toil of the man who works. But even that long-suffering class is beginning to think and assert its rights; even the patient, long-suffering Mujik has revolted at last.

A little while ago, an officer of the United States Navy of high rank, a frank and capable man, who was testifying before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, said that if the policy of competition in armaments continued it could only have one of two endings, bankruptcy or war.

Mr. Hensley, of Missouri, on another occasion asked Captain McKean of the Navy what would be the consequence if two individuals "became apprehensive of each other and began to arm themselves," to which the naval officer replied that it would lead "to the hospital or the cemetery."

Hensley then asked him if the same thing would not happen to nations under like circumstances. Captain McKean replied that society would compel disarmament in the case of individuals and that the society of nations might do the same thing as to particular nations under such circumstances.

Another naval officer of high rank said that it was the policy of our government to be either the first or second naval power in the world. I think he really meant that that was the policy our naval officers wanted. When reminded of the fact that other nations might object to our being the first or second naval power of the world his reply was "we have the power and the money to protect ourselves and I think we could do it."

What, let me ask you, will become of the rights of small nations under such a policy? Is it not a return to the rule of the tooth and claw and can there be any just peace under such conditions, any hope for the small country, however just and peaceful, which hasn't the money and power?

#### REPUDIATION A POSSIBILITY

Already there is talk of repudiation in Europe, but not, of course, by officials of the contending powers for they are still trying to borrow, but by students of the world-wide madness who realize that there is a limit to the burdens that men can bear. That outcome would be hard on those who have put their earnings into the notes of Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, but in the long run it might not be bad for the mass of men. If *excessive* armaments and war credits should both be abolished it will lead to a long period of peace. Some people believe that it is this threat of repudiation hanging over them that has caused the owners of such securities to demand that the taxpayers of the United States shall underwrite the war loans of belligerent Europe.

#### BIG ARMIES DO NOT INSURE PEACE

The theory that huge military preparation assures peace exploded in 1914. At that time Russia, Germany and Austria had the greatest armies in the world and they were the first countries to enter the war. I don't understand, in view of what has happened, how any man can keep a straight face and make that argument. Nations are like the men who compose them. Given a hostile feeling and weapons and they will use the weapons. It is perfectly clear that if we are to have a lasting and just peace after the great war the insane policy of competitive arming must be abandoned. I believe that must have been the President's thought when he used the phrase "peace without victory" in his speech to the Senate in



January. The President knows, as every thoughtful person must know, that if either side in the European War should win an overwhelming military victory its faith in the efficacy of arms in the settlement of international disputes will be renewed and strengthened, and that it would not agree to the policy of reduced armaments. If neither side should have such a victory, the folly and futility of war will be plain to the dullest mind. Its very horrors and inconclusiveness would illuminate the argument and hasten the substitution of the court and board of arbitration for the sword.

#### COURTS AND ARBITRATION WILL FOLLOW

I am convinced that if we can persuade, or compel, governments to reduce their military and naval establishments every other step in the plan for a just and lasting peace will follow easily and naturally. Heads of governments who are not inclined to quiet reasoning when they command great fleets and armies would then take a different view. The setting for war is complete when two heads of quarrelsome governments are heavily armed, but if either realizes that while his army is the best of its size in the world it is still not large enough to overrun and destroy a neighbor, he will incline to talk it over and settle differences some other way.

Abolish overgrown armies and navies and there will at once be an opening for the Council of Conciliation, the Court for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes and the Board of Arbitration. If we can take away from the heads of governments, from the heads of all governments, the power to make war, *or to make conditions that compel war*, and take it so far away that they will forget that they ever had any connection with such things, the people will do the rest. The people, I believe, may be relied on not to condemn themselves to destruction. They will not put themselves into the hell of Verdun or Gallipoli.

From this you may surmise that I am pleading for democracy, and so I am, for I believe that democracy spells peace.

If the Republic of Russia really has been set up on a firm foundation, if the people of that country are to have a real voice in disposing of their own lives and fortunes, the "Bear that walks like a man" will cease to be a menace to Europe.

Already the republicans of Russia have spoken a sympathetic word to the Poles in whom a century of oppression has not stifled

the hope of independence. For the first time since the Grand Duchy of Finland fell victim to the rapacity of the Romanoffs, there is a sympathetic feeling in Helsingfors for what is being done in Petrograd.

I do not sympathize with the suggestion that the Russians should not try for a republic, that they are not yet ripe for such complete freedom. It may be that all the people in the world are not yet sufficiently advanced for self-government, but all are advanced beyond the need of despotism, all are entitled to have a try at free representative government. It is better to have democracy with occasional disorder than autocracy with unremitting oppression.

#### EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

The wars that are begotten by huge military preparations put all sorts of financial and social burdens on the people. Modern wars, these huge scientific, mechanical wars, mean bankruptcy to nations that engage in them. They postpone indefinitely projects for the social betterment of the people. They mean inferior houses for the family, less vigorous children, thus passing on their miseries to the innocent unborn, inferior schools, undernourishing for women and children and the physically less fit men who have not been sent to the trenches. They mean increasing contributions from the earnings of labor to meet interest charges and to prepare for other wars that ambitious monarchs look forward to. They engender hatred between peoples that holds back civilization and prepares for other calamities, for be it remembered that "Wars still other wars do breed." They break friendly relations between neighbors in a country like ours where the citizens are contributions from all branches of the human family.

If we would not disturb the peace of the world with internal dissension we must be tolerant and patient. Good American citizens who were "Saxon and Norman and Dane," Teuton, Kelt or Frank, each with a lingering interest in, and affection for, the country of his origin live side by side in our republic. Their diverse origin makes it more difficult to keep the peace than among an absolutely homogeneous people. The situation calls for a wide tolerance, for great wisdom and patience.

Suspicion of the loyalty of a citizen just because he was born in Germany, or is the son of a man who was born in Germany, is

unworthy the great republic and grossly unjust in nearly every case. By unjust suspicions and persecution men of spirit who are loyal may be made rebellious in time. All citizens have a right to be judged by their previous conduct and character. Suspicion, sensationalism and intolerance are the worst features of the war psychology and we have it now in an exaggerated form.

In the American Revolution of 1776 there were many earnest supporters of the Colonies who were born in Great Britain. Many sons of Englishmen, Scotchmen and Irishmen whose relatives in the old country wore the uniform of King George followed Washington from the beginning in Massachusetts to the ending at Yorktown. We have monuments to the memory of von Steuben, Kosciusko and Lafayette all in one small square in Washington. I do not doubt for a moment that in the war with Germany many German-born men and their sons will loyally and effectively support the American republic and they ought not to be insulted by unjust suspicion or worried by the unthinking who show their patriotism in violence. Let us try to protect them from a suspicion that is so frequently insulting, and from the nagging and annoyance that espionage bills and such un-American legislation will make possible.

We must live with these people after the war and it will contribute to the cause of internal and external peace if we will remember their embarrassing situation and treat them as Americans should be treated.

May I, in closing, quote two or three sentences from the great speech made in London recently by the great, little Welshman, now the real head of the British government? Take these words of David Lloyd George home with you:

I am the last man in the world to say that the success which is given from America is not in itself something to rejoice at greatly. But I also say that I can see more in the knowledge that America is going to win a right to sit at a conference table when the terms of peace are discussed. That conference will settle the destiny of nations and the course of human life for God knows how many ages. It would have been a tragedy, a tragedy for mankind, if America had not been heard there and with all her influence and her power.

I can see peace, not a peace to be a beginning of war, not a peace which will be an endless preparation for strife and bloodshed, but a real peace. Europe has always lived under the menace of the sword. When this war began two thirds of Europe was under autocratic rule. Now it is the other way about and democracy means peace.

Many strange things have happened in this war, aye, and stranger things will come and are coming rapidly. Six weeks ago Russia was an autocracy. She now is one of the most advanced democracies in the world.

Today we are waging the most devastating war the world has ever seen. Tomorrow, tomorrow, not perhaps distant tomorrows, war may be abolished forever from the category of human crimes.

## THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ISOLATION IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE

BY JOHN H. LATANÉ, PH.D., LL.D.,  
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During the one hundred years following the treaty of Ghent the United States engaged in two foreign wars: the Mexican War, which lasted from May 13, 1846, to February 2, 1848, and the Spanish War, which lasted from April 21 to August 12, 1898. The combined length of these two wars was a few days over two years. During the same period the entire American continent was singularly free from wars of importance or of long duration, either between American states or between American and European states. No other part of the world can show a record at all comparable to this. If, therefore, we are in search of bases for a just and durable peace, we should examine the public policies of America rather than of Europe.

During this century of comparative peace with other nations the foreign policy of the United States has been guided by two great principles, the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of political isolation or the avoidance of entangling alliances. The Monroe Doctrine is a guarantee of the *status quo*, the only principle on which the peace of the world can securely rest. The policy of isolation means the absence in time of peace of alliances which have been a necessary condition to all great wars. If there had been no European alliance in July, 1914, and if the several countries, free from the obligations which such alliances impose, had been able to choose the course dictated by their highest interests, does any one believe that there would have been a world war? Is it going too far to assert that the

future peace of the world depends upon a world-wide acceptance of these two American principles: no disturbance of the *status quo* by any one state or group of states for selfish ends, and no permanent alliances between states or groups of states? So far, therefore, from abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and our historic policy of avoiding entangling alliances, President Wilson proposed in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, that these two American policies should be internationalized and given world-wide application. In holding out the expectation that the United States would join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing a permanent peace he said:

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

The President has here stated, it seems to me, the two essential principles on which the future peace of the world must rest. He has clothed them in American habiliments so as to avoid the appearance of breaking too violently with the traditions of the past. Nevertheless the attempt to internationalize these two principles of our foreign policy involves the risk of sacrificing them altogether, and many Americans will undoubtedly oppose what will be considered an idealistic effort to extend to the rest of the world the benefits of a policy which hitherto we have enjoyed exclusively.

On the contrary I am convinced as the result of the changes of the last twenty years that the time is at hand when we must either abandon the Monroe Doctrine altogether, or resort to an alliance to maintain it, or to some form of world federation to extend it. For nearly a century we have upheld without an army, and until recently without a large navy, a policy which has been described as an impertinence to Latin America and a standing defiance to Europe. Has the Monroe Doctrine rested on moral force alone, or, if not, by what magic have we defended it so effectively against

all the world without the exercise of physical force? Few Americans have ever considered this question. Notwithstanding the many discussions of the Monroe Doctrine that we have had in recent years, this phase of the subject has been largely neglected. As a matter of fact the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in the past has been due not to our own might, but wholly to the balance of power in Europe. Some European power would long ago have come in and called our bluff, that is, made us give up the doctrine or fight for it, had it not been for the well-grounded fear that some other European power would start an attack in the rear. Every time that the Monroe Doctrine has been called in question conditions outside of America have determined the issue. Let us review briefly some of these instances.

In the first place, the original declaration of President Monroe would have had little effect, but for the known attitude of England and the strength of her navy. The international situation at that time was a very interesting one. When Napoleon overthrew the Spanish monarchy in 1808 and placed his brother Joseph on the throne, the colonies of Spain refused to recognize the new sovereign and, as the combined fleets of France and Spain had been destroyed by Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon and Joseph were unable to extend their authority over Spanish America. The Spanish colonies thus drifted into independence in spite of themselves. Released from an unreasonable and oppressive colonial system they set up provisional governments, and immediately threw their ports open to English and American vessels. An extensive trade soon sprang up, and with English and American goods came English and American ideas. Spain's colonies thus passed through a period of enlightenment which shaped their future action. When, after the overthrow of Napoleon, their lawful sovereign Ferdinand VII was restored to his throne, he failed to realize the changes that had taken place and undertook to refasten on the colonies the old colonial system and to shut out all foreign commerce. The colonies naturally resisted and thus began the war of independence. By 1822 Spanish authority had been everywhere overthrown, and the United States formally recognized the independence of the Spanish-American republics.

Meanwhile the powers of Europe had held a series of congresses, beginning with that of Vienna, for the purpose of undoing

the work of Napoleon, restoring as far as possible the old order, and suppressing new attempts at revolution in Piedmont, Naples and Spain. At Verona in 1822 they decided to send a French army into Spain for the purpose of suppressing the new constitution and restoring Ferdinand to absolute power. Against this intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, Wellington, who represented England at the conference, protested, and when his protest was not heeded he formally withdrew. This marked the final withdrawal of England from the grand alliance which had overthrown Napoleon. The British government considered the question of opposing by force the French invasion of Spain, but finally decided not to act. By the summer of 1823 the Spanish constitutionalists were overthrown and Ferdinand was restored to absolute power. Absolutism reigned once more in western Europe.

The reactionary powers, which constituted the so-called Holy Alliance, felt, however, that their work was incomplete so long as Spain's colonies remained unsubdued. They decided, therefore, to hold a conference in Paris to consider the question of assisting Spain to recover her revolted provinces. It was at this crisis that George Canning, the British foreign secretary, called into conference Dr. Richard Rush, the American minister at London, and proposed that England and the United States form an alliance to prevent the proposed intervention of the Holy Allies in Spanish America. England's interest in the matter was mainly commercial; ours mainly political. After mature deliberation President Monroe and his cabinet wisely decided that, in view of the fact that the attitude of England was known to the powers of Europe, an independent declaration on the part of the United States would have all the effect of an alliance without any of its embarrassing features. He, therefore, delivered in his annual message to Congress a broadside declaration against European intervention in America, which did not except even England. Canning was much chagrined. He had proposed an Anglo-American alliance, and in reply the United States made a declaration which he had the foresight to see might be used against England itself in the future. Furthermore the attitude of the British government was known only to the chancelleries of Europe, while Monroe's declaration was made to the world at large. When, therefore, the European powers dropped the project of intervention in America the United States got all the

credit. A few months later England formally recognized the independence of the Spanish-American republics, and Canning made his famous boast on the floor of the House of Commons that he had "called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old."

The most serious strain to which the Monroe Doctrine was ever subjected was the attempt of Louis Napoleon during the American Civil War to establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. He was clever enough to induce England and Spain to go in with him in 1861 for the avowed purpose of collecting the claims of their subjects against the government of Mexico. Before the joint intervention had gone very far, however, these two powers became convinced that Napoleon had ulterior designs and withdrew their forces. Napoleon's Mexican venture was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern Confederacy. Hence, his friendly relations with the Confederate commissioners and the talk of an alliance between the Confederacy and Maximilian backed by the power of France. Against each successive step taken by France in Mexico, Mr. Seward, Lincoln's secretary of state, protested. As the Civil War drew to a successful conclusion his protests became more and more emphatic. Finally, in the spring of 1866, the United States government began massing troops on the Mexican border and Mr. Seward sent what was practically an ultimatum to the French Emperor; he requested to know when the long promised withdrawal of the French troops would take place. Napoleon replied, fixing the dates for their withdrawal in three separate detachments.

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States, which was, of course, greater at that time than at any other time in our history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but I am convinced that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme. Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact



endanger his throne. He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. In order to have a free hand to meet the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands. As the European situation developed he decided to withdraw his troops before the dates agreed upon and to leave Maximilian to his fate. Thus the Monroe Doctrine was vindicated!

Let us take next President Cleveland's intervention in the Venezuelan boundary dispute. Here surely was a clear and spectacular vindication of the Monroe Doctrine which no one can discount. Let us briefly examine the facts. Some 30,000 square miles of territory on the border of Venezuela and British Guiana were in dispute. Venezuela, a weak and helpless state, had offered to submit the question to arbitration. Great Britain, powerful and overbearing, refused. After a long correspondence, ably conducted by Secretary Olney, had failed to move the British government, President Cleveland decided to intervene. In a message to Congress in December, 1896, President Cleveland reviewed the controversy at length, declared that the acquisition of territory in America on the part of a European power through the arbitrary advance of a boundary line was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and asked Congress for an appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission which he proposed to appoint for the purpose of determining the true boundary, which he said it would then be our duty to uphold. Lest there should be any misunderstanding as to his intentions he solemnly added: "In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow." Congress promptly voted the appropriation.

Here was a bold and unqualified defiance of England. No one before had ever trod so roughly on the British lion's tail with impunity. The English-speaking public on both sides of the Atlantic was stunned and amazed. Outside of diplomatic circles few persons were aware that any subject of controversy between the two countries existed, and no one had any idea that it was of a serious nature. Suddenly the two nations found themselves on the point of war. After the first outburst of indignation, the storm passed; and before the American boundary commission could make its report England signed an arbitration agreement with Venezuela. Some persons

after looking in vain for an explanation have concluded that Lord Salisbury's failure to deal more seriously with Mr. Cleveland's affront to the British government was due to his sense of humor.

But here again the true explanation is to be found in events that were happening in other quarters of the globe. Cleveland's Venezuelan message was sent to Congress on December 17. At the end of the year came Dr. Jameson's raid into the Transvaal and on the third of January the German Kaiser sent his famous telegram of congratulation to Paul Kruger. The wrath of England was suddenly diverted from America to Germany, and Lord Salisbury avoided a rupture with the United States over a matter which after all was not of such serious moment to England in order to be free to deal with a question involving much greater interests in South Africa. The Monroe Doctrine was none the less effectively vindicated.

In 1902 Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. You will remember that in that year Germany, England, and Italy made a naval demonstration against Venezuela for the purpose of forcing her to recognize as valid certain claims of their citizens. How England was led into the trap is still a mystery, but the Kaiser thought that he had her fixed, that if England once started in with him she could not turn against him. But he had evidently not profited by the experience of Napoleon III in 1861. Through the mediation of Herbert Bowen, the American minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy accepted this offer and withdrew their squadrons. Germany, however, remained for a time obdurate. This much was known at the time.

A rather sensational account of what followed next has recently been made public in Thayer's *Life and Letters of John Hay*. Into the merits of the controversy that arose over Thayer's statement of the Roosevelt-Holleben interview it is not necessary to enter. The significant fact, that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure, is, I am satisfied, established. Admiral Dewey stated publicly that the entire American fleet was assembled at the time under his command in Porto Rican waters ready to move at a moment's notice. Why did Germany back down from her position? Her navy was supposed to be at least as powerful as ours. The reason why the Kaiser concluded not to measure strength with

the United States was that England had accepted arbitration and withdrawn her support and he did not dare attack the United States with the British navy in his rear. Again the nicely adjusted European balance prevented the Monroe Doctrine from being put to the test of actual war.

It must be abundantly evident to all that our historic policy of isolation has been rendered possible only by the existence of the balance of power in Europe. We have never been too weak to tip the scales. But in recent years a new element has entered into the international situation and that element is the naval and military power of Japan. Formerly we had the European balance *plus* the United States. Recently we have had the European balance *plus* the United States *plus* Japan. Scarcely had the United States acquired Hawaii and the Philippines and committed itself to the open door policy in China when Japan emerged victorious from the war with Russia as a full-fledged world power ready to contest with us supremacy in the Pacific. American diplomacy, hitherto limited in its aims to the American continent, was suddenly confronted with complex problems which were world-wide in their ramifications. The Anglo-Japanese alliance has been in effect a guarantee of peace between Japan and the United States, for England would never consent to back Japan in a war with us. But the Anglo-Japanese alliance appears to be doomed. Japan and Russia have recently formed an alliance, the exact terms of which have not been made public, but which undoubtedly aims at the further exploitation of Manchuria and the defeat of the open door policy in a large part of China. If the new Russo-Japanese alliance supplants the older alliance with England, as now seems likely, our position in the Pacific will be very seriously weakened. The Japanese shift from England to Russia will naturally force England and the United States into closer accord. How far the Russian revolution will weaken the Russo-Japanese alliance cannot yet be foreseen.

If the old system of alliances and balances of power is to prevail after the war, we shall have not a revival of the old European balance, but a new world balance, England, France, and the United States forming the basis of one group, Russia and Japan of the other, with Germany for the time being isolated, like France after the overthrow of Napoleon. Such a condition would mean the indefinite continuance of large armaments, secret diplomacy, and endless

intrigue. The only other possibility is that before the war ends Germany will weld the opposing powers into such a firm league that peace will not dissolve it but rather transform it into some form of permanent world federation. This is the hope of mankind, and the more closely we ally ourselves with England, France, and democratic Russia, the more surely will this dream of a federation of the world become a reality.

It is useless to advocate a strict adherence to the traditions of the fathers. The old order has already passed away, though some of our representatives in the halls of Congress are reluctant to recognize the fact. The United States stands already committed to world-wide democracy and internationalism. Hitherto we have stood defensively for these principles and we have been willing to fight for them only in America. We are now to fight for their universal recognition. President Monroe's declaration in favor of guaranteeing to free states the right of self-development will be given a world-wide application, and the American policy of avoiding entangling alliances will become the cornerstone of the new league. On no other basis can we go into a league to enforce peace. We must not be the buffer between alliances and ententes. The other states must go into the league on the same basis that we go in on, that is, without any treaty obligations to any other power or group of powers within the league. Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of the United States provided that no state should enter into any alliances. The adoption by all the great powers of the American policy of isolation should be the first step toward a League to Enforce Peace or any sort of world-confederation.

We may not at first be able to prevent ententes, but we can and should prohibit alliances. The alliance has always been the chief weapon of autocracy. Democracies are going to decide issues as they arise on their merits and not tie their hands in advance. No government can take away from a democracy its right in an emergency to declare for war or peace. Even the British government in July, 1914, could give no definite guarantees as to what course England would pursue in the event of war between Germany and France.

After the war, then, our choice lies between a world balance of power based on two great alliances, in one of which we must take our place, or some form of world confederation; in other words,

between *two* leagues or *one*. Can any one have any doubt as to which system is preferable? The one means militarism and the economic burden of even larger armaments than the world has yet seen; the other means international democracy, responsible diplomacy, and, eventually, a just and durable peace.

## TWO EVENTS THAT PRESAGE A DURABLE PEACE

BY OSCAR S. STRAUS,

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One naturally asks: Why discuss the problems of a durable peace at this stage? Why draw plans for the rebuilding of the international household when the fire is still burning, and we do not quite yet know how extensive the devastation will be?

Such a discussion has great value, none the less, because it educates our own mind. It educates the minds of the American people. It prepares us for that larger world view which we must have in order to take our proper share in the reconstruction of the world. As the President has said, with such great wisdom, we are willing to contribute the Monroe Doctrine to this world reconstruction in order that there may be an international Monroe Doctrine.

To do that, we need to enlarge our views, we need education in this country for international mindedness. Most of us, I think, have changed our views considerably since this war began. Many of our wise pacifists have developed into belligerent pacifists. I confess I belong to that school myself. Before this war began, the proposition presented itself in the glaring phrase, "Utopia or hell!" Can you blame us for choosing Utopia? We did not realize that we had to wade through the jaws of hell to reach Utopia. America is ready to march through hell to secure democratic freedom and the permanent peace of the world, founded upon law and justice.

When the German Chancellor sought to justify the invasion of Belgium by characterizing the solemn international engagement for the neutralization of Belgium as a "scrap of paper," the phrase was new and expressive but the act itself was old. It was a glaring and concrete translation of the Machiavellian doctrine of state, which some of the leading German philosophers and militarists, notably Treitschke and Bernhardi, had been preaching for a generation, that might makes right and that when the highest interests

of a state, as interpreted by *itself*, came in conflict with the accepted principles of international right, that those interests must prevail, thus making of international right a "scrap of paper."

The Berlin Congress of 1878, which met after the Turko-Russian War to prevent the threatening European War, was attended by the foremost statesmen of the great powers to adjust international differences and to create new Balkan states out of principalities under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The condition upon which these new states were constituted and recognized—notably Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia—was that under the new governments these states should grant to all of their inhabitants equality of rights, civil and religious.

The ink upon the charter which transformed the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia into the independent state of Rumania was scarcely dry when that kingdom violated the basic conditions of its foundation by not only denying equal rights to her Jewish population, but by oppressing them in body and soul under the most cruel and barbaric restrictions, so that thousands of them were forced to flee and many of them sought refuge in this and other countries. Other violations soon followed. Bulgaria attached to herself eastern Rumelia. A few years later Austria ruthlessly violated the Treaty of Berlin by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. This violation directly resulted in the tragedy at Serajevo when the Crown Prince and Princess of Austria were murdered. Out of this last violation the "scraps of paper" which tore up the Berlin Treaty lit the flame that directly produced this world war.

Prussian militarism on its side made a "scrap of paper" of her most solemn international engagements and caused the march of the mighty armies of Germany through Belgium, working havoc and ruin, violating every principle not only of peace but of war. Civilization was stunned and the allied nations, unprepared as they were, were compelled to come to the rescue.

Our country was slow and unwilling to believe that a people so enlightened as the Germans, who were in the vanguard in science and culture, would justify this violation and cruel breach of international faith on the part of their rulers and their militaristic establishment. But, alas, it soon became evident that the philosophies of their Treitschkes and Bernhardis, which had dethroned righteousness and justice, had eaten into the hearts and corrupted the

souls of the dominant classes in Germany. The American people, thoroughly imbued with the ideals of the fathers of our republic and with the doctrine of Monroe defining our continental policy, to hold aloof from the affairs of European states, were slow to recognize the real issues of the war, which involve the basic principles of civilization and the existence of free government throughout the world. When Germany began her submarine blockade and sunk the *Lusitania* and scores of other merchant ships, we were at last compelled to recognize that our rights and the rights of other neutral nations on land and sea, which had been built up through the process of ages by the gradual advance of civilization, were with shocking ruthlessness and outrageousness being violated with increasing horror by Germany.

Our government was patient and long enduring. With every effort to maintain and safeguard our rights as a neutral nation, German frightfulness projected us into this war. President Wilson clearly and cogently set forth all of this in his memorable address to Congress in a state paper which will rank among the great documents of the history of civilization giving the reasons which forced America to take up arms to uphold civilization, to "spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured."

He further stated: "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants." The President in this memorable passage expounds an historical and clarifying truth: why in the past the concerted efforts on the part of nations to maintain a durable peace have invariably failed.

I refer to these circumstances, so recently transpired and which are fresh in our minds, in order to call more specific attention to the problems of a durable peace. Those problems have been not only exposed but clarified by the two important events which have within the past few weeks taken place; namely, the dethronement of Czardom with the establishment of free government in Russia, and the entrance of the United States into the world war to uphold free government.

Autocracies are necessarily militaristic. They have their birth in might and are maintained by might. Democracies have



their birth to secure equality of rights and therefore must rest on justice. With the success of the Allies it is not only fair to presume, but most probable, that there will be no menacing autocratic powers after the termination of the present war. The democratic nations will be preponderant and they will have learned the lesson to be vigilant, so that for the first time in history the leading powers of the world being democratic will be privileged to enter into a partnership that will give security, under a league of democracies, for the perpetuation of freedom and the equal rights of all its constituents, great and small. Under the domination of autocratic nations the international relationship of the world was in an anarchistic state. But under the league of democratic nations the international relationship of the world can and doubtless will be secured upon the broad and lasting foundation of international justice.

## A BASIS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND

BY WILLIAM C. BULLITT,

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I shall not attempt to deal with the problems of durable peace in general but shall try to concentrate attention on one of those zones of hostility and hatred in which a conflagration is likely to arise and to wreck a durable peace after it has apparently been made.

There are, of course, many such zones in the world. There is the zone in the Pacific where the interests of the United States and Japan conflict. There is the zone in the Balkans where the interests of Russia and Austria conflict; but I wish to call your attention to the zone in the North Sea, where the hatred of Germany and England concentrates. And I shall try to explain the source of that hatred and a method by which it may be eliminated.

I do not think that the hostility of Germany and England springs primarily from commercial and industrial rivalry. I do not think that England's hatred of Germany springs primarily from her wrath at the violation of Belgium and the atrocities com-

mitted in Belgium and France. I do not think it springs from envy of the growth of Germany's power in the past decade. I do not think that Germany's hatred of England springs primarily from envy of the vast British Colonial Empire or from the belief which is widespread in Germany, unbelievable as it may seem on this side of the water, that England started and organized the present war.

None of these things, to my mind, is at the bottom of the hostility between Germany and England. It lies much deeper; in the thing which is usually at the bottom of a great hatred—fear. Fear on the part of Germany, that the British fleet will starve her to death; fear, on the part of England, that the German submarines will starve her to death.

How legitimate are these fears is shown vividly by the condition of affairs in both those countries today—Germany on the verge of starvation; England afraid that in six months, if the submarine campaign goes on, she will be on the verge of starvation. But these fears are not simply things of today. They are inherent in the economic life and geographical position of those two great industrial nations, cooped together in the same corner of Europe.

Germany, today, scarcely less than England, is dependent upon the sea for her life. She has ceased to produce enough food to support her people. She may be able to live through the present war with closed frontiers, but her agriculture has already been raised to a very high state of development. It is not susceptible of much greater development, and with her normal increase of population in ten years she will be utterly unable to live with closed frontiers. Her life will be in the gun muzzles of the British fleet. Moreover, she earns her livelihood largely by importing raw materials, turning them into finished products, and exporting the finished products, and for this entire process she must have security on the sea. Furthermore, the fear that she will be cut off by the British fleet from her supplies of food and raw products is kept constantly in front of her by the fact that every German ship that goes to the ocean must pass by the door of England. Her ships can reach the open ocean only by way of the Channel or the North Sea, which is in truth but another channel, varying from three to four hundred miles in width, which can be controlled almost as easily by the fleet based on the Orkneys as the Channel is controlled by the fleet based on Portsmouth.

I don't think you can realize unless you have gone to bed hungry in Berlin during the war, how intensely every class in Germany, from the top of the Foreign Office to the end of the minority Socialist party, is determined that in some way there must come out of this war something which will eliminate the danger of being cut off from overseas supplies.

The German Conservatives have their solution. They say, "All we have to do is to build a bigger fleet than England or simply destroy England altogether." Fortunately, that is more easily dreamed than accomplished. For until England is willing to commit suicide, she will retain her present naval supremacy. She lives partly on her banking, to be sure, but vitally on the earnings of her shipping, on her imports of raw products, on her exports of finished products. Furthermore, her relationship with her colonies imposes on her the obligation of defending them, and this she accomplishes, not by maintaining fleets in their waters, but by a concentration of force in the North Sea, which is at once the base of defense and attack for the whole world.

But this very supremacy in the North Sea, which England must maintain, means a perpetual latent control of German commerce. This is the vicious circle of fear which produces the hatred and enmity between England and Germany. So long as the fleets of each threaten the merchantmen of the other, so long will there be fear and hatred and war between them.

The President of the United States perceived this a long time ago, and in January, 1915, in order to attempt to reconcile Germany and England, he sent an emissary to both those countries to propose what I consider one of the wisest plans that has ever been put forward by the great man, for I believe he, who is our President, is a great man.

The emissary of the President was ordered to propose that Germany and England and all the other nations in the world should agree that even in time of war, all merchantmen, both belligerent and neutral, should be unhindered in their passage except when carrying contraband, and that contraband should be confined strictly to munitions of war. This would mean that even in time of war the merchantmen of England and Germany would come unhindered into port, that there would be no starvation of civilian populations, that there would be no threat of such starvation.

And I believe that it would mean that the fear which is at the bottom of the hostility between those nations would be eliminated and that in time, perhaps a decade or two, their mutual interest in the peaceful development of the undeveloped portions of the earth would lead to their coöperation and ultimately to their friendship.

The leaders of the German army and navy and of the Conservative parties met the President's proposal with a most emphatic "No!" They said, "We will not give up our great offensive weapon, the submarine, by which some day we shall be able to starve England into submission." But on the other hand, the Socialists, the Radicals, and Von Jagow, who was at that time the head of the Foreign Office, assented to the President's proposal. They said, "We are willing to agree to give up our weapon of offense if we can make sure that we shall never have to suffer again the food shortage which is sucking the blood of our children, our wives and our parents." And although these men are not in control of Germany today, there has been every indication in the past few months that they will be in control of Germany when the war closes, and I believe that in the peace conference Germany will stand firmly behind the President's proposal.

When the President's emissary reached England, he met almost exactly the same reception as in Germany. The Conservatives said, "No, never! We will never give up the means by which we killed Napoleon, by which we are killing Germany today. We will never give up the commercial blockade!" But the labor leaders, the Socialists, and particularly the group of Liberals led by Lord Loreburn, accepted the suggestion, and Sir Edward Grey himself was inclined very strongly in that direction. Then the sinking of the *Lusitania* killed all hope of immediate reconciliation between Germany and England; and the subsequent career of the President's proposal I have not time to trace.

But the fact is that when the peace conference comes, the President's proposal will again be pushed by the representative of the United States. And I believe that England can be brought to back this proposal, although the sentiment there today, I imagine, would be against it. I believe that she will accept it ultimately for the reason that the submarine in the next six months will bring home to her what it means to fear starvation, what it means to be afraid that not only yourself, but also your children and your parents will not have food.

Furthermore, it has come to be generally recognized in the British Foreign Office, that England has been able to carry out her blockade of Germany, not merely because of her fleet, but also because we have been willing to acquiesce in that blockade because we believe, on the whole, that her cause has been just and that her triumph will be to the interest of the whole world. Furthermore, England knows that the submarine is still a relatively undeveloped weapon, and that no one can tell how fatal to merchant shipping the super-submarine of the future may become.

I therefore believe, that if the President has the united support of America on this proposition, it will go through, particularly in view of a recent addition which the government has made to it. The addition is this: that although the right to stop merchantmen in time of war should be taken away from any individual state, it should be reserved to all the nations of the world acting collectively through the League to Enforce Peace. In other words, the league would carry the pistol which would be denied to any individual state. This addition will remove the chief objection of the British Conservatives; which is that the German army, if this plan should be adopted, would dictate the course of events in Europe; for the League to Enforce Peace would hold in its hands a counterpoise to balance the power of the German army.

It is, I believe, the duty of all Americans who are interested in a durable peace to back the President in this proposal, because I see no other way whereby the hatred between Germany and England can be abolished, and unless that hatred can be done away with, unless the roots of it can be cut, while the League to Enforce Peace may prolong peace, it will never establish a peace which can be considered durable.

Furthermore, if this proposal should be adopted, if the starvation of civilian populations should be taken out of war, a great step forward will have been made in the establishment of decent international *mores*. And after all, we are entering this war for one purpose and one only—that better international *mores* may be established on the earth.

## THE DISPOSITION OF CONSTANTINOPLE

BY TALCOTT WILLIAMS,

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Permanent and universal peace, for which the world yearns and today travails in agony, can only come with permanent and universal righteousness. The vexed questions of the hour can only reach a final settlement as they are settled in justice. The issues involved in Constantinople and its disposition are difficult. So far, in modern history, they have been insuperable, because they are involved in a larger issue which no nation, large or small, has yet been willing to face on any one definite principle, framed in justice and applied with impartiality. The question of Constantinople is not, fundamentally, the disposition of a city, but the disposition of two waterways connecting open seas.

On the open seas, the nations are agreed in demanding an equal freedom and equal security for neutrals, or were until the use of the submarine and the new application of the old doctrine of the continuous voyage, one by Germany and the other by Great Britain, have raised disputed questions. In peace and in war, however, international law and the nations are agreed on the general principle and constant policy which makes the open sea free to all, open to all, and protected by all, though the major share of their protection has been extended by the English and American navies. English justice has, to take modern times, hung more pirates than all the rest of the world put together. American courts come next. Both navies have together cleared the seas of piracy, and of claims like that of Spain to broad realms in the Spanish main. The ships of all lands have profited by their work.

On straits and ways from sea to sea, the world has no such agreements and no common concern or uniform principle. Once all straits were owned and held at a price for passage. Denmark claimed the Skagerack, and England the Channel with an assertion of supremacy over all the Seven Seas about the British Isles. Even a century ago, Barbary pirates held the Straits of Gibraltar, the heirs of long generations of ocean pirates from the red-flagged Phœnician traders 3,000 years ago, carrying on sail and prow the open

hand of Astarte. Her emblem survived to our own recent day in the marauding flags of the Mediterranean. It had its final western legacy in the death's head of the "Jolly Roger," for the mark of the Semitic goddess guarded both the dead and the living.

The Barbary pirate is gone after centuries in which his ravages were early recorded on Latin inscriptions on Spanish coasts and in Spanish towns in the days of the Antonines, and in the records of our own sea-faring churches on Cape Cod, and the New England coast at the close of the eighteenth century. The Dane no longer demands Danegeld and the English Channel had become as free as the oceans and seas about, until the submarine came to make or to mar international law as the wages of battle may at last decide. The control of the straits will remain undecided, and the peace of the waters will be limited and strained by their work and put to naught at every channel from sea to sea or from ocean to ocean, until the wise rule and principle is adopted that straits, natural or artificial, connecting seas must be as free to peaceful trade as the seas they join and as forefended to belligerents as any neutral ocean waters.

This principle will be a shock to many, particularly to the two nations, England and America, who first asserted and created the peace of the seas from Drake to Decatur and have, at the cost of more than one war, asserted neutral rights on the high seas in the presence of belligerent flags. None the less, to the principle that straits and connecting waterways should be free as the seas to the world's mercantile marine, and no more closed to belligerent flags than neutral harbors, the world's practice steadily tends. The Ottoman Empire, it is often forgotten, adopted this principle and practice when European governments were asserting proprietary rights over every strait and channel which joined the world's wide waters from sea to ocean. Before the end of the seventeenth century, the Sublime Porte laid down the doctrine that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should always be open to the merchantmen of all countries and always closed to the man-of-war of all ensigns. English, French and Russian mercantile flags were flapping and turning as the vessels that carried them were tacking in the narrow beats of these straits at the very time when the naval ensigns of these three lands were wiping out the last strong fleet of the Sultan in 1827 at Navarino, when the French were depriving the Ottoman

Empire of the territorial rights in Algeria and Russia crushing the last remnant of the Turkish fleet in Sinope in 1852, and so on, up and down in a period of three centuries, this immunity for mercantile flags survived in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus wide-spread hostilities, until these acts led to a declaration of war. At this, as at many other points of international practice, the Sublime Porte under a long succession of Sultans, in its days of triumph and of defeat from Mohammed the Conqueror (El Ghasi) to Mohammed V, in the twentieth century, has shown a forbearance, a wise tolerance, a readiness to give all creeds protection to which the lamentable and cruel massacres of one period and another, including our own, should not lead us to be blind in surveying the past or foreseeing the future.

This ancient principle was affirmed by England in the treaty negotiated by the dauntless Stratford de Radcliffe. Still in early manhood, in 1809, it was repeated by England, Austria and Prussia in the treaty of 1840, and France agreed to it in 1841. The wisdom of this practice was affirmed at every stage of this question in the Congress of Paris in 1856, the Convention of London in 1870, and in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. At every stage since, up to the present war, this has been the accepted doctrine. But in war it has always silently disappeared as in the past. The freedom of straits has never anywhere rested on the same basis as the freedom of the seas.

The freedom of the seas has been secured, because there the interests of all states are equal. The freedom of straits has not been secured because in them, the interests of states are not equal. Each country has followed its self-interest. The world's leading straits are in the hands of England and America. England holds the two gates of the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. The United States holds the Panama Canal. Each country has talked the neutrality of other straits and acted and enacted control of its own. Gibraltar was seized July 24, 1704, by a *coup de main* when England had not declared war on Spain, though hostilities over the Spanish succession had begun in Flanders with France. The attacking fleet was English and Dutch, but Admiral Sir George Rooke hoisted the English flag above the Rock and there it has been ever since, controlling the navigation of the straits, never more completely than today. The Suez Canal began neutral in



peace and in war, belligerent ships being excluded. Arabi Pasha took these pledges at their face value and lost Egypt to the Egyptians, whose labor built the canal. The Sublime Porte tried to apply to it the "ancient principle," which had guided the policy of the Ottoman Empire in the two water-ways indispensable to the safety of the Turkish capital; but the first breath of war destroyed guaranties signed and sealed, not on one but several "scraps of paper."

The Panama Canal began neutral. It is today under the complete control of the United States. No administration will permit any other disposition in the present posture of the world's governance. It is fortified. It will be defended against all comers. All vessels pay the same dues but they are not under the same rights and they never will be, while international rights have no protection by land or by sea but force.

England and the United States have each an immediate and direct interest—one in Gibraltar and Suez, and the other in Panama, greater than any other land, one by its tonnage, and Indian empire, and the other by its territory, its trade and its twin coasts connected by the rift in the American Isthmus. Each is powerful enough to enforce this right against all comers. Neither will yield either strait. But as long as these straits are so held, no country dependent on a strait will be satisfied or can be satisfied by any control, short of that which broods an ever present power, at Gibraltar, Suez, and Panama. The instant that power weakens, some other flag will fly over each strait.

Unfortunately, instead of being early claimed by one strong power with special and particular rights, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are equally needed by two strong powers and are necessary to the very existence of the empire which has so long held them. Neither Russia nor the Teuton alliance can treat as negligible the control of these straits. If the Mississippi flowed not into a gulf, but a closed sea, whose exits were the Panama Canal into the Pacific, and the Windward Passage into the Atlantic, we would never trust the key of either in the hands of any power, weak or strong. The straits which separate Europe and Asia are the real mouths of the Danube on one side, and on the other of the Dnieper, the Don and the Volga, connected with the Don by the canal from Kamgskin to Rasponiskata.

If Turkey has remained in its present control of this access to the mouths of these streams, through the Black Sea, it is because neither Russia nor its Teuton neighbors were strong enough to seize these straits against United Europe. They cannot today. Neither will ever be satisfied with the other.

These two powers are evenly matched as to each other. They have the same conflict as to landways as to waterways. Neither Russia nor the Teutonic powers can leave the control of the one practicable railroad across the Balkans from Belgrade to Salonica to chance. They can no more permit a weak power like Serbia to control one end of this rail route to the Aegean, to the Suez Canal, and to the world's commerce, or another weak power like Greece to control the other end at Salonica, any more than we could permit a weak power like Venezuela to hold the key to our ocean door. No strong power can safely permit this, if it can help itself, and no strong power will if it can do better, as witness the eligible vantage sites occupied by England.

The question of Constantinople is really the question, therefore, not of an ancient city or even of an imperial capital. It is the question of adjusting and securing freedom of access for a population of 260,000,000 in the Teutonic Alliance, Russia and the Balkan States by railroad lines and two straits, to the Mediterranean and the commerce of the world.

The states in our Union are by every possible measure far more homogeneous than the group of lands, tongues and races which need and must have free impartial passage over these lands and water-ways to the South. But for the general authority over foreign and interstate commerce by land and water possessed by the federal government, our own states would have plundered each other whenever one of them had control of any eligible land or water route. New York and New Jersey both levied tribute on passenger and freight traffic two generations ago, one by the head tax on the Camden and Amboy, and the other by rates on the Erie Canal, rates which paid off the capital cost of the water-way in about 40 years, with interest.

Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary and the Balkan States cannot possibly trust each other with the control of these great arteries of commerce summed in the Constantinople question. It is today impracticable to create any joint authority to regulate interstate

commerce in this area, though the Danube Commission is a step in this direction, and the treaty agreements as to the Balkan railways another. It was a difficult task for us to provide in our constitution for the distant regulation of commerce for a people, speaking one tongue, and a majority of one common origin. The solution of such a problem in East Europe has been beyond the political possibilities of the present and probably of the future. The Republic of Russia might accomplish this, if it dealt with republics in Germany, Austria and Hungary, but even Russia has only taken the first stage in the new Pilgrim's Progress to democracy, and the Slough of Despond may not be distant.

Were all the lands involved republics, a federation might come. In democracy, and in democracy alone lies the peaceful solution of the contentious problems of international affairs. What imperial governments at Berlin, Vienna, and Petrograd could never accomplish and could never be trusted to control or accomplish by the smaller kingdoms of the Balkans, could be done by federated states, with no ambition for conquest, and no motive for annexation. If the Germanic States were once united in a Federation of Germany in which the Prussian conquests of the past century recovered the autonomy once enjoyed by the Hanover and the rest; if the Slav and non-Slav States of the Balkans were federated, if the old integers of rapacious Russian conquest reappeared in a federated republic, these peaceful federations, German, Russian, Central Slav, South Slav and non-Slav, from Hungary to the Ottoman Republic, could control and regulate these landways and waterways, their railroads and the twin straits, on common and mutual principles protecting the commerce and safety of all. Today, this seems a mere dream; but it is both more probable and more possible than before the events of the past three years. Empires can never be trusted. Federated republics by their nature and organization are peaceful and loyal. At all events the inevitable choice is between one great "Central Europe," dominating all between the Baltic and the North Sea, and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and a group of federated self-governing lands.

## JAPAN, AMERICA AND DURABLE PEACE

BY TOYOKICHI IYENAGA, PH.D.,

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The problems of a durable peace await, for their definite formulation and practical solution, the issue of the present war. If German militarism comes out victorious, peace dictated by it cannot be but temporary. If, on the other hand, the cause of justice and liberty be fully vindicated, the bitterest experiences and untold miseries the war has inflicted upon the world should teach the people thereof that the evil doctrine of "might over right" must forever be discarded, and some method devised to insure the stability of peace and safeguard the interest of humanity.

The world war, it seems to me, has already reached its last stage: a final decision cannot long be deferred. There was a time, I admit, when I entertained a doubt whether the European War would not end in a draw—in a peace without victory. When the policy and war measures adopted by the Entente Powers in the Balkans showed unmistakable signs of weakness, indecision and lack of cohesion, and in consequence the Allies were completely outmaneuvered and out-fought in the vigorous well-managed campaigns prosecuted by the Central Powers, too much optimism regarding the decided triumph of the Allies' cause seemed unwarranted.

The first intimation that this temple of success reared by German arms could not long endure, but would sooner or later crumble to the ground by reason of the incompetence and blindness of German statesmanship, came to me through the publication of the now notorious Zimmermann note, which aimed to form a German-Japanese-Mexican Alliance to counteract the hostile measures of America. The monstrosity of that note was only equalled by its stupidity. As to Mexico, I am not in a position to know definitely her actual status or attitude; but for Japan I can assert most emphatically that the note is a sufficient warrant to judge how low German statesmanship has fallen, how utterly ignorant it is of Japan's history and aspirations. It completely ignores "the spirit of Japan," by whatever name described—the *Yamato-Damashi* or *Bushido*—which puts honor and loyalty foremost in the list of

virtues. A nation that holds honor dear to its heart will never turn traitor to its allies or without cause attack another nation with which it is on friendly terms.

Germany doubtless measured Japan by her own standard of international ethics. Let me illustrate what I mean: Following the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Treaty, when Germany, Russia and France formed a formidable coalition with the purpose of robbing Japan of the best fruits of her victory over China by forcing upon her the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula, Prince Ito, then Premier of Japan, exclaimed:

Germany, we shall never forgive! Russia looks upon us as a future rival in the Far East; France is, of course, her ally, and has important possessions and ancient interests in Eastern Asia. We can understand their action. But for Germany, which always professed genuine friendship and has no special interests in those regions, to join hands with them and stab us in the back—her intervention was odious and gratuitous.

The reason why Germany joined the coalition was before long revealed to the world by the seizure of Kiaochow.

In the same treacherous manner, moved by the same unholy motive, Germany thought Japan may be induced to play her foul game and checkmate the United States in the event of war between the two powers! And what was the ground upon which Germany built her hope for success of the infamous intrigue? Recently the German foreign minister had the audacity to declare in effect before the Reichstag that Japan has less antagonism toward Germany, though at war with her, than she has toward the United States. True, the Japanese have no antagonism toward the German people; rather do we admire their many worthy qualities and the valuable contributions they have made to science, philosophy and literature. It would also be idle to deny that Japan has certain grievances against the United States, which it would be befitting to the great American people to redress in conformity to the principles of justice and "the square deal" they have proclaimed to the world. These grievances are, however, of local origin and are capable of amicable settlement. To the United States as a nation, Japan has always professed genuine friendship. And this profession is no make-believe; it is true, honest, sincere. Manifestly German statesmanship was well-nigh bankrupt when it hatched such a preposterous plot as the Zimmermann note reveals.

And at last the death knell of German militarism was sounded when the American President and Congress resolved to enter the war! It is, indeed, beyond my comprehension how Germany could dare to challenge America to swell the ranks of her enemies. Have the great minds and statesmen who adorn the pages of German history left no heirs? Have the souls of Kant, of Goethe, of Bismarck, left the Fatherland as a condemnation of the horrible crimes Germans are today perpetrating on alien soils and the high seas? It was sheer madness for Germany to rouse the sleeping giant on this hemisphere and to let him mobilize the tremendous resources at his command in man power, money, credit and materials, for combatting the already hard-pressed foe. So far as the military situation in Europe goes, it may not be powerfully influenced, for a time, by the intervention of America, so that Germans can for a while dwell under the spell of their old illusion. But there is now no doubt as to which side of the belligerents will be final victor. When it is remembered that this war is so unlike other wars, that it is destined to be won on the farms, in the factories, the shipyards and the counting rooms, the overwhelming weight America brings will surely turn the scale to the side of the Allies.

The question that arises in our mind is, how long will be the time before Germany collapses? I make bold to say that it would be to the great advantage of Germany to sue for peace today and immediately stop this awful carnage and destruction before she has inflamed the American public by an hostile encounter. If she would now lay her cards upon the table and ask for lenient terms of settlement, her enemies would probably not be loath to grant them. In this respect the influence of America would doubtless be strongly exerted in Germany's favor. Were Germany so to act I could understand for the first time why she dragged the United States into this war.

The inertia of thought and action may, however, be too strong for Germany to take such a step before she has made another desperate move. The period of conflict then depends upon two contingencies—the result of submarine warfare and the decided stroke dealt by Germany upon Russia or separate peace with her. If both fail Germany is lost. We sincerely pray that the might of a newly born democracy of Russia will defeat the ambition of Germany. As to the submarine warfare, menacing as it is, the Allies will surely

find a way to combat it. The god of the U-boat seems to have so enslaved the German mind that it cannot see that his frightfulness will now be fully matched by American inventiveness, and that many times more tonnage than he can destroy will be forthcoming from the all-embracing lap of the American giant. Surely the days of German militarism are numbered.

As one of the Entente Powers, Japan of course hails with joy the entrance of America into their ranks. There is, however, a special reason for Japan welcoming America, for there are between the two countries striking resemblances in the geographical positions they occupy and the attitudes they assume toward the European War. Effects of the war have hitherto been the same in both countries. The duties and functions America and Japan should fulfill are also similar—patrolling the neighboring seas, supplying their Allies with munitions and food and subscribing to their loans. I know not whether America will send an expeditionary force to Europe, but it is certain that neither America nor Japan would be interested in the remaking of the map of Europe. Both are waging war to crush German militarism, not the German people, so that an enduring peace based upon justice and liberty may be secured for the good of all nations. Consequently, in the future peace conference, America and Japan are more than likely to join hands in every move they make, and to exert their influence in unison. Such coöperation will doubtless serve, to quote the words of the Japanese Emperor in his congratulatory message to President Wilson, “to cement and consecrate the lasting friendship of our two nations.”

In concluding, I may be permitted to add that, so far as America and Japan are concerned, nothing is more important for the furtherance of the cause of harmony than to eradicate the root of trouble that lies between the two countries. The task is not a difficult one, if you have only the will to do it. For the issue is simple and not at all in conflict with the vital interests of America. Japan is not playing the rôle of a pure idealist, clamorous for the immediate realization of ideas that, however lofty and equitable, disregard the existing condition of the world we live in—a world far unlike the “Kingdom of Heaven.” Therefore, it should be definitely understood that Japan does not want to force upon the American people unrestricted immigration of her subjects. The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1907 stands intact and conforms to

your wishes. What Japan asks is simply just and fair treatment to a small number of Japanese subjects residing in this country, in other words, the full recognition of their equality with people of other nationalities. Such recognition of equality, political and social, is denied to Japan, to speak frankly, so long as her subjects are discriminated against and cannot enjoy rights and privileges accorded to other aliens. It would be far from your thought, I hope, to begrudge Japan, now in the front rank of nations, full recognition of equality in America. Once this premise is granted, the logical conclusion that follows must be courageously faced, namely, that any discriminatory law or measure running counter to the principles of justice and fairness should be rectified or nullified. Pray do not misunderstand me. I am not insisting upon the repeal of the Anti-Alien Land Act. I am simply advocating that the same principles of justice, equality and liberty, for whose defense you have not hesitated even to risk the hazard of this war, should be put into effect in the relation between America and Japan as in all international relations.

There may be many ways to accomplish the purpose. American resourcefulness, which is unbounded, is certainly equal to the task of finding the means. The trouble lies in the fact that the American people are not yet fully convinced of the vital importance of doing it. So long as this work remains undone, I must state with your permission what I consider to be the plain truth, much as I regret to say it, that the problems of a durable peace between America and Japan will not have received their definite and final solution. Consequently, while Japanese must do all in their power to make the work easy for you, at the same time I appeal to you most earnestly and sincerely to lend your powerful influence for the attainment of the object, so that the relations between our beloved countries may rest on the solid and safe rock of lasting friendship.



FOUNDATIONS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

BY HANS VON KALTENBORN,

Assistant Managing Editor of *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*.

I am going to present a point of view on the relations between America and Japan somewhat different from that presented by Dr. Iyenaga.<sup>1</sup> In every discussion by Japanese of this problem, they declare that it is a local issue peculiar to this or that state which may happen to be passing anti-alien land legislation. And yet the character of their demands will show that the issue is far more fundamental, that it cannot be exclusively related to the legislation of any one state or any half-dozen states in our Union (for there are half a dozen which have passed anti-alien land legislation similar to that of California); that it is, on the contrary, a fundamental problem of racial equality.

Let us, therefore, put out of our minds once and for all, the notion that this discrimination against the Japanese is an arbitrary discrimination practised by wilful individual units of our federal system. The problem confronting the United States and Japan is a fundamental problem of equality, and that problem has its origin in the citizenship law of the United States,<sup>2</sup> which has been on our statute books for many generations. This law provides that no member of the brown or yellow race can obtain citizenship in this country, and hence makes impossible political equality for Japanese residents.

If we desire to remove that discrimination—and I am not at all sure that in the course of time we may not desire to remove it—that is one thing, but let us not forget that this discrimination applies to 800,000,000 people and not exclusively to the Japanese. It is the federal naturalization law which declares that the right to become naturalized applies only to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African descent, and thereby makes it impossible for any state to grant political equality to the yellow or the brown races.

<sup>1</sup> See page 124.<sup>2</sup> *Revised U. S. Statutes*, Section 2169.

With this much established, let me go a little further and try to point out how we can best approach this problem at the conclusion of the war when we shall confront the opportunity of creating a durable peace. We must approach it, now that we are allied with all the white peoples whose lands border the Pacific, in full coöperation with these peoples. We must join with them as well as with Japan and the representatives of other elements of the brown and of the yellow races, at the great peace conference. There we must all work together to find the definite solution of this problem, because it is not a local problem peculiar to a state; it is not a local problem peculiar to the United States and Japan; it is a problem which has caused serious difficulty and serious thought, aye, and serious disturbance in every white country which borders the Pacific. We are going to get a false perspective on this issue if we fail to remember that it is an acute issue in British Columbia, where there is worse discrimination against the Japanese than in the United States, for under the laws of Canada, British Columbia has naturalized natives of Japan and yet has refused to let them vote, a discrimination which has been upheld by the Privy Council in London. In Australia we find that Japanese are not only unable to own land, but they are forbidden to enter the country. Even Japanese students and travelers who may come and go as they like in the United States are not permitted to remain in Australia over twelve months. South Africa, too, desires to keep out Asiatics and has taken steps to prevent their coming. Wherever white men predominate they have fought against Asiatic immigration.

Thus we face a problem that is not that of a state, nor that of the United States, but a problem as broad and as deep as the gulf which separates two races whose standards of living are far apart. Until we remove the economic aspect of the problem inherent in Japanese immigration to our Pacific Coast, we are not likely to find a solution which will satisfy Japan as well as the United States. Professor Tatabe, of the Tokio Imperial University, summed it all up in this one sentence: "Under the American standard of living two billion people can exist on earth, under the Japanese standard twenty-two billion." Until this economic difference can be compromised this Japanese question will continue to plague the white races of the earth.

Episodes in Japan's history make us feel that it is the honor of

*Japan* and loyalty to *Japan* which have been emphasized, and that a spirit of autocratic imperialism has sometimes dominated the sober sense of that nation. Therefore, let us hope that in Japan, too, those democratic elements now struggling for expression will triumph, and that those liberals who are, like Dr. Iyenaga, responsive to democratic ideals, may guide Japan's future course. Then, with the liberals of Japan and America coöperating, with the people of all the lands that border the Pacific working together to settle this issue as we are now fighting together for the same cause, let us hope that then we can at last settle this question in a way which shall make the foundation of an enduring peace.

## NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF COMMERCE PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE

BY STEPHEN P. DUGGAN, PH.D.,

College of the City of New York, New York.

The Balkan problem we have had with us for over a century. It was the occasion of the present war. It will be with us in the future unless a wise solution and a solution based upon proper principles of international reorganization is followed.

Now, what are those principles of international reorganization? As Professor Brown of Princeton<sup>1</sup> has stated there are three principles upon which such a reorganization must be based if the reorganization is to last: the recognition of the principle of nationality; the right of nations to their own free development without being dominated by other nations; and the right of a nation to freedom of commerce with the world's markets.

The reason why the Balkan problem has been with us for over a century and has presented itself as the powder magazine of Europe for the last fifty years is because every one of those principles has been violated. The Balkans have never been permitted freedom of development because of the rival antagonisms of the great powers of Europe. For a long time Great Britain felt that in order to make secure her passage to India and her commerce to the East, it was necessary that the Straits be in the control of Turkey, and for that

<sup>1</sup> See page 76.

reason, Turkish control over the other Balkan states was to be maintained and Turkish misrule continued. When, after the Arabi Pasha Rebellion in Egypt in 1880, England occupied Egypt and secured control of it and thereby safeguarded her route to India, her interest in the Balkan problem waned and her demand for the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey diminished.

The void was filled at once, almost, by another group of European powers, the Central Powers—Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany came on the international stage as a great power quite late. Looking around for colonies into which to send her surplus products, she found most of the world taken up by other powers, but she saw that there was one region that remained comparatively unexploited. That was Asia Minor, and she determined that that was to be her “place in the sun.” She must, therefore, take the place of Great Britain in dominating in Constantinople, and she took with her as her partner, Austria-Hungary. They divided up the field: Germany was to dominate in Constantinople and Asia Minor; Austria was to dominate in the Balkans. Germany did her job with efficiency. She did dominate in Constantinople and practically in Asia Minor. Austria bungled her job and only aroused increasing antagonism on the part of the Balkan nations against her.

Now, this suppression of all attempts on the part of the Balkan nations towards their own free development can only be overcome when those same Balkan nations understand that the confederation which they for one short year enjoyed and by means of which they presented a united front against any other power, should be reestablished. It may be said that that is the very thing that the Allies attempted to get the Balkan states to do at the opening of the war, to reestablish the Balkan Confederation and thereby prevent the union of Austria-Hungary and Germany with Turkey. But it must be remembered that the principles upon which the present situation in the Balkans is based were founded upon the Treaty of Bucharest which we signed at the end of the second Balkan War. That treaty violates the three principles pointed out above as the only principles upon which a true international reorganization can be based.

There is no reason, however, why those states should not confederate and present a united front. When they did in 1912, they

did it equitably. Before the first Balkan War, Serbia and Bulgaria came to an agreement and signed a treaty by means of which the only region in which there was a mixture of races, Macedonia, was divided fairly, Bulgaria getting the bigger portion. Why was that not carried out? Because again of the baleful influence of foreign domination, because Austria-Hungary was determined that Serbia should not get what she called her "window on the Adriatic," and by preventing her from doing that, compelled Serbia to look for compensation in Macedonia and to violate the agreement with Bulgaria.

Now if the nations are going to solve the problem in the Balkans at the end of the war, the principles mentioned already must be observed: the first of these is the principle of nationality. The two great principles of the French Revolution, democracy and nationality, are not yet in process of consummation because our political practice has always been about a century behind our political theory. Despite the teachings of history that you cannot suppress nations unless they are willing to be suppressed, despite the fact that for over one hundred and fifty years Poland was divided, and yet Poland is vigorous today, despite the fact that Bohemia, Ireland and other suppressed nations are problems for which statesmen seek solution today, it is probable that even at the general reorganization which comes, a solution might be attempted which will violate this principle.

If the principle of nationality were carried out what kind of a territorial reorganization would take place in the Balkans? I personally think, as the result of a good deal of study of this problem, that it is of comparatively simple solution, provided the fine ideals presented by Mr. Wilson to the world, and which are having such a splendid moral effect upon all the peoples of the world, will be followed. The trouble with the Balkans is that a large portion of each of the nations is in a free and independent state and the rest of it is under the domination and subjection of some other state, chiefly Austria-Hungary. Over eight millions of Roumanians are in free and independent Roumania, but over three millions are outside of it. There are more Serbians outside of Serbia, in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina, than in Serbia. The majority of the Greeks, as you know, are not in Greece but in the islands and on the shores of Asia Minor in Turkish dominions.

Now if the principle of nationality were carried out in the first place, the Roumanians outside of Roumania, in Transylvania and Bukowina who are so pitilessly persecuted in Hungary, would be united to Roumania. Ideally, it would mean that Bessarabia in Russia, which is inhabited by Roumanians would also be united to Roumania. It would mean also that Roumania would restore to Bulgaria that part of Dobrudja which is a part of Bulgaria. The greater portion of this is likely to happen if the Allies win. Those portions of Austria-Hungary which Roumanian peoples inhabit will at least probably go to Roumania.

What is the second element in the reorganization? It seems to me that despite the actions of Bulgaria in 1913 and 1915—in 1913 attacking her allies and in 1915 siding with the Central powers and with her old enemy Turkey—she ought to receive the Macedonian territory that she has conquered in this war. It must be remembered that Bulgaria sees the opportunity for a greater Roumania that I have just pointed out, for a greater Serbia that I shall describe, for a greater Greece in the Aegean, but that she, hemmed in on all sides by these three, will need all the Bulgarians in a compact state to maintain her national existence.

A third element in this reorganization would be a greater Serbia, or better still, as most of the students of the problems of the Balkans believe, what would be called a United States of Ugo-Slavia or South Slavia. Every intelligent person, who has read at all on the problem of the Balkans, understands the great desire on the part of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be united with Serbia. Few, however, know that north of those crownlands are others, Croatia and Slavonia particularly, that are just as anxious to be united and to be free and independent. They, too, are Slavs like the Serbs. They all speak languages practically alike. They have customs alike. They are of the same race. They differ in religion, the Serbs being Orthodox, the Croatians and Slovenes being Roman Catholics, and the Austria-Hungarian policy has been pushed to the utmost to keep them divided. But the outrageous persecution of the South Slavs that began in 1909, ending in the treason trials at Agram, where the Austria-Hungary government was proved to be guilty of forged documents in order to secure the conviction of men accused of treason, has driven these two peoples together. Up to 1909, all Croatians and Slovenes and

South Slavs of Austria-Hungary wanted a union, union within the monarchy if possible, but union anyhow. Now it looks as if nothing could prevent, eventually at least, the union of all the South Slavs including Serbia and Montenegro in a great South Slav state. If history repeats itself, that consummation is inevitable. Moldavia and Wallachia, the two provinces of Roumania, when they secured their independence by the Treaty of Paris of 1856 were not permitted by the powers to unite into a single state. But they did three years later. By the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Bulgaria was divided, but in five years the treaty was broken by the people who united themselves. If, as a result of the international reorganization which we hope is going to be based upon sound principles, these states are not united in a great South Slav state, it will only be the prelude to a movement later on whereby they will be united.

The last element in this reorganization is Greece. If the reorganization is to take place on the principle of nationality, the only Balkan state to be diminished in size is continental Greece, because that part of the territory east of the Vardar River which Greece took from Bulgaria at the end of the second Balkan War is inhabited primarily by Bulgarians and is Bulgarian in influence and ought to belong to Bulgaria. But it is to be remembered that the future of Greece is where the glory of Greece was in the classical days—it is in the Aegean Islands and on the shores of Asia Minor. It is to be remembered that in 1915, Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece if she would come into the war on the side of the Allies. It is also to be remembered that in 1915 the greatest of the Greek statesmen, Venizelos, was willing to cede to Bulgaria the district east of the Vardar, including the town of Kavala, in the hope that Greece would get the city and province of Smyrna on the shores of Asia Minor. In other words, the solution of the Balkan problem on the principle of nationality would work again for a greater Greece, as for a greater Serbia, a greater Bulgaria and a greater Roumania.

There remains only one state in the Balkans to be considered. That is Turkey. I hope that the war will end by the Turks being put back, bag and baggage, out of Constantinople. What will become of Constantinople? Constantinople has no nationality. Of the million people in it, about half, perhaps a little less than half, are Moslems, but there is a fifth portion that are Greeks and a fifth portion Armenians, and there are a great many Jews. It is a gath-

ering of all races and nations. Now I sympathize with the desire of Russia to get to warm water. The whole policy of the past century has been dictated by that. I do not think that Russian policy has been dictated by a desire for conquest, it has been dictated by a desire for free access to warm water. It may astonish you to know that of the 20,000 miles of seacoast in Europe, Russia, which has half of the territory of Europe, has less than 2,000 of those miles, and a large portion of those 2,000 miles are icebound in winter. So I sympathize with the desire of Russia to get to warmer water.

The great dislike for Russia maintained by Scandinavia, by Norway and Sweden, has always been because of the fear that in her desire to get to warm water, she would cross them and annex them as she did Finland.

But if Russia is put in control of Constantinople, the same sack in which she was held in the past could be maintained for other states. If Russia is put in Constantinople and can at any time shut the straits, as Turkey has shut the straits to her several times, it means that the commerce of Roumania and Bulgaria, too, can be strangled.

Hence unless those two principles, one of nationality and the other of economic access for freedom of commerce, are going to be the bases of the Balkan settlement, the present war will only be a prelude to another war.

## THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AN ENDURING PEACE

BY E. E. PRATT, PH.D.,

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The economic center of the present conflict is the struggle between Germany and the United Kingdom. These two countries represent essentially different commercial and economic systems. Great Britain, confident in the excellence of its products and in the retention of long-held markets, was slow to introduce labor-saving devices, large-scale production and efficiency methods, and was gradually finding its wares displaced, even in its own markets, by the products of less conservative nations. Germany, keenly alive to the opportunity thus created, set out to invade practically every great market of the world, with the help of the most modern appliances, the most modern methods of utilizing labor, and a very



practical, thorough and comprehensive system of commercial education. Even this educational system became a source of friction between England and Germany through the influx of young Germans in England to take up clerkships there as a part of their training.

England had the advantage of almost unlimited possibilities of expansion in her colonies. Germany was poor in colonies and found most of the world's surface preëmpted. But she solved the problem of expansion by making her colonization economic rather than national. And the German settlements in the developing countries of the world have been perhaps as effective in extending the influence and increasing the trade of the mother country as have the great colonies of England.

Besides the sharply defined commercial rivalry of England and Germany, the war had minor causes of an economic nature—Russia's reaching out for an ice-free port, Japan's desire for a freer hand and a larger trade in China, and Germany's dream of obtaining economic jurisdiction over the near east. All these factors, which together account for the great war in its economic aspect, may also help to determine the economic elements in an enduring peace.

The statement was often made before the war broke out in Europe that nations are economically interdependent, and that statement is truer today, perhaps, than ever before. Germany's position now is a forced attempt at economic independence, and if she is losing out, it is simply because such a position at present is absolutely untenable.

For some of the materials essential to the conduct of the war, almost all the world's supply is derived from two or three countries. Rubber is produced extensively only in Brazil, the Straits Settlements and the East Indies; nitrates, only in Chile; tin, only in Malaysia and Bolivia; platinum, only in Russia and Colombia; manganese, only in Russia, India and Brazil; diamonds, only in Africa; and jute, only in India. Sulphuric acid, which is essential in the manufacture of practically all the high explosives, can be obtained only from sulphur and from pyrite. Sulphur is produced in commercial quantities only in Sicily, the United States and Japan, and almost one third of the world's pyrite supply comes from Spain. Over half of the world's tungsten is produced in Burma, Portugal and the United States.

All these very essential materials, therefore, are controlled to

a considerable and in some cases to a very large extent by a very small number of producing countries. Before the war, most of us perhaps were alive to the advantages of an export trade, but it must be counted as one of the lessons of the war that our economic life and the export trade itself are dependent, much more than had been realized, on our import trade.

The economic factors responsible for the war and the economic interdependence of the nations of the world, upon which the war has thrown new light, point the way toward the conditions of an enduring peace. In the first place, each nation must have access to raw materials and markets for its products in order to insure industrial development along the lines for which it is best suited. Secondly, there must be no preferential tariffs. Before the war Russia was dependent upon Germany to a very considerable degree as a market not only for rye and wheat but for mineral products as well; and German influence had permeated Russian trade and industry. Now if Great Britain establishes a tariff on foodstuffs and raw materials and gives a preference to colonial goods in return for colonial tariff preferences to British manufactures, Russia will be forced again to sell her wheat to Germany. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that England's markets, especially for foodstuffs, be opened to Russia and that British and American capital be invested in Russian industries. The United States also will expect freer entrance for its products into certain foreign markets. Discrimination against American goods, as now practised by France and Canada, cannot safely continue.

Commercial treaties are not sufficient to prevent disagreements. In some cases they even create difficulties for third parties, if not for those directly concerned; and their shortcomings emphasize the need of broader international agreements on many subjects that now cause disputes among nations. There is opportunity for this country to adopt a vigorous policy on international agreements with regard to the parcel post, patents and trade-marks, commercial statistics, commercial travelers, customs and sanitary regulations, and many similar matters, which could be satisfactorily handled by this method.

There might also be uniform shipping rules. At present the rebates given by certain steamship companies furnish one of the standing causes of disputes in the shipping world; but no one nation will force its steamship companies to eliminate rebates as long as

steamship companies of other nations are free to offer them. Such difficulties might, however, be adjusted by an international agreement similar to the Brussels Sugar Convention. International control might likewise settle the long-continued controversies over points of strategic commercial importance, such as the Dardanelles and the railroad across Afghanistan or through Bagdad.

One of the strongest weapons of the proposed League to Enforce Peace would be its control of a certain number of raw materials, through the fact that members of the league produce the greater part of the world's supply. If, for example, a league among the nations thus had control of certain of the essential raw materials to which I have directed your attention and could, in the event of war, sufficiently curtail the shipment to any country of those essential raw materials, it would be a question of only a few weeks or a few months before the nation opposing the league would be forced into peace.

I have attempted rather to meet the subject with suggestions than to cover it in any comprehensive or detailed way. Broadly speaking, the subject reduces itself to one consideration. The present war is largely an economic struggle. The disputes of the future, whether or not they eventuate in war, will have their origin, to a large degree, in international trade problems. We must bend all our efforts, therefore, to reducing the points of conflict in trade and commerce, if we are to hope for an enduring peace.

## INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ESSENTIAL TO A DURABLE PEACE

BY DAVID LAWRENCE,

Washington correspondent of *The New York Evening Post*.

I write this from a war capital—only lately a city of peace. For two and a half years we have been a neutral nation. Suddenly we have become a belligerent. In that transition from a state of neutrality to a state of belligerency lies the key to the problem of a durable peace. I do not wish to be misunderstood in anything I may say here today as conveying disappointment that the United States has entered the war against Germany for no man can be disappointed with that which is right, painful or distasteful as that may be. But I am disappointed that the United States somehow lacked

the moral or expressive power to convey to Germany the rightness of our contention and that Germany seemed utterly incapable of understanding the right and accepting it, painful or distasteful as that might have become.

No better demonstration, indeed, of the problem that must be solved before there can be durable peace in the world has been given in modern history than is contained in the sequence of circumstances under which the United States, three thousand miles distant from Germany, has just become involved in a state of war. The joint failure of Germany and the United States to remain at peace after correspondence of nearly three years emphasizes the futility of diplomacy and unofficial instrumentalities to preserve peace when there is no free interchange of public opinions between nations.

Could the heart of America have been poured out to the people of Germany, could the utter unwillingness of the United States to enter the European War have been demonstrated conclusively to the German people, could the passionate desire of the American people to sacrifice their lives and fortunes for the vindication of the rights of humanity and the laws of nation have been convincingly carried home to the people of Germany, and moreover could the German people have spoken their will through a representative body, who is there who will say that the United States and Germany would nevertheless have been at war today? The German people are not so unlike our own people as to be deaf to the voice of reason. They either are unenlightened and uninformed as to the profound impression which inhumane methods of warfare have had on neutral peoples, or they are involuntarily silent, indeed impotent still to utter a protest or effect a change in their government.

What does America today pray for? What is it that will be hailed as the first sign of peace and the restoration of reason in Germany? A revolution, the overthrow of the imperial government that has decreed submarine warfare, that has deported Belgians, that has justified the destruction of the *Lusitania*—the murder of noncombatant women and children on land and sea. Would the German people in possession of democratic institutions have sanctioned these atrocities? Americans do not think so. And, therefore, the universal hope is for a revolution that will release a spirit of democracy that is in potential existence wherever intelligent and civilized peoples live. But how can such a revolution be effected, how can democracy assert itself without available processes

for the crystallization of public opinion? There are no such processes as yet in Germany. Autocratic government is still powerful enough to prevent free speech, free assemblage and the election of a legislature by the free will of the people.

It is the constitutional freedom of the press that has made of America a democracy in fact as well as in name. It is the freedom of the press that permits the formation of public opinion. German newspapers have been timidly subservient to the autocratic interests of the imperial government. They have often been secretly subsidized by the German government. They have been even in time of peace directly controlled by the government.

The most essential problem in the making of a durable peace is the dissolution of any partnership that may exist in any country between the government and the press. There can be no government by the consent of the governed unless the people have a means to make known their wishes. In America they not only have chosen representatives in Congress to speak *for* them but enough uncontrolled newspapers throughout the length and breadth of the land through which the people can speak uninterruptedly *to* Congress when once assembled.

Last, but not least, is the question of editorial and news intercourse between nations. The spoken words of physical contact are of course most effective in preventing or solving international misunderstandings but the interchange of public opinions through the press is often the only way that distances can be overcome. News and editorial opinion passing from nation to nation must not be treated as contraband by an intervening state at any time. Otherwise there is an opportunity for the interposition of the national point of view of states through which cables and telegraph lines must pass enroute to a nation most vitally interested in understanding the viewpoint of another with which it is in controversy or dispute. Interference with the free intercourse of nations through the press either by financial seduction of news agencies engaged in international news distribution or by the exercise of arbitrary powers over the press of any people that desires to be free must necessarily impede international harmony. It must defeat the development of that international mind, as distinguished from a national or provincial attitude, which is so essential to the success of any league to enforce peace or concert of self-governing nations. *There must be international freedom of the press.*

## SOVEREIGNTY AND RACE AS AFFECTED BY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

BY THEODORE MARBURG,

Formerly United States Minister to Belgium.

Just as the old idea of natural rights has given way to the conception that the state has a right to do whatever it is in the interest of society in the long result that it should do, so it is becoming plain that the doctrine of absolute sovereignty set up to guard the state itself against interference by other states must ultimately give way before the conception of a society of nations. As is well known, the theory of natural rights, which set boundaries to the activities of the state operating on its own people, was designed to protect men against the power of the autocrat. When governments came to reflect the will of the people the need for this device disappeared. The doctrine of absolute sovereignty had its origin in a similar motive. The theory was designed to safeguard the right of the individual state in a world where the powerful state was governed by few rules or precepts and was moved principally by the desire for aggrandizement. As democracy spreads, the dominating motive of aggrandizement is diminished and the desire to do justice to the sister state begins to emerge. When this happens the same ultimate test may be applied to the doctrine of sovereignty as was applied to the doctrine of natural rights.

If it is in the interests of men that nations should enjoy sovereignty full and unimpaired, well and good. If, on the contrary, sovereignty unimpaired leads to disaster—in the shape, for example, of unjust and destructive wars—it should not be suffered to continue. The state should retain only so much sovereignty as makes for the welfare of men organized in states.

The experience of the forty-eight states now comprising the United States of America is really an application of this conception. The Union was constituted of sovereign and independent states. They surrendered sovereignty but not self-government. The separate states of the Union still govern themselves with respect

to three quarters of the things that touch the public interest. Absolute sovereignty was surrendered by them in the common interest.

Now, world opinion is not ripe for a union of the nations so complete as the union of the American states under a federal government. But even a rudimentary organization must be based upon this same conception, namely, the right of the society of nations to demand of the individual states whatever it is in the interest of the race that they should demand.

Within the state the individual without wealth or influence who, in former times, was preyed upon by the powerful, now enjoys, under modern institutions, the same rights and privileges before the law as the wealthy and powerful. Just so, under a properly organized society of nations, the small state will come to enjoy security equal to that of its more powerful neighbor, a security far more ample than any doctrine of absolute sovereignty can give it under present conditions.

Society implies restraint. We can have no liberty without a surrender of license. The one license which it has become perfectly clear the nations must surrender is the license to make war at will. Begin with that demand, make it difficult for nations to settle disputes by force, and they will seek and find other ways to settle them. That truth is at the very bottom of the whole movement for world organization. If we take our stand upon that demand the machinery for settling disputes will come.

In this connection a few words must be said about the question of race and alien government. Certain groups, such as the Netherlands Anti-Oorlog Raad, demand a plebiscite of the inhabitants before a transfer of territory is permitted. Theoretically this would seem to fit in with the demands of justice. Practically, serious difficulties present themselves in connection with the proposal.

In the first place, to admit this right of approval by the population of the territory about to be transferred involves logically the right of secession. Suppose, for example, that at the end of this war the people of Alsace are consulted about restitution of the province to France, that they should approve of it and that the transfer is thereupon made. If, then, at a future time, these same people of Alsace should reach the conclusion that they had

made a mistake and should demand release from their allegiance to France, could this demand logically be denied? And are we prepared to admit the right of secession whenever a local community exhibits discontent under a government? To have set up such a principle would have conceded the right of the New England States to secede from the American Union when the several waves of discontent swept over them at the end of the eighteenth century and in the early years of the nineteenth century. It would have admitted the right of the Southern States to secede when the slavery issue became acute. It would admit the right of Ireland today to secede from Great Britain and to establish, close to the border of the home country, a separate sovereignty which might afford a foothold for an enemy attack.

Peace is secured by union, not by disruption. For generations the border of England and Scotland was the scene of bloody strife, all stilled by the union of these two countries in 1707. For fourteen hundred years after the fall of the Roman Empire of the west, Italy was torn by ceaseless wars between her city states and between her principalities, leaving her an easy prey to the invader—all stilled by union. The mind of Cavour grasped this truth firmly and laid broad the foundations for a single Italian State which has spelled rebirth, security and progress.

For centuries men witnessed similar wars between the principalities and petty kingdoms of France. It was the very establishment of strong central government in France at an early day which enabled her to shine as a leader in Europe in all the walks of civilization.

In Germany for long years the hand of every baron and petty noble was turned against his neighbor. There too it was consolidation which brought law and ordered progress.

In the second place the plebiscite is often a meaningless form. Certainly it has been such in France, where it has been used to confirm a *fait accompli*. For the people to endeavor to undo the thing already done would have meant anarchy. Therefore the result has usually been millions of affirmative votes against a few thousand negative votes. Napoleon Bonaparte made himself first Consul in December, 1799, organized his government and six weeks thereafter instituted a plebiscite to confirm his act. Is there any need to say what the result of that plebiscite was? When in



May, 1804, he had safely gotten the title of Emperor conferred on him by the Senate he again invited a plebiscite with like result. Louis Napoleon was not slow to see the advantages of this method. A plebiscite, December 20, 1851, endorsed his high-handed methods of dealing with the National Assembly and of perpetuating himself as President of the Republic in violation of the provisions of the Constitution. Next, having gathered into his hands all executive power with the right to nominate the members of the Senate and of the Council of State, through which alone legislation could be initiated, he proceeded once more to institute a plebiscite which conferred on him the title of Emperor.

Now, is not the question of a transfer of territory in much the same category? Such transfer at the end of a war has to be agreed upon in framing the treaty of peace. For the people of the territory in question to negative the decision of the Congress might mean reopening the vital issues of the war and so renewing the war. Under such circumstances, is there any doubt that the votes of the inhabitants will simply register what the Congress has decreed? At such times, too, the men "in possession" generally get their will done. Dickey refers to the way in which, during the French Revolution, "the Terrorist faction, when all but crushed by general odium, extorted from the country by means of a plebiscite a sham assent to the prolongation of revolutionary despotism."

The real solution of the problem of race conflict lies in equal political rights for all white men in white men's countries. If the Johannesburgers had enjoyed the full franchise under the Boer government the injustice practised against him would have been impossible and the South African War would not have occurred. When men everywhere come to enjoy equal political rights—enabling them to help themselves to full civil rights and religious liberty—they will in course of time cease to care whether they live under this or that government.

Discontent will further tend to disappear if we add to this the system of local self-government such as obtains in the United States, where the people of the separate states govern themselves in respect of the majority of things that touch their interests.

A league of nations to discourage war is almost certain to come into being after the present conflict, because the Entente Powers, in their joint note of January 10 to Mr. Wilson, committed

themselves formally and officially to the project. But, until it is shown that the league can and will protect its members against sudden assault, until it is shown that the league itself will hold together in times of storm and stress, no country can be expected to place its sole reliance for protection on it. Until then, Great Britain, for example, could not in fairness be asked to impair the strength of her great fleet.

An important line of progress in the history of war has been the tendency to spare the non-combatant and confine the conflict to the armed forces of the belligerents. These helpful rules of war, so painfully bought by experience and laboriously worked out through generations of endeavor, Germany has thrown to the winds. And she has not stopped there. Deeds which men, relying upon the common dictates of humanity, thought it wholly unnecessary specifically to forbid, have been done, not in the heat of battle, but deliberately as part of a conscious policy. Others among the belligerents are not free from blame for giving way to the temptation to retaliate. But in their case we behold the spawn of an uncontrollable rage excited by the acts of the enemy.

To many men the crimes committed in this war, the very assault itself, were, before the event, simply unbelievable. The result is a shock to confidence—confidence in the binding force of treaty obligations, confidence in international law, and confidence in the upright intentions of the neighbor. No matter what the issue of the war, we are therefore apt, for a time, to witness armaments going on at an accelerated pace. But once the German menace is definitely removed by a change of spirit on the part of the German people, the world may not only work back to its normal condition, but the existence of a league of nations—after it shall have established general confidence in its ability to do what it is designed to do—must eventually bring about an actual amelioration of the condition of armed peace existing before the present war. To the security due to the geographical position which some nations enjoy, and to their individual preparedness, states will then add the security of a guarantee by the family of nations against sudden attack.

## THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF NATIONALITY

BY C. E. MCGUIRE, PH.D.,

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An examination of the history of the idea of nationality and the study of the development of nationalism, especially in the nineteenth century, would permit the enumeration of many instances of the depression and restraint of nationality; and, on the other hand, it would not be easy to cite a single example of a nationalism unambitious further to expand and satisfied that it had fulfilled every legitimate aspiration. If by some magic formula we were able to reverse the position of the world's affairs and subordinate the vigorous and dominating nations of Europe to the weaker and oppressed, what assurance have we that the latter would not manifest the same callous disregard that now is alleged to characterize the former? Is it, therefore, nothing but a matter of cumulative community selfishness, and are we to desist from our search for an underlying principle of nationality and for sanctions upon which all nationalities may base their claims for recognition? We are depressed by the answer of history. Nevertheless, history in so far as it records the development of ideas and the attempt to give them practical form and effect must be our instructor. Let us, therefore, examine and classify what we may agree to be the main interests of nationality, testing each interest in the innumerable retorts which history offers us, and at the same time bearing in mind that however imperfectly it may interpret them in action, our race is capable of following its ideals with sustained intensity through long periods.

The commonly accepted factors of nationality may be stated as the following:

- (a) Racial identity or a reasonable homogeneousness of race
- (b) Identity of language
- (c) Unity of religion
- (d) A symmetrical and healthy development of commerce and industry
- (e) A uniform theory of government

What do we mean by racial identity or a reasonable homo-

geneity of race? There is abroad, especially in this country, a belief that without racial identity and homogeneity of origin and development the national spirit will not thrive and animate a people. It is true, those who are most apprehensive of the failure of the national spirit to guide and strengthen the United States have been alarmed by the fact that the population of the republic has been increased and is increasing, not through the expansion of the original racial element, but rather through the accretion of every branch of the Indo-European races and of many non-European branches. They labor breathlessly to bring about a fusion, an assimilation of these elements. They would welcome the greatest possible intermixture of race in order that the resultant product should find all its constituent racial tendencies neutralized and subordinated to those of its environment. But the tragedy of the "melting pot" theory is not its ineffectiveness so much as its superfluity. The greatest peoples in history, those most conscious of their aspirations towards unity, and which stand out so strongly in Greece, in Rome, in Spain, in Germany, in Ireland, have had no racial identity or exclusiveness of origin. They have severally welcomed races as diverse as the Arab, the Celt, the Teuton, the Scandinavian, the Etruscan, the Thracian. The national spirit in each case has been strong enough to impose language and ways of living, religious outlook, unity of purpose and its own fervent conviction of identity upon the new elements, often not seeking to do it but rather repelling them. In such cases it has been an invariable rule that the fullest and freest contribution of racial talents and excellencies has determined the formula of the nation's success. This is not to say that prejudice and internal difficulty and strife have not existed, but rather to say that in spite of these obstacles and many more, the newer racial elements have been fused and assimilated if at all, not so much by the stamp of administration, as by the attracting power of a stronger character and higher standards of individual life.

The interest which we associated with identity of language is one that appears to the mind at the first consideration of nationality. Many difficulties in the way of the creation of a strong national state are removed by the existence of a common language understanding. The part of literature in molding and strengthening national feeling cannot be over-emphasized; and the influence of the daily press today in standardizing language must not be overlooked,

even though it be less than one would expect in view of the ubiquity of the press. Again the national systems of education have served as an effective means for the development of a national feeling through uniform instruction in language and literature devised and imposed by a single authority. Business men, professional men and the journalistic fashioners of our ready-made opinions receive their higher literary training and their ability to set the standards of our speech in learned institutions where speculation on the duty of intense nationalism is indulged in with facility and in abundance. None the less, nations have grown great and national feeling has been intense and evenly distributed without uniform regard for language standards. Any of the great European nations will afford examples to those well acquainted with them of a surprising diversity of dialect and popular speech, to say nothing of bi-lingual Belgium and tri-lingual Switzerland, familiar for their profound sense of national unity. Even France and Germany and England would suffice, to say nothing of the radical language differences which prevail in Hungary, in Finland, in Russia and in Spain. I do not refer to separatist movements such as the Catalan, but to the many distinct dialects which make up any one of these countries, distinguished in our day for their thorough nationalism. At times the idea of nationality has survived when the nation has lost or nearly lost its language; English-speaking Ireland is hardly less conscious of its ineradicable distinctness than if only the Celtic tongue were heard within its shores. Ireland's ballads have had their widest influence in nourishing hope of freedom and memories of oppression, in their English translations; and the work of political parties has been done in English. Despite the apparent plasticity of the Jewish race it retains an amazing sense of its exclusiveness and aloofness often with but the faintest grip upon the common tongue of the race. Is there then an interest of language? History's answer seems to show unmistakably that the ideal of nationality involves the notion of a common tongue adorned and inspired with the literature which properly expresses the hopes and aspirations of the people. But history shows too that this incidental notion of identity of language is but a rare element in assisting to achieve the freest development of nationality. Apparently nations can get on very well with a variety of dialects so long as superior interests of association keep together the groups which use them.

There is a national interest, we are told, in the existence of harmonious criteria in philosophy, ethics and theology. In these days perhaps this argument is glossed over because again we have inherited inextricable difficulties from preceding centuries. Even where the theory of a harmonious outlook on life and religion rises above the crudest interpretations of the formula *cuius regio, eius religio*, it has attained only to the height of the national "genius." The national and mechanical state is religion enough for its subjects, if it could but have its way. So far as any portion of a people may subscribe to an international and supernatural religious faith, the force and vigor of the nationalism of that people is correspondingly weakened. An interest in religious unity, therefore, that is, the interest in the state regulation and measure of religious aspirations, would seem to be indispensable to the truly vigorous nation, but, fortunately for the human race, history gives no encouragement to those who make devotion to nationality synonymous with worship of the state. An interest there is in a religious harmony of strong convictions and intolerant not of faulty judgment and clouded vision, but rather of negation of principles, and of human pride. This interest, moreover, is one of nationality, but it is not an interest of nationalism. Its satisfaction calls for the fullest contribution by each race, by each individual, of the best in thought and character to the good of mankind. Such an interest can be assured by no national and material formulas; and those who seek to interpret it must sacrifice alike rationalism and nationalism. Every attempt to ignore religion and a moral conception of the universe and of the significance of life, has ended in sophism, in materialism, in decay, in horror. Every attempt to destroy or oppress the Catholic Church has made it more intensely distinct and international; every attempt to bend it to the uses of states and persons has been reacted against even more strongly by the innate vitality of religious conviction.

Again, the interest of a proper distribution of economic burdens presupposes a symmetrical and healthy development of commerce and industry in any one national group. "Self-sufficiency" and "economic independence" are the watchwords of today, significantly indicating our recrudescent emphasis upon nationalism. We are told, and it is true, no doubt, that a nation must produce, refine and distribute every element essential to the continuity and

protection of its national integrity, material and spiritual. It would follow, therefore, that a real interest of nationality would be a well-rounded economic régime with not too much emphasis on any product—agricultural, mineral or manufactured—but rather a precise balancing of all the elements which go to make up a civilized community. In order that skill or natural advantage shall not again (as it is alleged they have done) cause us to grow unconscious from day to day of our racial barriers, it is proposed now to abrogate certain economic laws and to subordinate all rules, however familiar, to the superior interests of nationality. This call for economic solidarity is an inevitable accompaniment of nationalist movements. We have only to glance through history to find reaffirmation of our instinctive thought that the world and its civilization are a piece, both in duration and in extent; that as history is an uninterrupted causal chain, so the material world which we view at any given instant is an economic tableau constructed with an exquisite nicety and inter-relation which the human mind cannot grasp, much less succeed in altering by futile attempts at isolation of one or another portion.

Has nationality an interest in a uniform theory of government? It would seem that the concept of nationality, that is to say, the concept of identity of interests, necessarily involves unobstructed devising of the method by which nationality will fulfill, or at least express, its purpose in the world. Unless a people have an opportunity adequately to direct their own destiny regardless of their neighbors, they cannot serve as the model of a successful nation; and it is obviously impossible for the sense of direction of their destiny to be national unless this sense be accurately apprehended and interpreted. A uniform theory of government would seem, therefore, to be necessary; there must be a conviction that one method of government and one alone will correctly interpret and permit to be carried into effect the high designs and purposes of the nation. But again, too, history reassures us. The ideal of nationality would seem to have been far too much for weak human nature if it had involved the acceptance of a uniform theory of government, and above all of any particular theory of government, as an indispensable condition of its realization. Perhaps there is some truth in the statement that the more uniform the acceptance of any theory of government the less success judged from any point

of view that theory will have of being carried into effect by that people. The history of human freedom is a history of human discipline, but not a discipline imposed by martinet or philosopher upon the individual. It is the record of contest between alternatives and the acceptance of either only after tested conviction. The minority is as likely to be right as the majority. Indeed, *in the struggle for right* the minority is more likely to be right than the majority, influenced as it must be by the gravity of the consequences of its contentiousness. It would seem, therefore, that again history shows itself indifferent to the categorical and inherent requirement of nationality that a people define and maintain a common theory of government. Whatever good the whole concept of nationality may have contributed to civilization and to the uplift of mankind has been accomplished with but little success in carrying into effect uniform theories of government. The *consent of the governed* or the *rule of the best* will in the future as they have in the past represent the widest divergence of views on the subject of government, and no aspiration of national integration will succeed in welding them. It is in their clash and contest that there lies the hope of progress of individual discipline and effort, of the eventual contribution by national and political units of the world to the cause of internationalism, of what today we may discern to have been contributed to the best nationalism by the divergent racial groups composing our various peoples.

For again, we repeat, history, that is, the world and its civilization, is of a piece in extension and in duration. The immutable truth which illuminates the thought and conduct of an individual is but a facet of the same eternal gem which energizes and inspires the racial and political unit. The truth of the humble worshipper of God is the truth of the majestic processes of international relations. The aspiration of the human soul to the eternal *oneness* of truth is what animates the noblest aspirations of nations; but our inarticulateness in transmitting thought and the material conditions of our common life render dark and uncertain the expression of those social and national thoughts and aspirations. The farmer tilling the rugged, reluctant soil of Castile, apprehends the nature of his task, and knows that to it he must adjust himself and his ways in order to escape failure. No less the nation must apprehend



the laws which will govern its development, and realize how complete the disaster if these standards be not observed.

In the *oneness* of truth, in the universality of history, there is provided an ample satisfaction for all the aspirations of nationality. Wherein those aspirations reflect the light of truth, just so far does history record their providential transmutation into interests and their fulfillment, without recourse to the unsuccessful artifice of nationalism.

### "A MESSAGE FROM SYRIA"

By MRS. LAYYAH A. BARAKAT,  
Philadelphia.

I am a mere insignificant woman in the midst of this intelligent and scientific body, and I represent a little country—Syria—but I have a heart that has been given enlargement by the American Christians. I was only a barefooted Mount Lebanon girl. My father, my grandfather, my uncles and many of my people laid down their lives for their country. My people today are suffering under the yoke of the blood-thirsty and cruel Turks, and for all I know—for two years I haven't heard a word from my very own—my people have probably died from starvation, for no other reason than that they seek freedom and Christianity.

Syria is the country that gave you the Bible; Syria, the country that gave you the Christ; Syria, the cradle of Christianity. Before the discovery of America we had only one-half of the globe and we thought it was the whole world, and we looked to my little country as the very center of that world. To that center the Christ Jesus came; from that center the Christ sent his golden rule throughout the world. But since the discovery of America we have another half of the globe and we find America the new center. We expect the light to reflect back from this very center to our own, to send her Christ's golden rule, that Syria may have freedom and may have liberty, that Syria may be a democratic nation. They are longing for it. What can we do to help them?

I am one that was redeemed by the pennies of a Philadelphia Sunday School. It was the pennies that went to my native land from the hands of the consecrated American children that made me

what I am. You sent us missionaries; you taught us democracy; you opened our eyes; you made us believe that we are worthy of freedom; will you leave us alone now to perish? We plead with you. God is using you now and is going to use you yet for greater things. America is the best country under the sun.

The entry of the United States into the world war is to relieve the oppressed people and to uphold democracy. Surely the people of Syria are one of the most oppressed under the despotic rule of the Turks, and they long for the privilege of self-government. This right has been taken from them and they now appeal to this great nation to help break the yoke from their shoulders and make them free. America can do it if she only will.

The glorious American flag I love; it protected me from the sword of the Turk when I was but three years old. It protected my poor widowed mother. It protected me in 1882 when I came from Egypt, a refugee. I ran away barefooted from Egypt and found refuge under this flag. I arrived at the foot of Washington Avenue, Philadelphia, without money, without friends, without language—a stranger in a strange land—and I was taken in by the true Americans. God bless America. God raise America higher.

One of our eminent professors has said, "The world needs a new philosophy; the philosophy of this great century must go to the world." It is not philosophy that the world wants. The world wants something that man has not yet gotten—the world wants religion; the world wants God. But you may say, What is religion? Religion is the presence of God in the soul of man, and when man has the presence of God in his soul he will help the weak and lift up the fallen.

Where is Assyria and her art and science? Where is Babylon and her power? Where is Nineveh and her great and wonderful works? Where is Egypt and her education? They have gone, and nothing but ruins are left to tell us what they once were. They rejected God and God rejected them and put them out of existence. This shows us that philosophy and education cannot perpetuate nations, but we need the golden rule of the Son of God to bring the golden age for the life of man.

## THE BOHEMIAN QUESTION

BY CHARLES PERGLER,

Cresco, Iowa.

The exit of Turkey from Europe is now a question of a short time. Russia is no more an autocracy, and henceforth will be a democratically governed country. Thus remains unsolved only one major international problem involving the rights of small nations, speaking of nations in the ethnical sense and as distinguished from states. The allied note to President Wilson demands the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination. The Czechs and Slovaks ask for the reconstruction of an independent Bohemian-Slovak state. All this postulates the dissolution, or at least a very serious diminution, of Austria-Hungary.

The federalization of the Austro-Hungarian Empire has become impracticable, if not wholly impossible. The case of Switzerland is hardly in point. Mr. Toynbee defines nationality as a will to coöperate, and a nation as a group of men bound together by the immanence of this impulse in each individual. The Swiss have developed this will to coöperate, while in Austria it always has been unknown, and conditions are such that to hope even for its inception would be wholly utopian. Nor can we point to the United States of America as an example, because we are after all a nation formed by the free will of immigrants of various origins, and with an underlying basis of uniformity of outlook, uniformity of language, and uniformity of culture, furnished by the original settlers in this country who came from England.

Nationality is the modern state-forming force. To disregard it is to stand in the path of an ultimately irresistible force. The historical process of unification of various nationalities, which began with the German and Italian aspirations for a national state, ultimately will be consummated. If it is not completed now, the world is due for another convulsion within a relatively short time. When this consummation takes place, that Austrian territory inhabited by Italians will be joined to Italy, the Roumanians will be gathered in one state, there will come into being a Yougo-slav (South-Slav) state, and Poland will be independent or autonomous.

If Austria then remains in existence, the only nations left within it will be the Germans, the Magyars and the Czecho-Slovaks.

In this "small Austria" the Czechs and Slovaks would constitute a minority; the Germans and Magyars would again combine to dominate and oppress the Czecho-Slovaks. Austria even so mutilated would continue to be a source of strength to Germany, and would form a basis for another attempt to realize pan-German plans of middle Europe and the consequent conquest of the world. The internal conditions of such a state would necessarily be volcanic, and Austria would continue to be a menace to European peace. We should thus be confronted with a situation which President Wilson in his address to the Senate described as the ferment of spirit of whole populations fighting subtly and constantly for an opportunity to freely develop. To again paraphrase another of the President's statements, the world could not be at peace because its life would not be stable, because the will would be in rebellion, because there would not be tranquillity of spirit, because there would not be a sense of justice, of freedom and of right.

The Austrian question is the Turkish problem in another form. Austria can be no more federalized than European Turkey. To permit Austria to exist in any form when this war is concluded, is merely to delay the solution of a problem that will never down; and in the life of nations, as well as individuals, delay and procrastination, the tendency to postpone a final decision, are crimes for which penalties are sure to follow. We have seen what this penalty is: a war devastating civilized countries.

The suggestions made in certain quarters that a federal constitution in Austria be one of the conditions of peace shows the futility of the hopes to federalize Austria. Those knowing Austro-Hungarian conditions need not be convinced that the empire's ruling classes would never carry out such conditions in spirit, and perhaps not even in letter; the world would not go to war immediately to force Austria to comply with such a condition of peace, and thus the germs of a future war, brought about by our failure to see clearly now, would be permitted to exist.

A liberal Russia will be what Russia always claimed to have been: a protector of the small Slav nationalities. With Russia liberalized, the spirit of nationalism, which must not be confounded with chauvinism, will be intensified, and Russia will never again

look with equanimity upon the Asiatic oppression of Slovaks by the Magyars, to cite a single illustration. This again shows the necessity of a final solution, and the danger of compromise and temporizing.

The Czechs have proven the possibility of independence by their economic and cultural development. Economically and financially the Czech countries are the richest of the present Austrian "provinces," and when freed of oppressive taxation, discriminating in favor of financially "passive" Austrian lands, the independent Bohemian-Slovak state would be even richer. At the present time 62.7 per cent of the burden of Austrian taxation is borne by the Czech countries, while the rest of Austria carries only 37.3 per cent.

It should be emphasized that the economic strength of the new states would be reinforced by the undeveloped resources of Slovakia, the inhabitants of which form a part of the same ethnic group as the Bohemians, and desire to be joined with the Bohemians in one state. This presents no difficulty, since the Slovaks live in one part of the Hungarian kingdom, and are not scattered in isolated groups. For that matter, the world has about realized that in provoking the great war the Magyar oligarchy was *particeps criminis*; this war was not only a German war, but it was a Magyar war as well.

The Bohemian-Slovak state would thus consist of the lands of the crown of St. Wenceslaus, *viz.*, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia, so that it would have a population of over twelve million inhabitants, and a territorial extent of fifty thousand English square miles, while Belgium has only eleven thousand, three hundred seventy-three square miles. Therefore it would not be a small state, being in fact eighth among twenty-two European states.

After all, the belief in the necessity of large states is largely a product of German mechanistic political philosophy and political economy. Already voices have arisen that certain states have become too large to manage. Mr. Louis D. Brandeis has shown that even under modern conditions certain business units can become so large as to be physically incapable of successful administration. May this not be equally true of states, especially polyethnic states?

If it be said that it is hard to reconstruct a state, or organize a new one, permit me to answer that it was not easy to organize the United States of America, and the period of experimentation under

the Articles of Confederation was full of trials and tribulations. For a long time it was a question whether in America we should have an aggregation of loose-jointed states, or whether a foundation for a real nation would be laid. Yet those architects of human society, to borrow an expression of Walter Lippmann, relative to Alexander Hamilton, who after our revolution held in their hands the destiny of this nation, did not shrink from undertaking the task.

It is objected occasionally that the new state would have no direct access to the sea. Access to the sea is important, but, with modern methods of communication, not as important as it was in the past. The sea after all is a means of communication; whether these means be the ocean, or the railroad, it makes little difference if the country is confronted by high tariffs. Again, the solution of this problem has been suggested by a number of writers, and by President Wilson in his address to the Senate, wherein he advocates the granting of economical rights of way to landlocked states in the following language:

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

It should also be remembered that a direct connection could be established with the new Yougo-slav state with its harbors on the Adriatic.

It is also true that the future Bohemian-Slovak state will have a German minority; but in central and eastern Europe hardly any state can be constructed without certain national minorities. In the present instance the minority is not as large as would seem on the basis of the false Austrian and Magyar statistics. But it will certainly be easier to safeguard the interests of a German and Magyar minority in a Bohemian-Slovak state than it would be to protect the rights of Bohemians and Slovaks in a deformed Austria, or to force Austria to become a federal state.

This question of national minorities will of course have to be worked out in detail, but judging from the way Bohemian cities and communes have handled the problem of German minority schools,

it may be safely predicted that there will be no oppression of German minorities, no more than there was during the centuries that Bohemia was an independent state.

A leading advocate of permanent peace recently suggested that the question of national minorities might be solved to a large degree by a system of judicious exchange of such minorities, or of various members thereof. This gentleman had in mind the situation in Macedonia, but the suggestion is worth considering in other connections. For instance, Vienna has a large number of Bohemians, and the question of the Bohemian minority in this city has always been quite acute. A large number of these people might be repatriated and their place taken by Germans living in Bohemia, who originally were colonists in any event. It goes without saying that such repatriation would have to be voluntary, but if once undertaken should be facilitated by the respective governments.

One cannot help remarking that prior to this war those now worrying over the possible oppression of a German minority by a majority of Czecho-Slovaks were little concerned about the oppression of the majority by the minority, which has been going on for centuries. It should also be noted that a policy of denationalization of other peoples is one peculiar almost wholly to the Germans. After all, there is such a thing as psychology of nations, and the Slavs have never been noted for attempts to impose their language upon other nationalities. Russia is not an exception to the rule, for her reactionary policies were largely due to the Junkers from Russian Baltic provinces and to the German bureaucracy.

The factors thus enumerated, the right of any nation to independence once its possibility is demonstrated, the necessity of dissolving Austria in the interests of permanent peace, I believe to be decisive of the Bohemian case.

I would not even fear the joining of purely German parts of Austria to the German Empire. This would carry the principle of nationality to its logical conclusion. It would perhaps strengthen Germany absolutely, but very seriously weaken her relatively. To the German Empire would be added a few million Germans, but it would be deprived of the support of a much larger number of Slavs, who are now being made use of to fight the battles of their bitterest enemy.

When we consider the Bohemian question in relation to the

whole European problem of small nationalities, it is easily seen that it is simplicity itself, for a reconstruction of Europe in accordance with the principle of nationality means also the freeing of the French and Danes in Germany, the creation of a Yougo-slav state and emancipation of Poland. All these questions, whether difficult or easy, must be faced unflinchingly.

Let us not forget that the Czech question is also one of restoration. The Hapsburgs were called to the Bohemian throne by the free will of the representatives of the Bohemian state, and they undertook by solemn oath and pledges to protect and safeguard the independence of this state. The violation of such pledges and the deprivation of the Czechs of independence by force, do not do away with their legal rights, so that the Bohemian case has the strongest possible legal sanction.

The fact that the Czechs at one time had a strong and powerful state, well organized, is also a sufficient proof of inherent political capacity.

Bismarck maintained that the power ruling Bohemia rules Europe. This best illustrates the importance of the Bohemian question as an international problem. Without an independent Bohemian-Slovak state permanent peace cannot be realized.

## THE RIGHTS OF THE JEWS AS A NATION

By J. L. MAGNES,

New York.

It is good American doctrine to hold that all nations, large and small, have a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. But many nations, either because of their own aggression or the aggression of others, have found and still find that this right is questioned. The possible difference between today and yesterday is that, particularly since the aims of the present war have been formulated, the big nations say that they have less inclination than before to dispute the rights of small nations.

Aside from political and commercial reasons, this recognition of the rights of small nations may be a reaction from the effects of our meehanistic, technical civilization. It may be that even the



big nations instinctively feel that man does not live by bread alone, but that in each nation, however small in number or deficient in mechanical efficiency, or backward in politics, there are distinctive qualities of spirit, the loss of which would be a loss to the spiritual treasures of mankind. But the natural right to live, and to seek liberty and happiness, is different from historical or political rights. Just what rights a nation's history gives it is questionable, and a matter that has usually been determined by the arbitrament of arms. Our discussion is an attempt to determine what the rights of small nations ought to be without resort to force. In order to do justice, this should be done for each nation by a member of that nation.

Let me try to do this in a measure for the Jews.

But the question is asked immediately: Are the Jews a nation?

This brings us to the confusion and looseness in the use of the term nation. We shall probably have as many definitions of the term as there are nations themselves. For myself, I regard as a nation any considerable group who regard themselves as a nation as they themselves define the term. Any other conclusion is, it seems to me, the approved method of setting up the straw man to knock him down. If we examine our speech, we shall find that we use interchangeably the terms nation, nationality, people, race, ethnic group, state, citizenship, country, land. If the Academy can bring some order into this confusion, many persons and nations meaning the same thing might be spared the humiliation of fighting one another. Until then, all attempts must prove fatal to set up dogmatic criteria by which a "nation" is to stand or fall, or to be measured, in order to be entitled to the rights of a nation. It may be that, measured by the standards of the big nations, the small nations ought not to be called nations at all. But that the small nations are an existing fact and are something or other, by whatever name they be called, is clear. It therefore seems to me that we are not far afield if we regard as nations such considerable groups of persons as regard themselves as nations, however they themselves may define the term.

Take the Jews for example. Not all of them regard themselves as a nation. Yet the overwhelming majority—some millions, in fact—do. And what is of equal importance, these millions want the Jews to continue to be a nation, *i. e.*, they have the national

will-to-live. Under these circumstances, is it not rather academic to question whether or not the Jews are among the small nations?

Many Jews object to classifying the Jews as a nation because the word has political implications. In American usage we say that a man cannot have a dual nationality, *i. e.*, he cannot owe political allegiance to more than one state. The word nation and its derivatives are so bound up with the conception of political allegiance to the state that many Jews fear that the term nation as applied to the Jews would only subject them to the unjust charge of owing allegiance not only to the American State, but to a Jewish political nationality as well. From this point of view the use of the term nation in connection with the Jew is, indeed, confusing and apt to lead to misunderstanding. Those Jews who regard themselves as a nation certainly do not wish to imply a divided political allegiance on the part of any Jew.

If the term people instead of nation is used of the Jews, the matter becomes much simpler. What "national" elements has this people?

The Jews may be said to be of the same *race*. This does not mean that they are a pure race, or, indeed, that there is any such thing as a pure race. Nor does it mean to imply any mystic quality in the conception of race. It means merely that for many centuries the Jews have, as far as they were able, married among themselves. In fact, their religion in its earliest records and up to the present day makes it imperative that they should.

The Jews have a distinctive *language*, the Hebrew. Whereas many Jews are ignorant of Hebrew, this language has never ceased to be a spoken language among them. Moreover, it has always been and it now is their chief language of literary and spiritual expression. It is an impressive bond of unity among Jews. But not only have they a "national" language. They seem also to have a "national" language sense, *i. e.*, they have in many respects (and for this they have been ridiculed and condemned—unjustly, in my opinion) made languages out of the old Greek, the Persian, the Spanish and the German. The Jewish-German, for example, *i. e.*, the Yiddish, is a distinctive Jewish language spoken by millions of Jews, and by Jews alone.

The Jews have a *common history*, *i. e.*, they are conscious of a common past, and their present day life is made up in large measure

of elements derived from the past. The attitude towards them of their non-Jewish neighbors everywhere has always been and now is about the same, *i. e.*, sometimes individual Jews are judged as individuals in accordance with their merits or weaknesses, but as a rule the Jews are judged as a class, particularly when judged in a hostile sense. This attitude of their neighbors gives rise to common interests, particularly material interests, among Jews. But quite aside from this attitude of their non-Jewish neighbors, they have developed common spiritual interests out of their inner life. The Jewish religion is the chief of these. This religion, in addition to the highest concepts of a universal character, is composed of a "national" liturgy, "national" traditions, "national" ceremonies, "national" holidays, a "national" literature, "national" aspirations, and a "national" religious life. Aside from the specifically religious, the Jews have also developed a "national" culture, with many of the aspects of the national cultures of other "nations."

A people with so many distinctly "national" elements would be regarded as a full fledged "nation" by everyone using the term, if it were on its own soil and under its own government. Is it among the rights of such a people to lay claim to its own soil and its own government?

The Jews being a peculiar people, the answer to this question must be peculiar. It is yes and no.

The Jews are to be found in almost every country. Their national rights there must be dependent upon the rights of the other nations, peoples, races or communities in each respective state. In Austro-Hungary, where the rights of nationalities to national life, freedom and the pursuit of happiness are constitutionally recognized, the Jews, living in compact masses in Galicia and Bukowina, have the right to be recognized as a nation. The same holds true of Poland and Lithuania, and I have no doubt that the democracy of Russia will recognize the rights of the Jewish nation, just as the rights of all the small nations making up the Russian State will be recognized. Just what political rights are here involved must be dependent upon the general makeup of the state and its attitude towards its constituent nationalities. In the United States, where the state recognizes only the rights of individuals and not of nations, nationalities, races or peoples, the rights of the small "nations" here, the Jews among them, must necessarily

have no political aspect whatsoever, but must be entirely cultural—or spiritual—in their nature.

The nearest approach to a territory or a government of their own for the Jews can be had, if at all, in Palestine, the old land of Israel, the Jews' old home, the repeopleing of which has ever been one of the national aspirations of the Jews. This does not mean, necessarily, that all the Jews must be centred there, or that there must be an independent Jewish State or Jewish government. It means merely that those Jews who think they can serve their own people and the world best by contributing their energies to the creation in Palestine of a Jewish Centre for the Jewish people should be given every opportunity to do so under a government liberal enough, be it republican or monarchical, be it Turkish, English, French, Russian, German—to guarantee them freedom and liberty to develop the Jewish soul and the Jewish life and the Jewish hope, to the utmost.

Some of us Jews believe in these various rights for the small Jewish nation, because we believe in the Jews themselves, because we believe that the Jewish people has within it spiritual forces which should be developed for the sake of all mankind. The Jews, preserving their identity as an international people with a national centre in Palestine, replenishing the Jewish life everywhere with beauty, ideas, spirituality, should and can serve mankind as one of the greatly needed exponents of justice and of peace.

As to the rights of the Jews, therefore, as one of the small nations, I would say that:

1. Wherever they are, they have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

2. In states which are federations of nations and where the Jews live in considerable numbers, such as Austro-Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, they have the same rights—political and otherwise—as other nations.

3. In Palestine, the ancient home of the Jewish people, they have the right to develop a Jewish centre for the whole Jewish People. What political forms this centre is to assume must remain a secondary matter, as long as, in any event, they have complete freedom to live and to develop their Jewish soul to the utmost.

## THE RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS IN AMERICA

## THE REPUBLICS OF THE CARIBBEAN

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD,

President of the New York Evening Post Company.

In his recent address to Congress, which led to the declaration of war against Germany, Woodrow Wilson declared that

peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and freedom of nations can make them.

With these sentiments as a declaration of national policy, every American must agree, whatever may be his feelings as to the present war and the necessity thereof. For the line of conduct the President has thus laid down in these beautiful phrases is the one which the United States should surely follow in all its dealings with any of the nations with which we are brought into contact. They are particularly apropos at this time, when we are entering into closer and closer relations in dealing with the republics to the south of us. Just because they are so weak as compared with our own giant strength it is necessary that we should base our policy towards them upon the highest ethical and moral standards, coupled with true unselfishness and without any thoughts as to personal profit for the United States because of our philanthropic action.

The very highmindedness of this statement of Mr. Wilson's makes this an opportune moment to inquire whether in our dealings with certain islands in the West Indies we are maintaining his standards and ideals. It makes it possible for me to enter a plea before you for the need of an even more detailed declaration of American policy than this towards those republics in the Caribbean whose governments are now under American military control. Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti and San Domingo are today under American tutelage or controlled by governments upheld by American bayonets. But I shall deal in this paper only with the situation in the sister republics of Haiti and San Domingo. Of these, the latter, after an independent existence as a republic of seventy-two years,

has been taken over by force by our government; while of the independent government of Haiti—a negro republic of 112 years' standing, during which time no foreigner was ever attacked or injured, no white woman ever assaulted, and no legation ever violated save once—only a toppling shell of a government, which may crumble at any moment, remains. My appeal is for a definite declaration of intention as to these and the other republics, because there could be no more fitting time than this, when the United States is entering the world war for the avowed purpose of driving out despotism, crushing autoocracy and upholding the rights of smaller nations, and because one is vitally needed, if we are to hold the full confidence and friendship of Latin America.

What are we going to do to the smaller nations in the Caribbean, whom we are one by one taking over, because their governmental methods and results do not appeal to us? Plainly, we are drifting there. Our influence is extending rapidly by the acts of both the dominating political parties, and yet nothing is being done by reason of a deliberate national consciousness or a declared policy. In neither of the last political platforms is there any statement of a belief that the United States should go on deliberately extending its influence in the Caribbean, or any reference whatever to Haiti and San Domingo. If this is manifest destiny, it is an extraordinarily voiceless destiny. If it is an unconscious national drift, it has all the foreboding and the terrifying silence of an irresistible glacier. The American electorate has never voted upon it. It has alternately applauded the "taking" by force and trickery of Panama and the violation of a treaty with a small nation with which we were at peace, and the Mobile speech of President Wilson, in which he declared to the sister republics to the south of us that:

"I want to take this occasion to say, too, that the United States will not again seek to secure one additional foot of territory by conquest."

In his dealing with the sorely tried Republic of Mexico he nobly lived up to this doctrine, despite the bloody blunder of Vera Cruz. On the other hand, we have just witnessed the purchase of the Danish West Indies, at a fabulous price, "additional territory" to the south of us, without its calling for any noteworthy comment in press or public or in Congress, either for or against the proposal. Forgotten is the wonderful fight made by Sumner in opposition to

the treaty urged by President Grant for the annexation of San Domingo at the bargain price of \$1,500,000—the cost of islands having risen with the price of living. With Mr. Wilson the deciding argument for the purchase of the Danish Islands was reported to be the belief that, if we did not purchase them at once, Germany would—even in the midst of an overwhelming war—which recalls the fact that when Grant was balked of his desire to get hold of San Domingo, he declared: “If we abandon the project, I now firmly believe that a free port will be negotiated for by European nations in the Bay of Samana.”

President Grant made even more specific the spectre of foreign aggrandizement, which has done duty so often, together with the threat of a supposedly impending violation of the Monroe Doctrine, to take us a step farther along the highway imperialistic, by asserting to the Senate: “I have information which I believe reliable that a European power stands ready now to offer \$2,000,000 for the possession of Samana Bay alone, if refused by us.” But that was in 1870, and we had not yet reached that stage in our congressional development when it has apparently become a party duty to vote what the President asks, without regard to individual opinion or conscience, and so Sumner won on the merits of the argument, precisely as Seward was beaten overwhelmingly in 1867, when he advocated the purchase of the Danish West Indies for \$7,500,000.

Times have changed; so we took over the administration of the San Domingan customs houses in 1907 by treaty, solely in order to get her out of debt and to prevent revolutions by safeguarding the customs-house receipts, which were the chief booty of the periodic revolters. At first it seemed to work well, but then revolutions began again and it was openly said that the trouble was that we had not taken for ourselves power enough. Next, a treaty was forced upon this unwilling people, by shutting off of their revenues, and thus compelling them to surrender to us their last shred of independence. When the government fell by reason of inanition, we placed a naval dictator in charge in the person of Captain Harry S. Knapp, who began his reign in the name of the American democracy by suppressing some of the native newspapers which criticised our acts and by installing a censorship all his own that forbade even the newspapers in the United States to receive a single word that was not edited by himself. This autocratic ruling lasted only until

the press of this country laid the facts before Secretary Daniels when the order was promptly revoked. But the native newspapers, with one exception, the *Listin Diario*, having no one to speak for them in the seats of the mighty, are reported to have "stayed dead." Captain Knapp's cabinet consists of naval officers and marine officers, and there is no congress, no free press, no effective force to hold him in check. Foreigners are gobbling up the best of the cane lands.

In Haiti we have forced a convention on a free people by giving them their choice between a treaty surrendering to the United States the collection and disbursement of their customs receipts, and the creation and control of a constabulary. Having signed the convention, we then imposed upon them a military occupation, having refrained from paying the interest on their foreign and domestic loans while using \$95,000 a month of their income to pay the costs of our occupation, which the Haitian people detest, particularly our rigid martial law. It is only just to say that this policy was entered upon by our State Department with real intent to be of service, because it felt that the country was in chaos and anarchy, and that the foreign bondholders, through their governments, would soon insist that either the United States should make order in the republic or let some outsider do it. I am not here to impugn motives, but merely to record facts, and the fact is that the government and the people of Haiti, who always paid the interest on their foreign loans, are now on the point of bankruptcy and their government is on the verge of being broken down by us, while the Washington authorities delay the payment of interest on all loans and the refunding of the total indebtedness, which, despite years of revolution, is only \$32,000,000. They take pride, and justly so, that our marine officers have created a splendid gendarmerie of sixteen hundred men, have built and repaired a number of roads, and given the peasantry a sense of security which has not been theirs for years. If there was chaos, that is at an end, and there is that much clear gain.

But granting, for the sake of argument, all that may be urged as to the necessity of our intervening in these two republics, what then? Are we sailing by any chart? What course have we laid out? Is there any definite governmental aim? If so, it has not been stated. Neither the Republican nor Democratic platforms of 1916, I repeat, made the slightest reference to either republic or our rela-



tions to them. Is there any social or educational survey of the republics on foot? None. Is there any recognition of the necessity of differentiating between the Haitians, who are French in culture, and the San Dominigans, who are Spanish in culture? A proposal to send an American commission to Haiti privately financed was spurned a year ago by the State Department as likely to hurt the Haitian feelings if it should undertake a study of the underlying economic and social causes of the unrest of the past—those feelings, which, we are told, were in nowise disturbed when we forced the surrender treaty upon them! There is no definite national declaration as to how long we shall stay, how often we shall renew the treaties, or whether we shall ever let go. Neither President nor Congress has spoken on this point, nor as to whether we hitherto non-militaristic Americans should or should not govern these countries by military officials. If they are to be militarily governed, then by what branch of the service? Porto Rico and the Philippines are under the War Department; the other nations in our tutelage are under the navy. The Bureau of Insular Affairs is not yet trusted with the Virgin Islands; until the war permits a more leisurely arrangement, they are to be governed by an admiral on a makeshift basis.

All question of a serious taking of stock is deferred. We shall not know just how much of industrial bankruptcy and depression and human backwardness we have purchased in the Virgin Islands until peace returns. And then? Then it will surely be time to exalt the whole question of the government of our permanent and temporary wards of whom the bulk of our people are so ignorant, to a position in which it shall have the attention it needs and deserves. But how shall it be done? It is not merely a question of deciding whether the islands are to have military or civilian government; whether we shall not follow the example of England in Egypt in letting the natives carry on their own government under the oversight of a diplomatic agent-resident, in the manner of Cromer. It is not only a question of deciding whether Haiti and San Domingo are to be governed merely for the purpose of keeping order for a term of years and getting them out of debt, or even whether they are to be scientifically administered in order that their peoples shall really be trained in the art of self-government and be taught to walk, so that when we withdraw they shall not stumble and fall

again. Far beyond this, first and foremost of all, is the question: What is it we have in our minds and hearts for them? Are we to be guided wholly by philanthropy, by the desire to help these small nations to an independent existence, as we are praying for independence after the war for Greece, Belgium and Serbia, or is their proximity to us, the wealth of their remarkable economic resources and their trade relationship to us, to give to our spectacles another hue as we look upon them? Shall the country remember what Mr. Wilson has said: "It is a very perilous thing to determine a foreign policy in the terms of material interest"? Shall the nation say with him: "Morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us (in our relations with other nations), and we must never condone iniquity"—iniquity even in our own attitude and policy?

Shall the noble words of Wilson at Mobile apply only to conquest in war, or shall we make them a similar self-denying ordinance against that form of conquest which has given us practically complete control of Haiti and San Domingo, happily with but little bloodshed, but a control none the less as complete as if we had let General Pershing march to Mexico City and let him take over the whole government of Mexico. Many Americans have been killed in Mexico and much American property damaged; no such charge lay against Haitians or San Dominicans. Is the difference in our policy towards them wholly due to their difference in extent of territory? Is there to be further intervention of this sort to the south of us, dependent upon haphazard act or as the result of a well-thought-out policy? Surely, we can all agree that the vital importance of these relationships, not only as to those directly affected, but in their very great effect upon our trade and political relations with Central and South America, dictates that the administration of these wards should be in the hands of a Cabinet officer, and each dependency, temporary or permanent, represented as are Porto Rico and the Philippines by delegates to Congress. Perhaps it may be well, even, to establish a House of Colonial Delegates, in order that their special problems may profit by mutual interchange of ideas and of experiences.

Surely, some means must be devised for bringing the needs and desires of these very different peoples now under our care before the public, so that we shall not repeat in their case our nation's lamentable record in the matter of our Indian wards; so that, for instance,

when an admiral-governor suppresses a book and all the native press because he does not like the contents thereof, it shall be possible to get the facts before Congress, the government and the people. If such a one says, as one does today, that no native newspaper shall have any more right to criticize the American occupation of the island he controls than the Belgians have the right to criticize their cruel and overbearing conquerors, there should be some way of letting this be known outside the circles of officialdom, which are so apt to dismiss a question like this, even when it affects a fundamental human liberty, one expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, with a brusque: "It serves the beggars right."

In other words, the question before us is whether we are really going to set ourselves down to the task of governing well, according to the highest American tradition, these peoples who have no desire whatever to be governed by us and prefer to be governed poorly by themselves so long as they may have self-government and independence rather than be governed by outsiders whose culture and point of view in every fundamental thing are so alien. Shall we in the spirit of high humanity seek to establish with complete unselfishness, true democracy in these wonderful islands of Haiti and San Domingo, as against the autocracy of despotic or military control? Shall we not live up to the words of President Wilson in his war message, that "the world must be made safe for democracy"—safe, let us hope he meant, even from Americans? Certainly, there could be no better program for our conduct in Haiti and San Domingo than the President's assertion with which I began this paper. It is of the utmost importance for our own standing before the world that the several departments of the government whose duty it is to carry out the details of our foreign policy should not only conform to the high standards set by him, but should be still further committed to them by a detailed and definite promise registered in the eyes of all the world and before high Heaven itself. Any other course would surely give "aid and comfort" to the common enemy.

## THE RIGHTS OF SMALL AMERICAN NATIONS

## NICARAGUA AND COLOMBIA

BY HENRY R. MUSSEY, PH.D.,

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In his remarkable book on Mid-Europe, Friedrich Naumann sees the world of the future divided among three or four great empires—British, Russian, American and possibly Mid-European. By a law of inevitable social evolution, Naumann maintains, these great superstates attract to themselves more and more power, looking after their own interests within the world's system, becoming economically self-sufficient, and making the states outside helpless against their tariff policy, commercial intrigues, limitation of imports, metal monopolies, cotton trusts, against their colonial dominion and world-encircling policy.<sup>1</sup> . . . Small states which cannot carry through any tariff war, but need daily imports and exports, must in future be registered with one of the great world-firms, as soon as the superfirms themselves mutually separate off from one another even more than they had done before the war.<sup>2</sup>

Of course Naumann is thinking chiefly in terms of small European states, but is he or is he not describing what is actually happening in the western world as in the eastern? Is or is not the United States by steady process annexing, both economically and politically, her neighbors to the south of Mexico? Whether she is or not, is she, at each stage of her progress, taking scrupulous care to safeguard the rights of the small nations as interpreted by their spokesmen, and in this way avoiding any accumulation of grievances that may some day return to plague her? I shall confine my answer to the states of Nicaragua and Colombia.

Practically everyone admits some sort of right of a country's inhabitants to profit by its natural riches. All Americans do lip service, at least, to the right of self government. They agree that a stronger nation in dealing with a weaker should so far as possible safeguard these two rights. Our Caribbean neighbors have large natural riches, and they have not yet made a conspicuous success of self government. American capital seeking profit from Caribbean

<sup>1</sup> P. 193.<sup>2</sup> P. 195.

natural resources, like foreign capital in general, has not been too tender of the interests of the native peoples. When it has found their existing governments intractable or unfriendly, it has sometimes sought the support of our own government for a change, and it has not been wholly unsuccessful in such application. The great body of our people have neither known nor cared what was happening to the south of us, so long as it stirred up no war that called for anything more than a small force of regulars.

Nicaragua, the largest of the Central American states, has one unrivaled economic asset, namely, its canal route between the oceans. Aside from this, its riches are largely in its coffee- and cocoa-growing land. Its one railway is owned by the government, but a large New York banking house, by a loan of a million dollars, secured 51 per cent of the stock, and now directs the policy of the railroad. The same bankers similarly control the National Bank of Nicaragua, and they have a lien on the customs to secure certain loans.

From 1894 to 1910, José Santos Zelaya maintained himself practically as dictator of Nicaragua. During the last ten years of this period there were sixteen so-called revolutions. Zelaya was not satisfactory to the American interests in Nicaragua, and finally the United States lent diplomatic support to the revolution that overthrew him in 1910. Still things did not go to suit us, or indeed anyone else, and in 1912 we landed 2,600 troops, did some fighting, and put down another revolution—all this, of course, at the request of the government legally constituted—with our assistance. Our high purpose was thus stated by the Taft administration: The United States

will lend its strong moral support to the cause of legally constituted good government for the benefit of the people of Nicaragua. . . . The United States has a moral mandate to exert its influence for the preservation of the general peace of Central America.

In 1914 we again landed troops, and only by this means succeeded in keeping the existing government in power.

During these same years our executive was pressing for ratification a treaty which would give us large control over Nicaragua. The first treaty came to naught, and a new one was negotiated which was finally ratified by our Senate early in 1916, and two months later, after a bitter struggle, by the Nicaraguan government. By its

provisions, the United States, in return for a payment of \$3,000,000, secured: (1) the exclusive right to construct a canal *via* the San Juan River and the Nicaraguan lakes; (2) the lease of land for a naval base on Nicaraguan territory on the Gulf of Fonseca; and (3) a lease of Great Corn Island and Little Corn Island in the Caribbean Sea. (It may be recalled that the United States paid Panama \$10,000,000 and \$250,000 a year for the Panama Canal route.) Costa Rica, Honduras and Salvador at once brought suit against Nicaragua in the Central American Court of Justice, alleging that the treaty violated their existing rights.

The Central American Court of Justice was established at our instance in 1907 as a means of bringing to an end the disastrous wars that have ravaged the Central American states for a century. The court is composed of one member from each of the five states, and is authorized to hear and dispose of all questions between them, and under certain conditions, cases between them and other states. At the same time that the court was established, Honduras, the central and most belligerent state of the five, was at its own suggestion placed in a state of neutrality, guaranteed by its neighbors. The establishment of the court and the neutralization of Honduras together offered a promising means of keeping the peace among these troubled states, and the very first decision of the court, rendered the year after its establishment, prevented a war. The court is perhaps the most promising agency of its kind in existence.

Costa Rica's complaint was that Nicaragua had violated certain treaty rights of Costa Rica by agreeing without her consent to the canalization of the San Juan River, a boundary river whose waters reach the sea through Costa Rican territory. Costa Rica, as a lower riparian owner, is of course interested in anything that affects the waters of the river. The court, by a vote of four to one, Nicaragua alone dissenting, upheld the claim of Costa Rica that Nicaragua had violated the right of Costa Rica, but said that it could make no declaration that the Nicaraguan treaty with the United States was therefore null and void.<sup>3</sup> Nicaragua, with our military and naval power behind her, and our \$3,000,000 in her pocket, refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court.

Honduras and Salvador had a different grievance. The Gulf of Fonseca, probably the best harbor on the Pacific outside San

<sup>3</sup> *World Court*, January, 1917, p. 370.

Francisco Bay and Magdalena Bay, is enclosed within the territory of three states, Nicaragua, Honduras and Salvador, the chief Pacific ports of the two latter countries being on that gulf. Modern guns placed at our proposed naval base on Nicaraguan territory will command these ports and practically the whole Honduran and Salvadorean part of the gulf. In this case, as in the Costa Rican one, the court decided four to one against Nicaragua, which in this case also refused to acknowledge jurisdiction. As regards both the two great concessions granted us by the treaty, then, the court's decision is unequivocal that the rights of the complaining states have been disregarded by Nicaragua. I shall not try to discuss the merits of the controversy. It is vigorously asserted that the Nicaraguan government which refused to accept the decision of the court is a government practically brought into existence by the United States and supported by our warships and marines, against the protest of a majority of the Nicaraguans. Be that as it may, the Nicaraguan refusal to abide by the decision of the court threatens the destruction of that agency, and threatens the failure of the plan of neutralizing Honduras. Needless to say, it is piling up irritation and suspicion against the United States, despite our fair words inserted in the treaty itself: "It is declared by the Senate . . . that nothing in said convention is intended to affect any existing right of any of the said named states."<sup>4</sup> Of course not, and yet the Central American Court of Justice all but unanimously decides that our treaty does so affect their rights.

Of the Colombian situation I shall say little. The facts are of public record, proudly avowed by the chief actor. The alleged "holdup" of the United States by the Colombian rejection of the Hay-Herran treaty calling for a cash payment of \$10,000,000 and an annual payment of \$250,000 besides, the unsavory story of the activities of the old French company in trying to dispose of their concession before it should run out, the bloodless "revolution," arranged in New York, staged in Panama, and carried out with the careful collaboration of our military and naval forces, and the hair-trigger recognition of the new republic by the Washington authorities—all these are undisputed facts. We dug, and fortified, the canal, and gave Colombia a permanent grievance, which we have been trying ever since to find some way to redress without saying

<sup>4</sup> Costa Rica, Honduras and Salvador.

that we were at fault. Various treaties have been proposed; all have failed of ratification. A few months ago, it is reported, a number of the most influential journals in Colombia urged the withdrawal of their country from the Pan-American Union as a measure of protest against the failure of the United States to rectify what they consider their country's grievous wrong. It would be difficult to exaggerate the bad effect produced throughout the Caribbean region by our action in the whole Colombian matter, or the amount of ill-will and suspicion it has added to the burden we were already carrying as the most prominent strong power operating there to support the designs of its forward-looking capitalists.

With the recital of these simple and well-known facts I need only state my point, which is a very simple and evident one. We have at present the power to make our will supreme in the Caribbean basin. In the two cases mentioned that power has been used to carry through our own policy in contravention of what the leaders of the small nations affected rightly or wrongly conceived to be their rights. In consequence we have begotten a hostility which, while not yet actually of serious dimensions, none the less contains possibilities of importance in any case of foreign complications, as we realize today in our relations with Germany. Every unadjusted problem of this kind means the need for more soldiers and battleships in order that we may be able to enforce our view of the right upon our unwilling little neighbors, and as all experience shows, such a development is unfavorable to the settlement of new questions on terms that both parties consider fair. Might we not well have a permanent government commission, or a bureau in the state department, whose essential business should be the consideration of the economic no less than the political aspects of American investment abroad? Unless we turn attention seriously and sympathetically to these questions, we are in grave danger, despite the good intentions of our state department, of violating increasingly what our smaller American neighbors consider their rights. They stand in sore need of friendly help in their struggle for economic betterment and stable self-government. If we still hold our historic belief that they can finally attain these ends, we can pursue a policy of friendly coöperation with their governments and people, and not a blundering policy of unquestioning support of whatever American financial interests happen to be dominant in the respective states. On the other hand,



if we have lost our ancient faith, we can consistently carry out a policy of frank imperialism, based on our idea of what is good for the Central Americans, and for us, and forced upon them by our armed might. But in that case we ought not to forget the words of Theodore Ruysen:

Coercion from without results in uniting incongruous elements until at last the day comes when the nationality, however complex in its origin, united in aspirations, considers itself ready to occupy a place among the nations, and rises up against its oppressors to claim a place in the Sun of Liberty.

## “WAR TO STOP WAR”

### EMERGENCY COMPULSORY SERVICE IN AMERICA TO CRUSH THE SYSTEM OF COMPULSORY SERVICE FOR ALL CHILDREN OF MEN EVERYWHERE

BY JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS,  
United States Senator from Mississippi.

We find ourselves as a nation in a very paradoxical sort of situation. In giving the reasons for standing where we are, we must indulge in phrases that seemingly contradict themselves. We are carrying on war with the hope of putting an end to war. We are using the ordinary method of settling international quarrels—war—with the hope that by indulging ourselves in this one hideous thing, once more, we may avoid in the future the recurrence of other hideous things like it. Then we are resorting to compulsory universal service in an emergency for the purpose, if we can, of freeing the world of the dogma and burden and weight and folly and idiocy of universal military service all over the world, with the hope that after the potency of this great republic has been added to the power of those in Europe who are fighting for civilization and liberty and freedom and the ordinary usages of civilized society, that there will be no need—here, or there, or anywhere—for universal compulsory service. We do this with the idea in our heads that we are going to enforce upon all the nations of this world, whether they will or not, that they shall not keep their populations in armed camps, threatening the peace of the other nations of the world and forcing them to imitate their example.

I have been a peace fanatic—am yet. I think that war when it is not insanity is idiocy. There is no excuse for it, and there ought to be somehow, somewhere, a court with force behind it that can say to the lawbreaking nations,

The first one of you who dares make war upon another civilized power without having first proposed to leave the question in controversy to an impartial tribunal for settlement, is thrown thereby outside of the pale of international law—is for the nonce to be treated as a non-civilized power—a barbarian power—and readmitted into the pale of civilization only when you repent, not by word, but

by deeds, for the sin against all mankind which you have committed. For the time being of your international lawlessness, at any rate, you become not the enemy of the country against which you are waging war, but the enemy of mankind, and all civilized power representing mankind will by force teach you that lesson any time it shall be necessary.

I don't care what you call it, a "concert of the world powers," or as I like to call it, "an amphictyonic council of the civilized world." Whatever it may be called, mankind must learn in international quarrels what they have learned in individual quarrels among civilized people in any given country, that is, that the league is backed with sufficient power just as a court to settle personal disputes. If the quarrel should be improperly decided, then even that is better than that every man should take his quarrel into his own hands and settle the controversy by the fist of the strongest or the wit of the cunningest.

Of course, this plan is not going to stop all war. There are wars founded upon deep differences of traditions and institutional policies, that may come anyhow. Most of them, however, are founded upon other things, like this war, for example, that ought by all means to have been avoided. Who pretends that Austria really made war upon Serbia because a Serbian by blood but an Austrian by nationality—half crazy—assassinated a grand duke and his wife? Who believes it? Who believes that if the proposition made to her to leave the question to the concert of Europe or to leave it to The Hague or to leave it to an impartial tribunal, had been accepted, there would have been any war at all? Who is there that does not know that the real cause of the war was the determination to open up for the Teutonic powers the line from Berlin to Bagdad by way of Belgrade and Salonica so that there might be an open way through Serbia for the Central Teutonic powers? Who does not know that all this talk about a "place in the sun" for Germany was folly and pretense? There was plenty of place in the sun. That the real God's truth was that Germany was increasing her population by immigration every year more than it was being decreased by emigration and that there were no "pent-up populations" "without room for their energies?"

So much for that. I am in favor of compulsory service in war time. I am opposed to it in peace time. But there is very little use of debating right now about having or not having that system in peace time, because it depends upon how this war is going to

result, as to what is going to become, at its end, of the system. If Germany wins this war, we will have to keep up universal military service indefinitely, because Belgium will become a part of her empire, France will be a vassal state whose international relations will be controlled by the German ambassador at Paris; Holland will be a vassal state. Denmark, with her hands in the lion's mouth, will be another. All the seacoast of the North Sea and the English Channel will be subject to her power. All the shipbuilding industries, rivers and harbors and naval yards of those countries will be hers, and "the master of the land" will proceed to become "the mistress of the sea." She and her allies are pretty nearly withstanding all Europe now, even with the miraculous seapower of England cast into the balance against them. And without our aid she would have to go down, and if England went down, our time would come now.

If Germany wins, we will have to keep up this miserable thing forever. No, not forever but until we and England only or perhaps we alone, under God's grace, can whip it. If we win, not only here but all over the civilized world, we can say that a nation shall be allowed to keep a standing army in times of peace with so many men in it, the same number for each nation—great or small—so that the small power can't be taken unawares and ridden over. Even that will not deprive the great powers with the great populations and resources of their natural advantages, because in addition to the troops in the field, which will be about all that the small powers can maintain, the great powers will have behind them their immense populations and their immense financial resources and every national advantage which they can conserve and in need summon and mobilize.

We are in the war now. We didn't want to go into it. We submitted to being kicked. We submitted to having written notice served upon us that we were going to be kicked again. Then we said, "We don't believe the Kaiser really means to do it and we will wait for the third kick." Then the Algonquin went down and three more American ships—four kicks. Now we are in it.

There are some things in this world that men must fight for. War is idiocy when it is not insanity. It is a perfectly hideous thing for men to be shooting one another, widowing the women, orphaning the children, destroying the churches and the uni-

versities and the libraries, making to crumble in one short year the accumulations of mankind for a hundred years; but there are some things in the world worse than that, and one of them is for a great people to submit indefinitely to humiliation until it loses its own self-respect and by thinking itself contemptible, becomes contemptible.

"Beware of entrance into a quarrel, but being in it, bear thyself that thy opposite may beware of thee." We are going to do that. I don't say I think we are, I say we are. I know this people. Whatsoever must be borne in order that this struggle may be carried to a successful issue and that world militarism may be brought to its knees, begging for mercy and agreeing to do justice in the future, we shall bear. Whatsoever it shall cost in order that that issue may be accomplished, we shall pay it; and whatsoever must be endured to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the hideous spectacle to which we shall put an end by our victory, that we shall endure. And in doing these things, I think we will find that all sections and parts of this country will hang together. We had better do it, as Benjamin Franklin said, unless we want to hang separately.

And so it is with the civilized powers of the world in the face of this great military idealism. People who have ceased, without knowing it, the worship of Christ and have gone back to worshipping Thor and Odin—the gods of the Goths and Vandals; people who, or whose rulers, rather, not they, have come to the deliberate conviction, after study and philosophizing under teachers in universities, under statesmen like Bismarck, under military leaders like Bernhardt, that a state is bound by no moral law and that the interest of a state must constitute the state's right; in other words, that in international law, might is right and that the necessity of the state overcomes all moral considerations of every description, must have their sanity restored. This strange, curious form of insanity makes a state a separate entity of some sort, as if God had created cows and horses and men and then created something which He called a state; and this state-worship is more or less bound up with the idea that the man who hereditarily governs the state really does "rule by divine right"; that the state exists by divine right and that God created the state forgetful of the fact that after all, men created every state or else some one man, by superior

power and conquest, created it. What idiocy in the face of history! The idiocy of putting the creature before the creator of it!

A man not long ago wrote to me: "You Americans don't seem to understand the German idea of the state. You think of it not as a separate thing with a separate code of its own, but you think of it as you do of an individual." I wrote to him that as far as I was concerned, I was guilty; that I had never conceived of any government tolerable to man that wasn't founded upon the fact that men created it and that men had created it for the protection of their lives and liberties and civilization; and if any government didn't do that, men ought to tear it down, no matter what the name of it was, monarchy, empire or republic.

He thought that the state was an independent entity, and I said I regarded it as a creature. I regard the men and the women and the children as the things to be taken care of, and the state is there only for that purpose. I said, "You seem to think that William the Kaiser has been ordained of God to govern you, and you seem to think as a perfectly logical conclusion that the government which governs anybody is ordained of God to do whatever it pleases."

I read this recently, which you would think was written right now in America:

We are fighting for that which we love, whatever we call it. It is the right, but it is something even more than the right: for our lives, for the liberty of western Europe, for the possibility of peace and friendship between nations, for something which we should rather die than lose; and lose it we shall unless we can beat the Germans. Yet I have met scarcely a single person who seems to hate the Germans. We abominate their dishonest government, their unscrupulous and arrogant diplomacy, the whole spirit of blood and iron ambition which seems to have spread from Prussia through a great part of the nation—but not the people in general.

That is true with us today, isn't it? I haven't found in all America, one single man, though there may be some, that had in his heart one iota of hatred for the German people today. There is none that desires to avenge something, although we can hear the groans and the dying gurgles of the men and women and children who died from the *Lusitania*; yet with all that, there is none of that spirit of hatred that generally carries a people into a war. And God grant that there may be none, because when this war is

over we want to have a "just and durable peace," because a peace dictated by victors in a spirit of hatred is never just and is seldom durable.

We don't want to "crush Germany"—God forbid. We want to crush the system under which Germany is now laboring, and laboring under which, she has become a menace to the civilized world. If I could dictate the terms of peace tomorrow, I would say

Let Alsace-Lorraine go. Let Schleswig-Holstein go. Austria, let Bosnia form a government with her own Serbian kindred. Let Herzegovina go with her Montenegro kinspeople. Turn the Roumanians in Transylvania loose. Free Bohemia from Hapsburg rule. Reign over the Magyars if they wish that you should. Russia, Austria and Prussia, all three, let Poland be reëstablished once more as an independent power upon the surface of this globe, with rights of citizenship. Germany, let Belgium go. Turn Luxemburg loose if she wants to be. If there is any doubt about the will of the people in any of these countries, let them decide whether they want to go with you or go back to their kin.

But I wouldn't crush Germany. On the contrary, I would make Germany stronger than she is now. The German population of upper Austria and of lower Austria and of the Tyrol and of Salzburg and of any other province outside of the German Empire, I would add to the German Empire and make it stronger than it is today, and I would base nationality on the commonness of language, because you can't have a durable peace unless that is the case. Now that might result in crushing the House of Hapsburg, and it would do it very effectively, but it wouldn't crush the German people.

Says another, not an American:

We seek no territory, no aggrandizement, no revenge. We only want to be safe from the recurrence of this present horror. We want permanent peace for Europe and freedom for each nation. Crushing Germany would do no good. It would point straight towards a war of revenge. It is not Germany, it is a system that needs crushing. It is not that we happen to be sick of this particular war; it is that we mean, if we can, to extirpate war out of the normal possibilities of civilized life, as we have extirpated leprosy and typhus. We hate war so much that we shall carry it on in order to abolish it.

First of all, we want no revenge, no deliberate humiliation of any enemy, no picking and stealing of money or territory; next, we want a drastic resettlement of all those burning problems which carry in them the seeds of European War, especially the problem of territory. Many of the details will be very difficult, some may prove insoluble, but in general, we must try to arrange, even at considerable cost, that territory goes with nationality. And shall we try again to

achieve Castlereagh's and Alexander's ideal of a permanent concert, pledged to make collective war upon the peace-breaker? Surely we must.

Of course, all these hopes may be shattered and made ridiculous before the settlement comes. They would be shattered, probably, by a German victory, not because Germans are wicked but because a German victory at the present time would mean a victory for blood and iron. To prevent the first of these perils is the work of our armies and navies; to prevent the second should be the work of all thoughtful non-combatants. It may be a difficult task, but at least it is not hideous, though some of the work that we must do in order to accomplish it may be; so hideous, indeed, that at times it seems strange that we can carry it out at all—this war of civilized men against civilized men, against our intellectual teachers and compeers, our brothers in art and science and healing medicine, and so large a part of all that makes life beautiful. We must fight our hardest, indomitably, gallantly, even joyously, forgetting all else while we have to fight. When the fight is over, we must remember the phrase, "Never again!"

"Never again! Somebody advised not long ago that those words should be carried upon the kit-bag of every English sailor and upon the knapsack of every English soldier." "Never again" I say, a thing like this for us or for our brethren elsewhere. Our brethren, because all the children of God are brethren, whether they be Germans or Russians or French or Belgians or Americans. We are fighting to reestablish the brotherhood of man and to crush forever the doctrine that anybody has the right, for the sake of making himself or his nation more powerful than other people, to ride, rough-shod over men and women and children as Germany did in Belgium without even herself contending that they had even in the slightest degree provoked enmity by any act or word or intent, and then afterwards killed the civil population because they sympathized with their own brethren and their own land and because they had dared, as a little people, rather to die free than to live slaves.

So I say as this author says about the British soldier going out with "Never again" inscribed upon his knapsack,—I want every American who goes forth to go with that on his knapsack, and if he can't put it upon his knapsack, put in his heart at any rate: "Never again."

It means a great deal, because it furthermore means that you are so resolutely determined that this hideous thing shall never again occur that you have made up your mind you won't quit fighting now until you are sure that you can make it tolerably certain that it never again will occur.



Now, these words I quote are not my words. They are the words of Professor Gilbert Murray of Oxford University, pronounced in an address in 1914. He concludes by saying "One may well be thankful that the strongest of the neutral powers"—referring to these United States—"is guided by a leader so wise and upright and temperate as President Wilson."

## A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

BY WALTER L. FISHER,

Chicago.

The immediate cause that has involved the United States in war today is that our ships are being sunk and our people killed while they are lawfully engaged in peaceful commerce on the seas; but important as is the immediate protection of our national rights and of our people's lives against other nations who are engaged in war, this alone would not have drawn us into the war. We are at war because we believe there is a compelling necessity and a real opportunity "to make the world safe for democracy"; to end militarism as a political system; to destroy Prussianism as a national philosophy. We are at war, and our immediate task is to make war effectively. But if we cease for one moment to keep in mind the deep underlying purpose of our warfare, and the great object we hope and intend to accomplish by it, we shall weaken the very effectiveness of our warfare. We shall be of those who gain battles and yet lose a war. I agree entirely with the sentiment expressed by Senator Williams<sup>1</sup> with regard to that motto which should go upon the knapsack of the soldier, "Never again"; but unless the men and women of America who are not soldiers have that motto written in their hearts and express it in action, then indeed the sacrifice of the soldiers will have been in vain.

Two years ago Lord Grey uttered the profound truth that

Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war the struggle will have been in vain. . . . Over humanity will loom the menace of destruction. If the world cannot organize against war, if war must go on . . . the resources and inventions of science will end by destroying the humanity they were meant to serve.

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<sup>1</sup> See page 178.

And in December of last year, in one of the most remarkable and significant documents that have been published in Germany since the war began, Dr. Bernard Dernburg, formerly Colonial Secretary and for a time the accredited agent of Germany in this country, expressed almost identical views:

It certainly sounds foolhardy to speak of a reconciliation of nations in these times of bitterest hate when the slaughter of nations is at its zenith. Nevertheless it is necessary and inevitable. If no lasting peace comes, peace based on confidence alone, then inevitably there will come another war, and this new war can end only with the mutual annihilation of the nations of civilized Europe. Manly courage and manly strength are no longer the decisive factors; unfortunately the decisive factor is the machine. If mankind is to give thought for ten years more to machines for destroying life and property, another war at the present rate of technical development will mean the end of Europe.

. . . . International law is now a desolate heap of ruins, but it must be rebuilt and it must so regulate the relations of nations to each other that they must stand under its protection as free states, possessing equal rights, whether they be large or small. This protection must be exercised by the common power of all, either by force or by a common ban placed upon a transgressor which would be equivalent to barring him from intercourse with the rest of the world.

Nor should we overlook the declaration of the German Chancellor himself which led to Dr. Dernburg's discussion of the international situation:

When the world at last realizes what the awful ravages in property and life mean, then a cry for peaceful agreements and understandings will go through all mankind which will prevent in so far as it lies within human power the recurrence of such a tremendous catastrophe. This cry will be so loud and justified that it must lead to a result. Germany will honestly coöperate in the examination of every endeavor to find a practical solution and will collaborate for its possible realization.

President Wilson delivered a great speech when he stated to Congress the reasons which had compelled him to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, and to ask Congress to join him in declaring the existence of a state of war; but he delivered a far greater speech on January 22, 1917—a speech which, in my judgment, will live as the most important utterance of an American President since Abraham Lincoln spoke on the field of Gettysburg. If he or we lose sight of the reasoned utterances of that address or of the fundamental principles he stated, we shall just to that extent fail to grasp the issues and the opportunities of the titanic struggle of which we have now become a part.

It is said that these were but words and that what we need is deeds; that actions speak louder than words. May I suggest that words are sometimes deeds; and that the utterance of a speech like Lincoln's at Gettysburg or like Wilson's in the Senate may be as truly a deed as the unfurling of a standard about which men may rally, or the sounding of the bugle that calls them to the colors; and every ear that is deaf to that trumpet call, and every step that is taken away from that standard, lends aid and comfort to the enemy and lessens the chances of success in war and of a greater victory in peace.

We shall do well to turn, again and again, to the declarations of President Wilson when we were yet free from the hurries and the hatreds of war. If they were the words of truth and soberness three months ago, they are as true today and more sober.

In the very address which led to our declaration of the state of war, the President said:

I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22d of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the 3d of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now as then is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

We will do well, therefore, to refresh our recollection of what the President did say on January 22:

. . . . The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. . . . The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. . . . But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply first of all that it must be a peace without victory. It is not

pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be adopted in humiliation, under duress at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. . . .

And the paths of the sea must alike, in law and in fact, be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality and coöperation. . . . Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings and come to stay. . . . The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry.

If these words are to rank as deeds and are to beget deeds, they must proceed resolutely from general principles to practical and definite proposals. It is absolutely imperative that we shall now, in the very midst of this war, while we are preparing for it and fighting in it, discuss the policies and formulate the plans which, in the words of President Wilson, are to result in "a world organized for justice and democracy." The plans may not be executed now, but their essential features must be devised and formulated now or they will never come into existence when peace is declared.

Even last November the *Times* said:

We agree that neutrals cannot do a better service to the cause of peace after the war than by the present discussion and advocacy of a practical system of the kind, if such a system can be devised.

And Lord Grey declared: "The best work the neutrals can do for the moment is to try to prevent a war like this from happening again."

If the discussion of the plans upon which a just and durable peace can be secured and maintained constitutes the most useful service which neutrals can perform in the midst of the war, this is also the most useful service which the belligerents can perform. A clear understanding of just what is to be the end of all the fighting can lessen the vigor of the fight only if there be some question of

the importance and the justice of the end. Now that we ourselves have ceased to be neutral, we have no higher duty to ourselves and to the world than to keep our minds open, our vision clear, our speech free, and our hands busy, for the accomplishment of the great purpose of the war, and we should have no understanding or commitment that will prevent us from making peace ourselves and from urging peace on others the instant that great purpose can in our judgment be obtained. Our fight is "to make the world safe for democracy." If in order to accomplish this it is necessary first to destroy militarism it is all important that we shall understand of what militarism consists, and we must not confuse militarism with its results nor fail to recognize it in our own councils and in the councils of our friends.

The essence of militarism is the belief that war is the natural, the necessary, the normal means by which international differences of opinion must be adjusted; it is the tendency to decry and to belittle the slow processes by which mankind as individuals and as nations has climbed up out of barbarism by substituting law for force. It is the conception of the state as something above and beyond moral law. Militarism is not ruthlessness; it is not cruelty; it is not savagery; it is the principle from which these evils spring. Once believe that war is inevitable and that preparedness for war is the only practicable assurance of peace, the inevitable result is the exaltation of force, the justification of cruelty, the acceptance of a despotic theory of the state, more blighting in its curse than the despotism of kaiser or king or czar. Once cease to plan for peace and there is nothing left but to plan for war. If mankind is to progress, if civilization is to go forward, nations must be held to the same moral standards as are individuals, and nations must progress little by little, step by step, as individuals have progressed. It is as true of international as of national or community affairs, that the progress of civilization can be exactly measured by the extent to which law has superseded force.

The issue that will confront the world at the close of this war, and which indeed confronts it now, is whether we are to put an end not only to militarism, but to the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can be promoted by force. Temporary advantages may be secured by the exploitation of other nations, espe-

cially—perhaps exclusively—undeveloped peoples and undeveloped lands, but in the long run the economic interests of the world are mutual. If, as we believe, the welfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national success, every nation has most to gain by helping to advance the trade of the world, to make all nations prosperous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent with sound economic laws. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy; and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social and intellectual ideal of civilization even more than as a political ideal. So far as the happiness of the mass of mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned, there should be neither exploitation nor a “war after the war” by hostile alliances in the world of trade.

I am advocating no diminution of the vigor with which we should prepare for and prosecute this war. I am merely insisting that we should know definitely for what we are fighting and for what we are to continue to fight. We have voted billions of money and authorized the training of millions of men. While these plans are being carried out with all the intelligence and energy which can be effectively applied to them we must not fail to see that even from the distinctively military point of view the formulation and announcement of plans for a just and durable peace is the most effective weapon we can wield. The presentation by the allied powers, with the support of the United States, and if possible of neutral nations, of a plan of international reorganization that would make it no longer possible for the Prussian military caste to persuade the German people that they must fight in self-defense would be worth more than millions of men on the fighting line in France.

Let no man belittle the influence of the argument of self-defense in Germany. It was Lloyd George himself who, at Queens Hall, in July, 1908, said:

Look at the position of Germany. Her army is what our navy is to us—her sole defense against invasion. She has not got a two-power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great powers who in combination could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that, when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the press and hints in the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*. . . . Here is Germany in the middle of Europe, with France and

Russia on either side and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion—suppose Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets which in combination would be stronger than ours, would we be not frightened, would we not arm?

We shall not remove this fear by defeating the German armies in the field or by imposing upon Germany the terms of peace. The English *Round Table* was right when it declared that "Prussianism, as a philosophy of war, will live until the German people themselves have rebelled against it." And a thoroughly posted and thoughtful American has said: "Germany can be made a liberal state only by her own liberals. No artificial liberalism imposed by the allies on a defeated Germany would last a month after the withdrawal of the allied army."

We must not make the mistake which has so discredited those intellectual leaders of Germany who by their manifesto demonstrated their inability to see anything but the German point of view. We must not make the mistake against which Burke warned us and attempt the indictment of a whole people. If we hope to make any progress toward permanent peace we must recognize that there are Germans who are not militaristic and who sincerely desire what we desire, even though we may sincerely disagree as to the methods by which it is to be accomplished. We must welcome every approach which such Germans make toward a better understanding; because our claim to infallibility is no better than is theirs, and it is of great importance to the world that the German people shall be brought to understand that militarism is not essential to their security or to their progress as a people.

If this is not the time for the formal offer of terms surely it is time to consider what these terms should be. If we are fighting for democracy, then democracy must discuss the terms upon which the fight shall cease. The old processes of secret diplomacy must end and they can end only by the substitution of free discussion which shall take place, so far as possible, before the event and not merely after it.

On April 2, President Wilson said:

Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a

narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

The events of the past few weeks should—it seems to me—have removed from the minds of thinking men the last lingering doubt of the wisdom and the necessity of a League to Enforce Peace to which the United States shall be a party. We have been given a convincing demonstration that we cannot keep out of the war by avoiding international alliances. No matter how beneficent our purposes, how pacific our policies, peaceful isolation has become impossible in a world at war. If we would maintain our own peace we must do our part to maintain the peace of the world. And what is true of us is true of every other great nation. For weal or for woe the restless energy and inventive genius of man have knit the nations of the earth together; and the inexorable laws of industrial and social evolution have made out of many peoples one people for all the deep and vital issues that affect the future of mankind. We cannot avoid our share of world responsibility if we would, and we should not if we could.

More than a year ago I advocated before the House Committee on Military Affairs, and again before the Senate Committee last December, the creation of a citizen reserve, trained by and through the regular army, and the building of submarines and destroyers instead of dreadnaughts and battle cruisers, at least for the present—a policy that if adopted would have been of incalculable value to us; but “preparedness” for war on land and sea would not have saved us from becoming involved in this war, nor will it save us in the future. A million men in arms in the United States today would not have deterred Germany from her desperate resolve to rule the seas with terror that she might bring England to her knees. Even our allies impress upon us that the issue will be decided on the ocean. We have a navy substantially equal to that of any of the Allies except England and yet it does not keep us out of war. It is folly beyond belief to think that in the future we can build ships or train soldiers enough to protect our national interests if we are to stand alone in selfish isolation while the rest of the world is left in bitterness to tread the bloody wine press.

The progress of civilization is measured by the extent to which law has become a substitute for force or has been put in control over force. Within the nation—in all community affairs—this is ac-



cepted as axiomatic. It is a sound axiom for international relations. The punishment of crime and the settlement of the rights of persons and of property is now recognized almost—although not quite—universally to be the function of the state in all communities that claim to be civilized. In these very communities, however, this has been accomplished not by completely prohibiting fighting at the outset, but by first restricting and regulating private vengeance and resort to force. The first step toward peace is to delay war—private or public,—the second step is to prohibit it. A study of the history of civilization from its primitive beginnings discloses many illustrations, but time permits reference only to two.

One of the most interesting and significant of Anglo-Saxon institutions was the trial by battle, which was long recognized in England as a form of judicial procedure under which the parties litigant could settle their controversies and determine their rights by personal combat in the presence of the court; but this could be done only after resort to the peaceful processes of the tribunal. This rudimentary device for substituting law for force by delaying war was undoubtedly akin to the duel, which was originally established by the Germans, Danes and Franks as a judicial combat between the parties or their champions by which the guilt or innocence of individuals and property rights of many kinds, including rights in land and titles to estates, were determined. So universal was its application that only women, cripples, invalids and persons over sixty were excused from submitting themselves and their rights to personal combat. It was under the pseudo-chivalry of Francis I of France and Charles V of Spain that the duel attained its vogue as the "code of honor," under which "gentlemen" were permitted to commit murder under the sanction of an "unwritten law." Only recently has it been recognized as a survival of savage customs and standards. Even now, despite legal prohibitions, it lingers, not only in Germany, but elsewhere, as an evidence of retarded development, of intellectual and moral immaturity. Nevertheless, the duel marked a great advance over the chaotic reign of force which it superseded. As Colonel Benton said in his account of the duel between John Randolph and Henry Clay, "Certainly, duelling is bad, but not quite so bad as its substitutes—revolvers, bowie knives, blackguarding and street assassinations, under the pretext of self-defense." We have many men still left

among us whose conception of national honor and international relations has not yet progressed beyond the *code duello*, and some who oppose bringing nations up even to its standards. In the discussion to which I have already referred, after stating that the objects upon which the entire world is in agreement "are to be attained only by a supernational union of nations," Dr. Dernburg says:

To accomplish all this will be difficult, and there will be many ups and downs, since even among the most enlightened minds of Germany there is an indefinite prejudice against the loss of sovereignty and free agency which is implied in these ideas. Our Hindenburg, for instance, said, a few days ago: "Questions of honor and self-preservation can never be submitted to courts of arbitration." I take the liberty of differing with him. Every officer whose honor is insulted is not permitted to take up arms without further ado; he must submit to a court of honor composed of his friends, and these are in duty bound to try every means to bring about an honorable compromise. Nations too must do that. Naturally every duel is not avoided by such means, but if the officer, despite the decision of the court of honor, has recourse to weapons, he ceases to be an officer and disappears from among those of his caste. That is what will happen also among nations. They will not abide by decisions and they will bear the consequences. There are occasions among individuals as well as nations when destruction is preferred to surrender. Yet that is no argument against courts of honor and courts of arbitration. The object of both is to curb unjustified provocation and unbridled pugnacity. Moreover, the question of what is incompatible with honor or national existence is so elastic that to withdraw it from the jurisdiction of courts is equivalent to depriving every court decision of permanence, and thus doing away with trust in such decisions.

The League to Enforce Peace does not propose to prevent us from fighting if we wish; it merely requires us to go before a board of arbitration, or a council of conciliation before engaging in war. It does not undertake to enforce the award of the one or the recommendation of the other. This hideous world war may make it possible to go much further than this in international reorganization, but the strength of this movement at present lies in the moderation and simplicity of its proposals. It seeks to do today what can be done today in the way that is available today. It leaves to tomorrow the adoption of methods and the accomplishment of objects that tomorrow alone may make attainable. Quite sufficient for the day are the difficulties thereof and the advocates of this league of peace do not overlook or minimize them. They simply do not regard them as insuperable. Confident in the power of a great

purpose and in the resources of statecraft, they are the proponents of a principle not the draughtsmen of a treaty.

They propose a league open to all who accept its conditions—a league which binds its own members not to engage in war between themselves until they have first submitted their difference, if this difference is justiciable (which means determinable upon established principles of law or equity), to an international court or board of arbitration, or to a council of conciliation if the difference is one involving a conflict of national interests or policies not justiciable in their nature, such as the Monroe Doctrine or our policy with respect to oriental immigration. The nations joining the league agree to use their economic and if necessary their military forces against any of their number who begin hostilities without first resorting to the methods thus provided for the avoidance of war. In order that the field of adjudication may be steadily enlarged, the signatory powers are to hold conferences from time to time to formulate and codify the rules of international law, the results to be binding unless rejected by some power within a stated period.

I for one believe it would be an admirable thing if we had to define and defend the Monroe Doctrine at the bar of reason before resorting to its defense by war. We may ourselves conclude to modify some of our ancient declarations and to moderate some of our ancient claims. We all know that since Monroe initiated that doctrine, conditions have radically changed; and Monroe's declaration has been so altered and enlarged by various statesmen and publicists in this country that its putative father would certainly not recognize it in the forms it frequently assumes at the present time.

We are all probably familiar with the story of that man who was accused of being a traitor to his country because he did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. He indignantly repelled the insinuation and said:

What, not believe in the Monroe Doctrine? I believe in it with all my heart, I would be willing to fight for it and if necessary to die for it. I never said I did not believe in the Monroe Doctrine. What I said was—I did not know what the Monroe Doctrine is.

The Monroe Doctrine probably reached its extreme development when Richard Olney, as Secretary of State, declared that it meant in effect that "the United States is practically sovereign on

this continent." But it is of the greatest significance that only a few months before his death Secretary Olney, in an able discussion of these very matters, in the *North American Review*, demonstrated "the necessity of determining, with the least delay practicable, what our future Latin-American policy is to be," and said:

Shall we preserve, unchanged, our traditional attitude as the champion of every American state against foreign aggression, without regard to its consent or request or its preference to take care of itself or to seek some other ally than the United States, and without regard to the surely incurred hostility of the aggressive foreign power? It has often been claimed, and sometimes effectively asserted that the United States, in its own interest and for its own welfare, must firmly resist any surrender of independence or possession of territory by an American state to a foreign power, even if the same be entirely voluntary. Suppose, for example, that an American state undertook to permit an oversea power to plant a colony on its soil, and to convey to it a port or a coaling station, is the United States to resort to war, if necessary, in order to defeat the scheme? These are only some of the inquiries which go to show the necessity of a speedy and comprehensive revision of our Latin-American policy.

Why should we seek understanding and alliance with South America upon our common interests, while we reject alliances with Europe upon interests of vastly more importance to us than any interest we now have or are likely to have with the Argentine or Chili? By all means let us cement bonds of mutual interest and of mutual obligation with South America, but let us not refuse to do our part in a field of greater interest and of greater obligation. Let us not forget that truth which William G. Sumner announced, when he said: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever are subject, because doctrines get into a man's own reason and betray him against himself."

So it is with that ancient doctrine that the United States should avoid "entangling alliances"—a phrase usually attributed to George Washington but in reality used by Thomas Jefferson, and a phrase which now needs at least some clarification. I have recently re-examined the history and contents of Washington's farewell address and Washington's illuminating correspondence relating to these matters; and it seems to me clear that if Washington were alive today he would be an ardent advocate of our participation in a league which President Wilson has well said is to create "not organized rivalries but an organized common peace." Nor is this

opinion based wholly on the stupendous change in world conditions since 1800, important as that consideration is.

Washington advised his countrymen under the conditions then existing against "permanent" alliances; but the context clearly demonstrates that what he had in mind was "*opposite* foreign alliances, attachments and intrigues," by avoiding which he said we would "avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."

In the farewell address what Washington warned us against was

permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others. . . . Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification.

In one of his letters to Lafayette, he said:

I would be understood to mean, I cannot avoid reflecting with pleasure on the probable influence that commerce may hereafter have on human manners and society in general. On these occasions I consider how mankind may be connected like one great family in fraternal ties.

Notwithstanding our warm attachment and great obligation to France for help in our Revolution, Washington steadfastly opposed our entry into the war between France and England, and in a letter to Monroe in 1796 he said:

My conduct in public and private life as it relates to the important struggle in which the latter (France) is engaged, has been uniform from the commencement of it and may be summed up in a few words: that I have always wished well to the French Revolution; that I have always given it as my decided opinion, that no nation had a right to intermeddle in the internal affairs of another; that everyone had a right to form and adopt whatever government they liked best to live under themselves; and that if this country could consistently with its engagements maintain a strict neutrality and thereby preserve peace it was bound to do so by motives of policy, interest and every other consideration that ought to actuate a people situated and circumstanced as we are, already deeply in debt and in a convalescent state from the struggle we have been engaged in ourselves.

Undoubtedly Woodrow Wilson, the student and teacher of

history, had these things in mind when, as President, he said in his great address before the Senate on January 22, 1917:

And in holding out the expectation that the people and government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. They all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

One objection is sometimes made to the league which indicates a complete misunderstanding of its proposals. It is said that if we and Germany were now in such a league we should have to sit supinely by during the process of arbitration or conciliation while Germany continued to sink our ships and kill our people. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On the exact contrary, Germany would be bound to discontinue the particular acts of which we complain until the report of the board of arbitration or the council of conciliation, or we and all the other signatory powers would unite against her. The very language of the third proposal is:

The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith, both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or *commits acts of hostility* against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as in the foregoing.

The discussion as to this league would not be complete without the voice that cries that it would be unconstitutional. We may entangle ourselves by agreement to defend the national independence of Panama or Cuba, we may agree not to use dum-dum bullets or to engage in privateering, we may agree to arbitrate our differences about the Alabama claims or the Newfoundland fisheries, but we must not agree to present future disputes to any tribunal

or council before we plunge ourselves and perhaps the world in war. There are always those to assert that it is unconstitutional to do whatever they do not want done; but the Constitution of the United States contains few limitations of the treaty-making power and none that prohibit such treaties as are involved in establishing a league to enforce peace. It is not proposed to take away the treaty making power, but to act under it. We are a sovereign nation for the assumption of obligations as well as for the assertion of rights. The obligations we assume will be far outweighed by the rights we shall gain. Whatever it may cost will be but a fraction of the tax in manhood and in money that is involved in preparation for war, to say nothing of participation in war.

The allied powers in their reply to President Wilson give to the previous statements of the responsible statesmen of most of the great neutral and belligerent nations, including Germany, this solemn sanction:

In a general way they (the Allies) desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note and their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world.

They recognize all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.

Here then is a proposal, which, so far as it goes, as useful as it may prove, whether it succeeds or fails in accomplishing all its advocates expect, is at least a move in the right direction. It will at least diminish the causes and the occasions of war. Therefore we, the people of the United States, desiring peace, willing to take our part in the great family of nations, should be willing to contribute whatever is necessary to further the most practical plan which has thus far been suggested for avoiding another unspeakable catastrophe such as the one now plunging the world in misery; and thus to aid those forces which work for civilization and for the peaceful progress of mankind.

OUR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION TREATIES SHOULD  
BE AMENDED

BY GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM,

New York.

As a preface to the statements I am about to make, I must state that I am strongly opposed to the United States of America becoming a party to a League for the Maintenance of Peace or any other form of permanent international alliance. The counsel of Washington is in my opinion as wise today as it was in 1796, and it still is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we can safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

During more than a thousand years, many experiments have been attempted at securing a continued peace in the world by means of compacts, alliances and treaties. All have failed to gain more than temporary breathing spells in the long history of human strife. Conflicting or coincident interests and ambitions are more powerful than written stipulations. The century of peace with Great Britain which we celebrated a short time ago was the result of no peace compact, but the product of common traditions, like moral standards and similar interests. Even the Constitution of the United States, the most perfect example of a "League for the Maintenance of a Just and Durable Peace," was ineffectual, despite identity of tradition and language, to prevent one of the bloodiest wars in history among the states composing the Union, and a durable peace was secured only by removing the institution of slavery whose continued existence created an irrepressible conflict stronger than any written compact.

There is a positive danger to our essential national interests in looking to others to secure for us those conditions which strong nations should themselves obtain and keep. The period of frantic effort to put away all sense of responsibility to prepare our nation to defend its vital interests by force of arms, through which we have passed in the last few years, among other ways found expression in the making of a large number of ill-considered international agreements which, now that our national eyes are reopened to actualities,



we would do well to abrogate before becoming entangled by their provisions in serious international embarrassments.

The *Tagblatt*, of Berlin, a recognized government organ, has commented upon President Wilson's war message of April 2, by saying:

We realize now what a big mistake it was that German policy saw fit to refuse to conclude the Bryan peace treaty such as England and other powers entered into with the United States. If such a contract existed today the United States would be compelled to submit even the gravest differences to a court or arbitration before breaking relations. This would mean gaining at least a year. It is not at all impossible that President Wilson in his embarrassment would have taken that course to get away from the serious position into which his one track policy has led him.<sup>1</sup>

This expression pointedly calls attention to the possible effect upon our national interests of the series of treaties which under the pacifistic emotionalism of William Jennings Bryan, when Secretary of State, the United States was induced to promote and enter into with most of the European countries (with the exception of Germany, Austria and Turkey),<sup>2</sup> with many of the South and Central American countries,<sup>3</sup> and with China. These treaties, ratified by the Senate during the years 1914 and 1915, committed the United States to submit all disputes which may arise between the contracting parties concerning questions of an international character, which cannot be solved by direct diplomatic negotiation and are not embraced in the terms of any treaty of arbitration in force between them, to a commission for investigation and report, with the agreement that the parties will not declare war or begin hostilities pending the investigation and report of such commission. Chile and Uruguay reserved from the operation of the agreement questions affecting their vital interests, and in the case of Uruguay, those affecting its honor. Previous to Mr. Bryan's advent in the state department, the United States had been foremost in the extension by treaty of the principle of deciding by arbitration all disputes with foreign nations justiciable in their nature and not involving matters purely of national policy.

<sup>1</sup>*New York Times*, April 5, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> That is with France, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal.

<sup>3</sup> Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Haiti.

The Senate of the United States always had been careful to preserve its prerogative under the Constitution of ratifying or concurring in the making of every treaty negotiated by the President, and in consenting to the ratification of the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes formulated at the Hague Conference of 1907, the Senate expressly resolved that:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

The resolution further recited that the approval of the convention was given with the understanding that recourse to the permanent court for the settlement of differences could be had only by agreement thereto, through general or special treaties of arbitration theretofore or thereafter concluded between the parties in dispute.

Following the Hague Conference of 1907, arbitration conventions were entered into with Great Britain and France, dated August 3, 1911, each of which provided as follows:

All differences hereafter arising between the high contracting parties which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, relating to international matters, in which the high contracting parties are concerned by virtue of claim of right made by one against the other, by treaty or otherwise, and which are justiciable in their nature, by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity, shall be submitted

to arbitration under the provisions of the convention. In order that there might be no possible doubt as to the meaning of these words, the Senate, in ratifying the treaties, did so upon the expressed understanding

to be made part of such ratification that the treaty does not authorize the submission to arbitration of any question which affects the admission of aliens into the United States or the territorial integrity of the several states or of the United States, or concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obligations of any state of the United States, or any question which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine, or other purely governmental policy.

Perhaps one of the strongest motives which led to this careful avoidance of committing the United States to arbitrate, or submit

to investigation by a commission, questions purely of national policy, lay in the determination, which certainly during nearly a century and until the year 1913 controlled the action of the American government, under whatever political administration, that the Monroe Doctrine was a definite policy of the United States, which it had itself adopted as essential to its national interests, and which it would not consent to submit to question by any other power. The excessive zeal of Secretary Bryan to make it impossible under any conditions for the United States to enter upon war, led to the abandonment of this salutary principle of national protection in the twenty odd treaties negotiated by him in 1913 and 1914 above referred to. Some students of those treaties and their effect already have maintained that they bind the United States to submit to arbitration even disputes which may involve the Monroe Doctrine under the provisions of those compacts.

Fortunately for us, as the Berliner *Tageblatt* has pointed out, Germany and her allies did not accept Mr. Bryan's invitation to enter into similar agreements with us, nor has Japan or Mexico done so. It is my belief that there are some questions which no nation can afford to submit to the determination of any outside tribunal, and there are some questions which cannot be submitted even to a commission of inquiry for consideration under an agreement that war shall not be made until the commission of inquiry submits its report. The present controversy with Germany affords a striking example of that fact. The final issue upon which we have broken with Germany is with respect to her right to wage a submarine warfare against all neutral vessels, our own included, which penetrate a zone drawn by her about the British Islands and the coast of France. Had she been a party to one of these Bryan treaties, we should have been bound by the treaty to submit to a commission appointed in accordance with the treaty the question whether or not Germany was justified in the adoption of her submarine policy, or if we were justified in considering it a *casus belli*. The commission would have had one year within which to make an investigation, and Germany, continuing her submarine warfare, would have disclaimed our contention that she was making war upon us, averred that she was merely pursuing a method of war against the allied powers, and maintained that we could avoid all injury to our interests by keeping our ships away from the prohibited zone. This being the dis-

puted point required to be submitted to a commission, would have prevented us from forcibly protecting our own interests, except at the cost of violating our treaty obligations. Under such conditions, it is more than probable we should have proceeded against Germany despite the treaty, and perhaps the most objectionable feature of these universal Bryan treaties is that they will inevitably tend to a breach of their own provisions under stress of circumstances.

That it is by no means an idle surmise that even the American government might disregard a treaty obligation which was found to be embarrassing, is demonstrated by the action of our state department within the past few months concerning the treaty negotiated by Secretary Bryan with Nicaragua. The facts of this case ought to be more widely known by the American people. On August 5, 1914, a convention or treaty was entered into between the United States and Nicaragua, known as the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, whereby Nicaragua ceded to the United States certain rights for the construction of a ship canal across the so-called Nicaraguan route, and in order to enable the government of the United States to protect the Panama Canal and the proprietary rights granted in connection with the canal route across Nicaragua, Nicaragua further leased for ninety-nine years to the United States government certain islands in the Caribbean Sea and granted the right to the United States during that period to maintain a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca on the Pacific side, with the right to a renewal of such lease and occupation for a further term of ninety-nine years. Costa Rica, Salvador and Honduras protested against this treaty upon the ground that it impaired their existing sovereign rights with respect to the waters and territory embraced within the concessions. The claims of Costa Rica were particularly strong being founded upon an award made by President Cleveland in March, 1888, as arbitrator of a dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The United States Senate, in ratifying the treaty, adopted a resolution declaring that nothing therein contained was intended to affect any existing right of any of the above named states. But this declaration did not satisfy either of them, and accordingly they appealed to the Central American Court of Justice, a species of Hague Tribunal, which Mr. Root when Secretary of State procured to be established in Central America, some ten years ago, for the purpose of furnishing a means of settling without war questions

and controversies arising among the sister republics of Central America. Costa Rica and Salvador separately presented to that court their respective objections to the treaty and the facts upon which each claimed that Nicaragua had no right without its consent to undertake to grant to the United States the rights sought to be conferred by the treaty. Nicaragua, under the influence of the United States, and it appears to be undisputed, at the suggestion of the state department, ignored the order of the Central American Court of Justice calling upon it to answer the claim of Costa Rica, and refused to submit its right to make the concessions to the court, although the convention creating the court provided for the submission to it, without restriction, of all controversies or questions that may arise between the contracting parties whatever their nature and whatever their origin. The court thereupon proceeded *ex parte* to examine the claims of Costa Rica, and on September 30, 1916, it rendered a solemn judgment reviewing the facts and finding that Nicaragua was without right or power against the objection of Costa Rica to enter into the Bryan-Chamorro treaty with the United States. Nicaragua promptly notified Costa Rica that it would not respect or abide by the decision. On October 30, 1916, Costa Rica officially advised the United States of the decision and the attitude assumed by Nicaragua, but up to the present time the United States has taken no steps to uphold the action of the court which was her own creation.

It is true that the United States was not technically a party to that proceeding, but morally she was, and as the great sponsor of the principle of the universal arbitration of international disputes, it certainly ill became her to encourage Nicaragua to disregard the summons to inquiry by or to flout the decision of the tribunal which the United States had procured to be organized for the very purpose of passing upon such questions. The award of the Central American Court of Justice so made will certainly be followed by a claim against the United States by Costa Rica under the Hague Convention, or otherwise, calling for submission to the Hague Tribunal, or some other court, of the question whether or not by entering into the convention with Nicaragua above referred to, the United States had not invaded the rights of Costa Rica and Salvador and sought to acquire something without the consent of those nations which could only properly be granted with that consent. It is difficult to

see how the United States could refuse to arbitrate that question and she will enter upon the controversy handicapped by the attitude of urging upon a small nation a treaty concession claimed to invade the sovereign rights of another small nation, and preventing the submission of the question to inquiry or arbitration before a court of her own creation. The lesson of this incident should be greater caution against indiscriminate treaty making for sentimental purposes.

But even more serious is the effect upon the principle of international arbitration of the attitude of the United States government towards the great Central American tribunal she called into existence in 1907. Not only did the United States encourage Nicaragua to enter into treaty relations with her in disregard of the rights of her neighbors, but her course has necessarily discredited the tribunal she helped to create for the purpose of settling just such disputes as she created when she entered into the treaty with Nicaragua.

The effect of treaties of the Bryan type upon the national policy of the United States known as the Monroe Doctrine is a matter for serious consideration. Beyond any question, after the war is over, Germany will seek expansion for her commerce in the western hemisphere. Germany's method in the past has been to conduct her commercial expansion wholly under governmental agencies. The expansion of German trade in South America means the establishment by Germany of coaling stations and naval bases and the acquisition of political control over portions of South and Central America. It is well understood that the purchase by the United States of the Island of St. Thomas was for the purpose of preventing it from falling into the hands of Germany. But suppose that after the war Germany should purchase from Holland the territory of Dutch Guiana, and information of the acquisition should come to us only after the purchase was completed. We should, unless we completely depart from our traditional policy, regard that as an invasion of our rights under the Monroe Doctrine and challenge the acquisition. True, we have no Bryan treaty with Germany, nor, it chances, with Holland, and in that particular instance, therefore, we should not be embarrassed by the stipulations of such a compact. But suppose Germany undertook to purchase from Ecuador or Bolivia, with each of whom we have Bryan treaties, would we stop and submit to a commission for investigation and report the

right of either of those countries to cede territory to Germany, and in the meantime allow German officials to establish themselves in the acquired territory? Such a course would be absurd. Abstractly, each of those countries has a right to do what it wills with its own. But as a national policy for the protection of our national interests we have declared that we should view as a deliberately unfriendly act the effort of any European nation to extend its governmental system to this hemisphere. We may maintain that position if we will. No other nation can settle for us the question whether or not we shall do so.

The fact is that during the period of what Rudyard Kipling so well calls our "drugged and doubting years," a widespread theory prevailed that all international strife in the future could be avoided by entering into compacts with foreign nations agreeing to arbitrate or refer to commissions for report all questions at difference. But nations after all are but aggregations of individuals; and the experience of individuals demonstrates the fact that the best drawn contracts imaginable do not always prevent litigation, and the principal value of compacts between nations as in the case of individuals is to afford, first, a definition of their respective interests and claims towards each other; and second, a moral barrier against hasty and unconsidered hostilities. No contracts or treaties, however well devised, have ever proved effective against the strong sentiment of a nation. Wise and prudent statesmanship should prevent a nation from entering into obligations which it can readily be foreseen would prove an embarrassment in time of stress and probably would not, possibly could not, be observed, except in cases where it would be as easy to negotiate a convention applicable to the particular circumstances as to rely upon a general convention whose terms might be broad enough to provide for the particular exigency.

In the general readjustment and reconsideration of affairs incident to our war with Germany, it would be well for the Senate to take up these Bryan peace treaties and negotiate modifications of them to make them accord with the unbroken American policy of a century and with our sound national principles, so that we shall not be confronted with embarrassments of our own making in cases where our national interests require prompt and not dilatory action.

## A YEARNING FOR WORLD PEACE

BY JAMES M. BECK,  
New York.

In discussing this question of the possibility of a just and a durable peace, if we apply the generous generalizations, that are always advanced in the discussion of the problems of war and peace to concrete illustrations in either current or past history, I think we will always find that the empirical remedies for war, whether sought by international arbitration or leagues to enforce peace, or mediation, fail in giving any final or completely satisfactory solution.

While statesmen, in their public utterances on the question, are not intentionally insincere, yet collectively every nation is more or less insincere in its protestations with respect to the subject. To confine our comments and criticisms to our own country, this nation has been the foremost exponent of the doctrine of international arbitration, and it has gone to extremes, verbal extremes, to which the responsible statesmen of no other nation have ever gone with respect to the lengths to which they would go in adjusting quarrels without resort to arms. And yet, in the Hague Convention and also in the Algeciras Convention, to participate in which we were invited by the European powers, we were quite willing to go there and indulge in an academic discussion of the possibilities of effecting a just and durable peace, but we were always careful to add the proviso that this should in no respect interfere with the continued efficacy of the Monroe Doctrine. That, of course, meant, not merely that we would not always apply the remedies which we otherwise advocated to any problem that would arise in the western hemisphere, but it also meant that we would not apply the same remedy in any European quarrel. Quite ignoring the solidarity of humanity and the fact that steam and electricity have woven the civilized world into a great organic unit, we have always, until the last few months, persistently disclaimed any legitimate standing with respect to the great questions of European politics.

So that with all our generous and eloquent advocacy of international arbitration, participation in it was always accompanied by



a very obvious and almost fatal limitation. When in England last summer, I was paid the great compliment of being invited to meet Sir Edward Grey. Of course I was very glad to go and I found this great, thoughtful, well-poised statesman quite willing to disclose his thoughts to me on a subject which was very vital and close to his heart, namely, the problem of world peace. A friend of mine in London told me that, immediately after the world war began and England entered into it because of the invasion of Belgium, he was sent for by Sir Edward Grey. When he entered Sir Edward Grey's room, he found him in tears, and Sir Edward Grey then said to him—and this was after England had issued its ultimatum to Germany—"All the dreams of my life have fallen like a pack of cards." No one who has followed Sir Edward Grey's career and who remembers the almost fatal hesitancy with which he held back his country in the matter of intervening in behalf of Russia and France will doubt that Sir Edward Grey was as great a pacifist as a statesman. In discussion with him I spoke of how wonderfully the peace of the world could be promoted if only Great Britain, France and the United States, the three great democracies of civilization, could coöperate, not by any organic alliance with Siamese-twin-like ligature, but by an *entente* by which they would pledge, not as a matter of solemn contractual obligation or with red stamps and red seals, but pledge in equity and good faith, with the moral sanction of three great and noble nations, their joint endeavors to promote peace with justice in civilization. Sir Edward Grey said to me in substance: "Mr. Beck, suppose that Great Britain would enter into a league to enforce peace with the United States," and he added, "Great Britain would gladly enter into any feasible or practicable form of coöperation with any civilized nation that would ensure peace to the world, but if we did, what reason have you to believe that the United States would coöperate and assume its share of the joint obligation and really take an active part"—of course, I am paraphrasing his words—"in enforcing that which the league thought to be just under a given state of circumstances?"

Well, that set me to thinking after I had left him, and I have thought of it very often since. Because after all, while the United States was willing to enter into very sweeping arbitration treaties—that of Mr. Bryan for example, by which a breathing spell of a year was to be given to consider the facts of any given controversy,

and that of Mr. Taft, who was willing to enter into the most sweeping obligations to arbitrate, even though questions of national honor were involved—yet he it remembered that while Mr. Bryan and President Taft were both sincere in their advocacy of their plans, it may be doubted whether, if we reduced the literal words of either plan to some concrete instance, either of them really meant what he said, because it is inconceivable that so noble and patriotic a statesman as President Taft would be willing to submit to arbitration questions which affect the honor of the country because a question that affects its honor is not a justiciable question about which men may reasonably differ. It is either some great question of national interest, which overrides all other considerations, or else it is a question where a wanton wrong is sought to be inflicted upon our country and we are asked to arbitrate whether a given nation shall inflict this wanton and deliberate wrong upon us. President Taft never could have meant, because he is too patriotic, that he would arbitrate such a question; nor did Mr. Bryan mean that if such a question arose, a year should be allowed to pass pending a discussion of the question, which would not even admit of discussion. Thus, we see illustrated the besetting sin of our public men, to say in a spirit of generous enthusiasm more than they really mean.

To my mind, the great difficulty of the whole problem lies in this. Questions are either justiciable or non-justiciable. That is a lawyer's phrase and like most lawyer's phrases, it perhaps obscures rather than illuminates thought. When we speak about a justiciable quarrel, what do we mean? We mean a question about which men may reasonably differ. It may be a question of fact or of international law. Or it may even be a question of some ethical standard not yet of sufficient universal sanction as to be embodied in that great heritage of civilization that we call international law. But in all events, it presupposes two things: first, that the question of fact or law is reasonably debatable; and second, that both parties to the controversy only want that which is just, and therefore, the controversy presents an honest difference of opinion which requires an impartial tribunal to elucidate.

Those are just the questions that generally would not result in war in any event. Because war is such a stupendous horror there is no nation, no matter what its spirit of militarism may be, that de-

sires to enter into the ordeal of battle upon a question which is merely a difference of opinion with respect to something that is debatable and which can be determined by some known standard of law or ethics.

The questions that are real subjects of war, the underlying subjects of war, are the questions which go either to national honor, because some wanton affront is about to be perpetrated upon one of two nations, or it is some great question of national honor and policy which rises so much above the ordinary conventions and standards of international law that no race is willing in such a controversy to bind up its destiny in red tape or define and limit its progress by a red seal.

Take as an illustration, the question before us in this very war. The question, primarily and on the surface, was one of international arbitration, and if ever there was a nation which, because of its advocacy for some generations of international arbitration, should have supported the theory of Russia, France and Great Britain, it was the United States. Why? Because on the surface of that quarrel, the principle of international arbitration was the immediate issue. Austria had served an ultimatum upon Serbia. Serbia had accepted all the terms of that ultimatum except two, really except one, and that was, on its face, a perfectly justiciable question—whether or not the guilt or innocence of certain Serbian officials should be determined by a mixed tribunal in which Austria should be represented, or whether it should be determined solely by the courts of Serbia.

That was a question about which men could reasonably differ. It was a question which, if referred to The Hague—an international tribunal could have been constituted—which would have taken the question out of the courts of either Austria or Serbia, and the guilt or innocence of the Serbian officials, alleged to be responsible for the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, could have been determined by a dispassionate inquiry of an international tribunal. But that very principle of international arbitration was refused.

If that were all the quarrel, it would be plain that on the refusal of Austria and Germany to arbitrate a perfectly justiciable question, Russia, England and France determined to accept the gage of battle in order to vindicate the principle of arbitration. But after all, considered philosophically, the subject was much deeper than that.

That was the superficial cause. It was not the underlying cause. The underlying cause was that great movement of races, which moves as slowly and resistlessly as that great glacier that comes down from the dome of Mont Blanc and never ends until it touches the valley of Chamonix; and those questions of national destiny cannot be arbitrated because no nation under present conditions of thought is willing to limit by the terms of red tape or a red seal its progress, either as a race or as a nation. I do not mean to intimate that Germany and Austria were justified in refusing arbitration. The Serbian quarrel did not justify the world war.

Therefore, it seems to me that all suggestions with respect to peace may minimize the causes of war, as undoubtedly they do, and may offer the available machinery for the proper and orderly adjudication of international controversies, about which nations would probably not fight in any event, because they are justiciable, yet when great questions of national and racial destiny arise a pacific adjustment of the matter cannot be found in lawyers' agreements to arbitrate. Then unhappily follows Darwin's struggle for existence with its survival of the fittest.

The peace of the world must primarily be founded upon that which is infinitely higher than peace, *viz.*, justice in the world. There never can be a real peace without justice, and unless we first maintain justice in civilization, there will never be any durable peace. Unfortunately, temporarily or permanently, justice must often, both in the lives of individuals and in the lives of nations, be maintained by force.

I say, therefore, that the League to Enforce Peace is not a practicable way because nations diverge so greatly in their ideals and their interests, in their relative power, in their racial destiny, that any league to enforce peace would be as futile as the Holy Alliance was, though perhaps for a different reason. Such a compact would share the fate of all other leagues between sovereign nations. Sooner or later the league would break up into contending groups, and, far from minimizing war, a quarrel in such a league would tend to spread the horrors of war over a greater part of the world than would have been the case if the quarrel had simply been one between two nations.

I have no satisfactory solution to offer, because the question of peace is like the question of justice. You know what George

Eliot said in *Romola*: that justice was "like the kingdom of God: it was not without us as a fact, it was within us as a great yearning." Without admitting the application of her conclusion to the kingdom of God, yet it is true of justice. It is a great ideal, a great goal toward which we laboriously and painfully struggle through the centuries; and so it is with the peace of the world. I believe the nearest approach at the present hour towards maintaining justice in civilization, and therefore, peace—because if the forces that make for justice are more powerful than those that make for injustice, justice will be, therefore, promoted—will be for nations of kindred ideals and of kindred interests to coöperate to maintain this peace.

For that reason, I regard the great events that occurred on April 4 as the most hopeful for the human race that I have seen in my whole lifetime. I had thought that the American nation had been wrong in disclaiming any fair share of the burdens of civilization and of its portion of the collective responsibility of civilization for the maintenance of peace and order and justice, and therefore, when on April 2 the President of the United States, in that extraordinary address to Congress—one of the noblest, I think, that has come from the President of the United States in the history of our country—put aside our traditional past, forswore, in the name of his countrymen, our selfish isolation, and determined that this country should play its part and play it like a man in the great work of civilization; when, following that great event, there came facts that must powerfully appeal to the imagination of men who are not wholly destitute of imagination, when for example a Texan youth, with a flag of our country at the end of his rifle, climbed Vimy Ridge, and, with the moral sanction and authority of our government, unfurled our flag upon one of the most redoubtable strongholds of Germany in northern France, then it seemed to me that this great nation was closing one volume of its history and beginning a new one, an even more glorious one than the past, for every volume of our epic history has been more glorious than the past.

Colonial America was glorious, but it became greater when it became independent America. Independent America was great, but it became greater when under Jefferson it became continental America. Continental America was great, but it became greater

under Lincoln, when it became a consolidated and united America. It is an infinitely greater fact that, following the splendid message of the President and the concurring sanction of the Congress of the United States, in whose hands the final determination of our foreign policies must rest, this nation became cosmopolitan America.

Understand, this new volume of our history will have many dark chapters in it. Any person who thinks that the peace of the world is going to result from this war is the victim, in my judgment, of a monstrous illusion. There can never be peace in the world as long as there is hatred and injustice in the world, and this war has engendered hates of such tremendous intensity, which have gone so to the very roots of human beings, that the man is blind, it seems to me, who thinks, whether Germany and Austria win or whether England, France and Russia win, that there can ever be any good feeling between the two groups of nations in the life of this generation. Neither the vanquished nor the victors are going to be wholly satisfied, much less are they going to feel any reasonable kindness towards each other; and therefore, we are entering the most portentous, the most terrible, the most menacing half-century the world has ever known.

No human being can tell what the outcome will be. All we know now is that we are in it. It does not matter whether the traditions of the past have hitherto forbidden it. We are past that. No one statesman, no one party, not even the instinct of the people, involved us. The logic of world events drove us in, for better or for worse, and we are in for generations and centuries to come.

The only question is: what is our spiritual preparedness? How far are we ready to play a man's part in the world? Our vast wealth and resources will take care of our material preparedness, after the usual muddling which is characteristic of all democratic governments. We have too much genius and resourcefulness not to ultimately make good use of our infinite and predominant material resources. But we must consider the spiritual preparation. It is this which gives me, as one who advocated from the beginning of this world war the participation of the United States in it, the most concern. What is the response of the American people to President Wilson's noble address? Are we capable of the great destiny that is opening before us? Are we capable of playing a man's part in the most prodigious chapter of human history that is about to be written?

I read in a recent copy of the *Philadelphia Record* that in one day in this city of noble and glorious traditions and of one million and a half people there were just fifty-six enlistments, and I see that twelve thousand men attended a baseball game. In our whole country, in ten days following the inspiring message of President Wilson, there were exactly forty-five hundred recruits. If you take the full military strength of the United States, that means when the United States stepped into the most desperate conflict of history, if Germany and Austria, should they win, turn upon us, our territory, indeed, even our national existence, might be menaced. In ten days following one of the most inspiring calls to arms that this or any nation ever had, just one in three thousand military effectives enlisted.

I sometimes wonder whether the American people are not still more interested in baseball and the "movies" than they are in the European War. I think their interest in the world war has always been largely an academic one. I think they like to read about it; they find it very entertaining. I think they take a certain academic interest in thinking about the justice of its causes; but this is true, that to the great mass of the American people, the fact that this is our war, that we are as much interested in its underlying issues as any nation, has not come home to them with any overwhelming or convincing force.

About a year ago I sat at luncheon with a governor and an attorney-general of one of the great states of the Union, and I was very anxious to know what was the opinion in this state with respect to the European War. I asked the governor the question and he replied, "Well, Mr. Beck, do you want me to be entirely frank? When cotton is up, we are entirely satisfied; and when it is down, we are cross with Great Britain and its restrictions of our commerce."

I said, "Do you mean that, governor? Do you mean that in the most stupendous crisis, perhaps, the world has ever known, certainly the greatest in interest to every nation, one which is going to determine the destiny of the human race for centuries—do you mean to tell me that the sole interest in your state is measured by the price of cotton?" He thereupon turned to his attorney-general and said, "What do you think about it?" The attorney-general said, "Governor, you are entirely right. The great mass of our people are interested in the price of cotton and they are not

interested in any other phase of the war except in a purely academic way."

Before we condemn that state too quickly, let us go west of the Alleghanies and we find it the same everywhere. Since the President has committed us to the cause of civilization, since he has sounded the bugle call which should not know retreat, if we look over this vast sleeping giant of a hundred millions of people, we find it as unmoved as though a summer zephyr had passed over the waters of the Delaware—a slight ripple, but the deep undercurrents are as yet touched but little.

And therefore I wonder what will arouse us out of our dream of isolation if a great, supreme convulsion like this European War cannot? What will rouse us and how are we going to be aroused? How are we going to teach the American people the great significance of this struggle? How are we going to give them a cosmopolitan outlook? How are we going to make them feel that they are in the very heart of the world and that the Atlantic and the Pacific are nothing more than open highways over which hostile fleets could freely pass? In other words, how are we going to give this people that vision, without which it was said upon the authority of the wise man, this or any people will perish?

## MORAL INFLUENCES IN A DURABLE PEACE

BY DON C. SEITZ,

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To discuss the problems of a durable peace is to discuss a disease for which there are plenty of doctors but no cures. There have been many prescriptions for the perfection of peace, but in the end all seem to adopt that of Tacitus: "They make a solitude which they call peace." Somehow one comes, however reluctantly, to the conclusion that the vast chemistry of nature requires the slaughter of mankind at furious intervals, just as it seems to need the devastations of fire and flood and the cruel raids of epidemics. Guard ourselves as we may against flames from mortal causes, the lightnings come from the heavens to sere the luckless earth. We may build dams and levees with all our strength and skill, but the raindrops from heaven gather and overwhelm the help-



less land. We make sanitation a science, but the germ and microbe take new turns to rid the world of our persons. The human sacrifice seems as essential as ever it was in the temples of Baal, or on the altars of the Aztecs. What reform in railway transportation have we ever been able to effect without the slaughter of passengers or employes? When were ships ever amply equipped with boats or life preservers until some hideous disaster roused us to enforce precautions? It takes the falling of an elevator with its crushed and mangled victims to produce the use of safeguards. Many must die in factory or tenement fires before the landlord can be made to put welfare ahead of profit. We preach much and practice little until forced by the chilling results of calamity, however much we may have been advised of its coming.

So too with war. Despite the teachings of Christ and the sufferings of the ages, it is our ever present peril. For two trembling years this nation remained out of the horror; our Cassandras kept calling: Prepare! Prepare! At last we do prepare. With the first preparations comes war! Surely as the seed produces grain, so do arms produce alarms, and alarms, war. Whatever reasons may be advanced by the students of world politics; whatever economic fictions may be urged, one thing stands out: the German Emperor having forged his tools for twenty-five years, and having reached middle life, determined beyond peradventure to go down into history with Caesar, Alexander, Frederick the Great and Napoleon, the chief butchers of mankind. Did you ever read the correspondence of the kings just before the outbreak? They were all cousins. They signed themselves "Willy," "Georgy" and "Nicky." To "Georgy's" last plea that he hold his hand, "Willy" answered: "It is too late. My armies are on the march!" He always intended it should be too late. His armies were always marching in his imperial mind. But where all the time were the people who suffered "Willy" to enmesh them in a rule that permitted the armies to march on unprovoking people? Whence came the right to chain them into battalions and march them on to martial murder?

It is history that the common people rarely make war. War begins either through oppressions or the obsessions of the great. The assailed, perforce, must fight. To save themselves from such assaults nations prepare by fitting themselves to commit reprisals or to resist. We have been reluctant here to feel that such a step would

become necessary and even now make a slow business of it. That preparedness may be needful because of the aggressiveness of others I cannot deny. To the argument that it is an insurance for peace I do emphatically dissent. Montaigne once observed that the walls of his castle on the mountain from which he took his title were in bad repair. Indeed, there was more breach visible than bastion. His neighbors were always reproaching him for permitting such dilapidatedness to prevail and pointing out the peril he underwent. The philosopher answered by saying he had noted that the strongest defenses had to stand the most assaults. During twenty years no hostile force had ever tackled the mountain, but his well-walled neighbors had to withstand many a fierce foray!

It is no time now to argue our own position. We have taken unexceptionable ground, even though departing wide from our ancient principles. World power means world responsibility, if we chose to make it so. The giant declines to remain longer supine. We do not greet the change eagerly. There is doubt in many an American mind as to the wisdom of so wide a purpose. Yet there could be no other justification save to aid the cause of universal democracy. If the task brings us to a world-state where rulers can be made the servants of the people, the die will have been well cast. But there are perils beyond. We, too, may forge tools that will cut their owners. We may take on a lust for conquest that will bring evil in its train. We will surely fill the minds of men with the excitement and confusion of war and when it is over these minds will not adjust themselves to the humdrum of an industrious and quiet life, but will remain idle and distracted to the end of their days. This is one of the greatest evils growing out of such a conflict. The dead and wounded count much, but the mentally disabled count far more. You need not worry over the European millions who are expected to leap back into industry when released from the ranks of war. They will not leap. They will be stunned by their share in the great events. Their minds will not find room for common thoughts. They will ever be in trench or battle to the last of their days, menacing no industries but those of their own lands.

What there is most to deplore is the breaking down of intellectual and moral influence, which I take it we are here trying to revive. The scholars and philosophers of Germany are the leaders in the upholding of strife. So it is across the world. We, here,

flout pacifists and call for deeds not words. The clergy are not preaching the doctrine of peace and good-will, but fiercely calling for vengeance, and gentle woman rallies all her strength, not in shuddering remonstrance against the ruth of war, but in zealous urgings that husbands, sons and brothers shall take a hand. With all due respect to the good, they appear more belligerent than the fighting men, more insistent upon revenge. I am not speaking as a critic. I am trying to describe one of the great anomalies. As to the consummation for which all mankind should wish, a durable peace, based upon good-will and justice, I frankly believe will never come. If it does it will be because some nation is brave enough to lay down its arms, dismantle its ships of war and say to all the world: "We have put aside the tools of conflict. We will be brothers to mankind and will abide the event, feeling that if our sacrifice fails the red will be on other hands than ours."

## EQUIPMENT FOR THE POST BELLUM PERIOD

BY CHARLES H. SHERRILL,

New York City.

It seems to me that the most important equipment that our country can have for the part which it must play at the end of this war, is its state of mind. We in this country have had a proper and a high state of mind not once but several times. We rose in our might to gain our freedom. We cleaned our escutcheon of the black stain of slavery. We freed Cuba, and then, having freed her from a foreign enemy, we freed her from ourselves, not once, but twice.

May I venture to suggest two vitally important movements through which we can help our country to improve its state of mind?

The first and less important of these is that of so altering our mental attitude toward other nations that in our dealings with them, commercial, personal or diplomatic, we shall constantly grant full consideration to their point of view. I am personally under great obligations to our Government for permitting me to represent it for two years in the great Latin-American republic of Argentina, because my service there taught me our need for studying and

thereafter considering the point of view of other peoples. Foreigners are apt to approach almost any subject from a different angle than ourselves, and unless we take that fact into account we shall fall short of coming to a full understanding with them in personal relations, in business, or in governmental questions of an international character. We must learn to take thought of how the other man is thinking—it is courteous, it is good business, it is of vital importance to anyone pretending to statesmanship. Let us take as an example our relations with the other republics of the western hemisphere. We, as a nation, have a right to be proud of the historical fact that our intentions toward those peoples have always been of the best and purest. But have we always considered their point of view upon international questions? Wouldn't our relations with them be greatly improved if, during our history, we had occasionally stopped to consider what *they* thought of the settlement of some question instead of going straight ahead to settle it according to our own views of right and wrong? I think we are all agreed upon this point, and especially those who, through living among South Americans, have come to know and, therefore, to like them as cordially as I do.

You will find before this war has come to its bitter issue that the South Americans will all be found on the right side of the argument. They are a great people. They are not excitable or flighty as many of us believe them to be. I shall never forget something that happened one night at the opera house in Buenos Aires. They have an opera house there which, in most particulars, is superior to the Metropolitan in New York. One night, for no particular reason, an anarchist threw a bomb in that audience. What happened? What would happen in New York City? I fear there would be panic and trouble. What happened down there was magnificent. The audience behaved very quietly, although a number of people were injured. The manager came out and stated very calmly that owing to an unfortunate accident it was impossible to continue the opera, and he asked the audience to withdraw. The band played the national anthem and they filed quietly out. No one who saw that magnificent proof of national poise and self-control can feel other than I do about those people. I believe that the Latins of South America, by coming

to the free soil of this hemisphere, have become steadied and Americanized, just as we Anglo-Saxons from northern Europe have been speeded up and Americanized, in the northern part of this hemisphere. In type we are approaching each other more and more.

My second suggestion touching our national equipment for the post bellum period is vastly more important than my first. It is that we use this crisis in the world's affairs to cast ourselves back into the state of mind of our ancestors when they wrote into our Declaration of Independence that splendid acknowledgment of the Divine Source from Whom flows all our blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Let me recall a picture to your minds. We are in Cambridge, Massachusetts. We are assembled on the Green. It is the night before the fateful battle of Bunker Hill, that momentous test of whether raw levies of farmers can fight off trained troops and therefore win the freedom they so passionately desire. What preparation are those sturdy ancestors of ours making for the life and death struggle into which they are about to enter? What do we see just as the day is breaking? There is a hush, and then all those earnest armed Americans kneel reverently down and invoke the Divine Blessing upon their patriotic enterprise. Then rising lightly to their feet, they march off to meet the enemy. They go equipped with that splendid spirit which armed Cromwell's Roundheads, those earnest warriors who always united in prayer before going into battle. We have come a long ways since the War of the Revolution, and part of it has been downhill, for we are not so earnest or so frank in our religion as were the heroes of those days. Recently I was reminded that the word religion comes from the Latin "religio"—a tying-back. What we as a nation need most, both in the present crisis and to meet world conditions thereafter, is a tying-back to the Great Author of our being,—a continuing and not a mere Sunday contact with the great Power House above. Made powerful with *that* power we shall pass from being mere descendants of those who won and kept our liberty, to being worthy ancestors of a far greater American race, facing confidently forward and upward to the future which lies before.

DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE COMING PEACE  
CONFERENCE

BY EDWARD A. FILENE.

A business man need not apologize for concerning himself, in these unusual times, with the problems of international politics. They are today giving close consideration to international affairs not always so much from intellectual choice as from practical necessity. For the fact is that in the years succeeding this war business success, social advance and political progress will depend more on the kind of settlement that is made of this war than on the individual plans and initiative men and women bring to any particular piece of work.

If this war ends in the usual kind of settlement, no amount of private initiative can free business from the handicap of rival armaments and their crushing tax burdens, and the trade wars that are as certain to follow a patched up peace as night is to follow day. Therefore upon the ground of self-interest, if no higher reason existed, diplomacy becomes as legitimate a concern of business administration as are the costs of production.

The stability and free development of the world's economic life demand a new kind of settlement of the war. There must be set up such joint guarantees of justice and peace that the nations will not be driven into an unprecedented rivalry in armaments which coupled with the enormous cost of reconstruction would give rise to taxation so heavy that, if indeed revolutions did not follow, trade wars would be inspired so destructive as to complicate the business life of the whole world.

One of the things that this war has demonstrated is that foreign affairs are personal affairs for all of us, although in our easy-going moments we have acted as though foreign affairs do not concern the average man and are the exclusive property of diplomats operating behind the closed doors of secret council chambers. This war has proved that the blunder of an hour in a foreign office may undermine the results of a century of constructive domestic effort. All this means that when the time comes to write the treaty that will end this war there must be recognized with new emphasis the vital connection between diplomacy and the domestic development of nations.

In a recent number of the *Echo de Paris*, Fernand Engerand, Deputy for Calvados, said: "The peace which will conclude this unparalleled war will be the greatest event in history, and the treaty which will ratify it must be a masterpiece." Speaking of the weakened condition in which Europe will come to the end of the war and of the desirability of assuring a long peace in which to recuperate he goes on to say: "A long, a very long peace is therefore necessary and this must be the main object of the treaty. The problem to be solved is, in fact, nothing less than to rebuild Europe, for to have a good peace it is necessary to have a good Europe." And now that we are in the war, we may say "to have a good peace it is necessary to have a good world."

The conditions and problems which we will face after the war will depend in no small measure upon the type of peace that is made. If at the peace conference, a peace is made that will in reality be nothing but a latent war, then the nations now at war will be compelled to add, to the enormous fixed charges of war debts and the expenses of reconstruction, the continuing burden of another rivalry in armaments unprecedented in cost. In the same degree that this armed conflict has been unprecedented so will the armed peace that follows it be unprecedented in the extent of defensive preparation if the traditional peace is made. This trio of burdens—war debts, the expenses of reconstruction and the cost of another rivalry in armaments—will constitute a compelling pressure upon each European nation to undersell every other nation in the neutral markets, and will inspire one of the longest and most destructive trade wars of history. So we may reverse the statement of the French deputy "that to have a good peace it is necessary to have a good world" and say with equal truth "to have a good world it is necessary to have a good peace"—a sane settlement of the war.

The two outstanding weaknesses of the peace conferences of the past have been:

1. They have been dominated by diplomats who have represented a more or less fictitious entity—the state—rather than the masses of every-day people who in workshop, store, office, field and home constitute the nation. National prestige has overshadowed the common welfare of men.
2. They have seldom brought creative statesmanship to bear upon the problem of future security. Each peace of the past has carried with it the germs of future wars.

The elimination of these two elements of weakness from the peace conference at the end of this war is fundamental to every social, industrial, political and ethical program of the future. And I am convinced that the elimination of these two weaknesses, while depending much upon a changed mind, finally will depend upon the way the peace conference is organized.

The membership of the coming peace conference must represent a new and more wholesome diplomacy, marked by the following characteristics:

1. It must be more modern. It must realize that its primary function is not to minister to an exaggerated sense of national prestige that smacks too much of the artificial honor of the old duelling days, but it is rather a job of social engineering—so adjusting the relations of peoples that the energies of the world will flow into constructive rather than destructive channels. The men who frame the treaty at the end of this war should in reality be a group of men drawn from the basic work divisions of men in all nations whose experience would make them wise counsellors in the working out of a really scientific management of the world of nations.

2. It must be more public. The traditional veil of secrecy that diplomacy has thrown over international affairs must be lifted to the greatest practical extent. The time ought to be past when five or six men could rush half a world into war over night without consulting in some way the men and women who must bear the burdens of war.

3. It must be more responsible. It is even more important that diplomacy be made responsible than that it be made public. It is, of course, neither practical nor desirable always to spread the record of the foreign office on the front page of the morning paper. But there must be devised means by which the masses can have an increasing control over the game in which they themselves represent the stakes. Heretofore even the democracies have given a blank check to diplomacy, signed with their lives and their resources, and diplomacy has been privileged to fill in the amount. But hereafter democracy must audit the accounts of diplomacy.

This plea for a greater democratization of diplomacy is frequently met with the statement that the man on the street is not interested in foreign affairs. That may have been so. But he is interested in his life, his family and his property, and this war has taught him how largely these are dependent upon diplomacy. The value and security of his job after the war depends in a very real sense on the way the war is settled. In our increasingly interdependent world he must become interested in this matter. He has never had a chance to be vitally interested, and as is true in every democratic experiment he will never learn but by the carrying of



responsibility. But the average man probably has a deeper interest in international matters than we guess. This war has forced men whose thinking has never before gone beyond the bounds of a parish to think in world terms.

I am convinced that the end of this war will offer the opportunity for a decided step forward in the democratizing of diplomacy and in the reduction of the hazards of war for the future.

All belligerents unite in saying that "security for the future" must be the guiding consideration of the peace treaty. It is clear, that a constructive peace that will safeguard the future is not probable unless the principles of the new diplomacy that I have outlined are in control of the peace conference.

A more democratic organization of the peace conference, making it more representative of the fundamental interests of society, is the one move that, in my judgment, most nearly insures the securing of the kind of peace the future interests of society demand.

It will not be possible overnight to reconstruct diplomatic procedure; but the coming peace conference will be different from all that have preceded it and in that difference lies the hope of better things. The conference will come at the end of a war that, as I have pointed out, will have dramatized as never before three things:

1. The necessity for guarantees against future wars.
2. The fact that the world has become so interdependent that all nations are involved in the wars of any nations, even though not as combatants.
3. The fact that modern war throws burdens upon all classes and all men whether soldiers or not; that the farmer, the merchant and the mechanic must sacrifice at home as the soldier sacrifices on the firing line.

With these facts so clearly proved, it seems to me that our government will have the opportunity, in the peace conference, of striking a new note in diplomacy. It will be pertinent to suggest that since the problem of security of the future underlies the fortunes of all classes and is so intimately involved with the future industrial and social development of the world, there should be included in the membership of the conference responsible representatives of the fundamental interests of society, such as business, labor, agriculture, etc. Such a suggestion coming from the United States would doubtless bear great weight. The United States might well take the leadership in the making of diplomacy more

representative and responsible not only by suggesting such a policy to other nations, but by setting as an example the men it selects to represent it in the peace conference.

*If there should prove to be insurmountable obstacles to so complete a break with diplomatic traditions as the appointment of direct representatives of business, labor and agriculture would be, then might it not be feasible to attach to each diplomatic representative a counselor from each of the fundamental work divisions of society?*

It is the duty of every business man, of every professional man, of every thinker and worker, as the most important part of his planning for the future, to study the forces that will shape the end-of-the-war-treaties, and to ally himself with his fellow citizens in an attempt to shape the treaties for the good of our own nation and the world. Because, as I said in the beginning—*In the years succeeding this war business success, social advance and political progress will depend more on the kind of settlement that is made of this war than on the individual plans and initiative men and women bring to any particular piece of work.*

## INDEX

- ARBITRATION TREATIES, OUR COMPULSORY, SHOULD BE AMENDED. George W. Wickersham, 200-207.
- America: democracy, 10, 28; duties, 127; internationalism, 7; intervention, 103; obligation to defend international right, 49; over-world trade, 22; principles, 101; public policies, 100; relations between Japan and, 129; relative unpreparedness, 14-15.
- AMERICA AND DURABLE PEACE, JAPAN. Toyokichi Iyenaga, 124-128.
- AMERICA MUST CHAMPION, THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT. Roland G. Usher, 49-57.
- AMERICA, PLANNING THE FUTURE. Henry A. Wise Wood, 19-23.
- AMERICA, THE RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS IN. Oswald Garrison Villard, 165-171.
- AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, THE WORLD CONFLICT IN ITS RELATION TO. Walter Lippmann, 1-10.
- American isolation, end of, 1.
- AMERICAN NATIONS, THE RIGHTS OF SMALL. Henry R. Mussey, 172-177.
- American policy, question of, 5.
- AMERICAN POLICY OF ISOLATION, THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE, IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. John H. Latané, 100-109.
- American standards, preservation, 68-69.
- Americans, security, 22.
- ANDERSON, CHANDLER P. Freedom of the Seas, 65-75.
- Armaments: competition, 95; reduction, 92; rivalry, 223.
- Armies, reduction in size, 93.
- Austria: federalization, 156; taxation, 157.
- Autocracy, definition, 8.
- BALCH, EMILY GREENE. The War in its Relation to Democracy and World Order, 28-31.
- Balkan states: free development, 132; territorial reorganization, 133.
- BARAKAT, MRS. LAYYAH A. A Message from Syria, 153-154.
- BECK, JAMES M. A Yearning for World Peace, 208-216.
- Belgium: invasion, 4, 110, 209; national unity, 149; neutralization, 89.
- Belligerents: interests, 66; service, 189.
- Blockade, abolition, 60.
- BOHEMIAN QUESTION, THE. Charles Pergler, 155-160.
- British navy: accomplishments, 63; supremacy, 5.
- BROWN, PHILIP MARSHALL. Elements of a Just and Durable Peace, 76-83.
- BULLIT, WILLIAM C. A Basis for a Durable Peace between Germany and England, 113-117.
- Business administration, diplomacy, 222.
- Civilization: burdens, 213; history, 193; justice, 212; progress, 189, 192.
- COMMERCE, NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE. Stephen P. Duggan, 131-136.
- Commercial treaties, effects, 138.
- Conscription, illustration, 29-30.
- Constantinople, control, 136.
- CONSTANTINOPLE, THE DISPOSITION OF. Talcott Williams, 118-123.
- Contraband, classes of, 60.
- Coöperation, international, 92.
- COUDERT, FREDERIC R. Neutral Rights upon the Seas, 58-65.
- DAWSON, MILES M. The significance of Our Mission in this War, 10-13.
- Democracy: coercion in, 28-31; enforcement, 29; experiments, 14; fed-

- eration, 17-18; international program for, 2; peace a result of, 97; universal, 218.
- DEMOCRACY AND WORLD ORDER, THE WAR IN ITS RELATION TO. Emily Greene Balch, 28-31.
- DEMOCRACY, GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL. Arthur E. Holder, 23-27.
- DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE COMING PEACE CONFERENCE. Edward A. Filene, 222-226.
- Dernburg, Bernard, 186, 194.
- Diplomacy: characteristics, 224-225; democratization, 225; futility, 140; secret, 29.
- DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE. James L. Slayden, 92-100.
- DUGGAN, STEPHEN P. Nationality and Freedom of Commerce Prerequisites to a Durable Peace, 131-136.
- DUTTON, SAMUEL T. The United States and the War, 13-19.
- Dynasty, war against, 86.
- ECONOMIC FACTORS, THE, IN AN ENDURING PEACE. E. E. Pratt, 136-139.
- England: commercial rivalry between Germany and, 137; conditions in, 114; coöperation between United States and, 50; defiance, 105; expansion, 137; hostility between Germany and, 114; industrial system, 136; naval supremacy, 115.
- ENGLAND, A BASIS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN GERMANY AND. William C. Bullitt, 113-117.
- Europe: balance of power, 107; coöperative, 4; reconstruction, 160; repudiation, 96.
- European War: America's participation, 2; America's relation to, 14; causes, 179; issues, 112; origin, 3; significance, 216.
- Export trade, advantages, 138.
- FILENE, EDWARD A. Democratic Organization of the Coming Peace Conference, 222-226.
- Financial resources, mobilization, 26.
- FISHER, WALTER L. A League to Enforce Peace, 185-199.
- FORCE, PEACE WITHOUT. S. N. Patten, 31-40.
- Free trade, meaning, 58.
- Freedom of the press, effects, 141.
- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, INTERNATIONAL, ESSENTIAL TO A DURABLE PEACE. David Lawrence, 139-141.
- Freedom of the seas: definition, 58, 59, 66; German theory, 74; limitations, 61; principles, 59; questions affecting, 67.
- FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. Chandler P. Anderson, 65-75.
- French Revolution, principles, 133.
- Germany: army, 117; blockade, 117; commercial rivalry between England and, 137; commercial system, 136-137; conditions in, 114; consolidation, 144; diplomacy, 73; expansion, 137; federation, 123; foreign policy, 9; hostility between England and, 114; intellectual leaders, 191; international ethics, 125; policy, 5; political revolution, 9, 140; sea strength, 21-22; security on sea, 114; self-defense, 190-191; submarine warfare, 203; trade, 206.
- GERMANY AND ENGLAND, A BASIS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN. William C. Bullitt, 113-117.
- GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN H. The Bases of a Just and Enduring Peace, 83-88.
- Government, uniform theory, 151.
- Great Britain, *see* England.
- Haiti: convention forced in, 168; democracy, 171.
- HOLDER, ARTHUR E. Growth of Industrial Democracy, 23-27.
- Home rule, importance, 36.

- Honduras: grievances, 174-175; neutrality, 174, 175.
- INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, GROWTH OF. Arthur E. Holder, 23-27.
- Industrial legislation, enactment, 25.
- International alliances: 200; avoidance, 192.
- arbitration; doctrine, 208; principle, 211.
- INTERNATIONAL COURTS, DISARMAMENT AND, PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE. James L. Slayden, 92-100.
- International disputes, arbitration, 205.
- government, establishment, 17.
- law: character, 51; explanation, 53; nature, 51; privileges, 54; principle, 81, 91; requirements, 70; scope, 51; standards, 211; violation, 89.
- peace, basis, 79.
- politics, problems, 222.
- reorganization: plan, 190; principles, 131.
- right: defense, 49; definition, 55; determination, 78.
- INTERNATIONAL RIGHT, THE, AMERICA MUST CHAMPION. Roland G. Usher, 49-57.
- Interstate commerce, regulation, 122-123.
- Isolation, policy, 100.
- ISOLATION, THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF, IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. John H. Latané, 100-109.
- IYENAGA, TOYOKICHI. Japan, America and Durable Peace, 124-128.
- Japan: democratic elements, 131; duties, 127; military power, 107; naval power, 107; relations between America and, 129; spirit, 124.
- JAPAN, AMERICA AND DURABLE PEACE. Toyokichi Iyenaga, 124-128.
- JAPAN, FOUNDATIONS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND. Hans von Kaltenborn, 129-131.
- Japanese, immigration, 130.
- Jews: history, 162-163; language, 162; national aspiration, 164; national elements, 162; religion, 163; rights, 164.
- JEWS, THE RIGHTS OF THE, AS A NATION. J. L. Magnes, 160-164.
- Justice: definition, 213; enforcement, 77.
- KIRCHWEY, GEORGE W. Pax Americana, 40-48.
- Labor: displacement, 16; sacrifices, 23.
- LA FONTAINE, HENRI. On What Principles is the Society of States to be Founded, 89-92.
- Language, identity, 148.
- LATANÉ, JOHN H. The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace, 100-109.
- Latin America, relations between United States and, 220.
- LAWRENCE, DAVID. International Freedom of the Press Essential to a Durable Peace, 139-141.
- LEAGUE OF NATIONS, SOVEREIGNTY AND RACE AS AFFECTED BY A. Theodore Marburg, 142-146.
- LIPPMANN, WALTER. The World Conflict in its Relation to American Democracy, 1-10. *See also*, 158.
- MCGUIRE, C. E. The Interests and Rights of Nationality, 147-153.
- MAGNES, J. L. The Rights of the Jews as a Nation, 160-164.
- MARBURG, THEODORE. Sovereignty and Race as Affected by a League of Nations, 142-146.
- Militarism: autocratic, 45; destruction, 189; essence, 189; spirit, 210; world, 181.
- Military service, compulsory, 179-180.

- Monroe Doctrine: application, 104-107; changes, 195; doctrine of world, 90; importance, 219; international, 110; maintenance, 102; origin, 102-104; vindication, 105, 106; violation, 167.
- MONROE DOCTRINE, THE, AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ISOLATION IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE. John H. Latané, 100-109.
- MORAL INFLUENCES IN A DURABLE PEACE. Don C. Seitz, 216-219.
- MUSSEY, HENRY R. The Rights of Small American Nations, 172-177.
- NATION, THE RIGHTS OF THE JEWS AS A. J. L. Magnes, 160-164.
- National sovereignty, unlimited, 4.
- Nationalism: aims, 78; competitive, 7, 8; coöperative, 7; development, 147; spirit, 46.
- Nationality: basis, 183; definition, 155; factors, 147; principle, 133-135, 159; requirement, 152.
- NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF COMMERCE PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE PEACE. Stephen P. Duggan, 131-136.
- NATIONALITY, THE INTERESTS AND RIGHTS OF. C. E. McGuire, 147-153.
- Nations: basic rights, 78; coöperation, 213; definition, 161; domestic development, 223; free intercourse, 141; rights, 160; security, 45; union of, 143.
- NATIONS, THE RIGHTS OF SMALL, IN AMERICA. Oswald Garrison Villard, 165-171.
- NATIONS, THE RIGHTS OF SMALL AMERICAN. Henry R. Mussey, 172-177.
- Naval defense, revolution, 15.
- Neutral rights, defense, 59.
- NEUTRAL RIGHTS UPON THE SEAS. Frederic R. Coudert, 53-65.
- Neutrality: abolishment, 6; breach of, 72.
- Neutrals: commercial rights, 5; interests, 66; responsibility, 69; security, 118; services, 188.
- Nicaragua: control, 173; economic asset, 173; treaty between United States and, 173-174, 204; violation of treaty rights, 174.
- Panama Canal: control, 121; neutralization, 121.
- PATTEN, S. N. Peace without Force, 31-40.
- PAX AMERICANA. George W. Kirchwey, 40-48.
- Peace: assurance, 189; at any price, 83-84; code of, 36; definition, 77; durable, 112, 124; enforcement, 77; essential elements, 81; insurance of, 96; League to Enforce, 32, 40, 88, 194; necessity, 51; perfection, 216; permanent, 101, 198; preparedness, 76; program, 46; securing, 144; self-enforcing, 36; stability, 124; terms of, 183; without victory, 87, 188.
- PEACE, A BASIS FOR A DURABLE, BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND. William C. Bullitt, 113-117.
- PEACE, A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE. Walter L. Fisher, 185-199.
- PEACE, A YEARNING FOR WORLD. James M. Beck, 208-216.
- PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE. James L. Slayden, 92-100.
- PEACE, ELEMENTS OF A JUST AND DURABLE. Philip Marshall Brown, 76-83.
- PEACE, FOUNDATIONS FOR A DURABLE, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. Hans von Kaltenborn, 129-131.
- PEACE, INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ESSENTIAL TO A DURABLE. David Lawrence, 139-141.

- PEACE, JAPAN, AMERICA AND DURABLE. Toyokichi Iyenaga, 124-128.
- PEACE, MORAL INFLUENCES IN A DURABLE. Don C. Seitz, 216-219.
- PEACE, NATIONALITY AND FREEDOM OF COMMERCE PREREQUISITES TO A DURABLE. Stephen P. Duggan, 131-136.
- PEACE, THE BASES OF A JUST AND ENDURING. Franklin H. Giddings, 83-88.
- PEACE, THE ECONOMIC FACTORS IN AN ENDURING. E. E. Pratt, 136-139.
- PEACE, THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ISOLATION IN RELATION TO A JUST AND DURABLE. John H. Latané, 100-109.
- PEACE, TWO EVENTS THAT PRESAGE A DURABLE. Oscar S. Straus, 110-113.
- PEACE WITHOUT FORCE. S. N. Patten, 31-40.
- Peace conference: democratic organization, 225; weaknesses, 224.
- PEACE CONFERENCE, DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE COMING. Edward A. Filene, 222-226.
- Peacemakers, machinists as, 27.
- PERGLER, CHARLES. The Bohemian Question, 155-160.
- Politics, international coöperation, 24-25.
- POST BELLUM PERIOD, EQUIPMENT FOR THE. Charles H. Sherrill, 219-221.
- PRATT, E. E. The Economic Factors in an Enduring Peace, 136-139.
- Preparedness, insurance for peace, 218.
- Public opinion, interchange, 141.
- Race, homogeneity, 148.
- RACE, SOVEREIGNTY AND, AS AFFECTED BY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Theodore Marburg, 142-146.
- Railway transportation, reform, 217.
- Reconstruction: cost, 222-223; expenses, 223.
- Religious unity, interest, 150.
- Russia: autoocracy, 18; democracy, 7, 86, 112, 126; liberalization, 156; political administration, 94.
- Salvador, grievance, 174-175.
- San Domingo, democracy, 171.
- Seas: access to, 158; freedom of, 36, 52, 118, 120, 188; neutral rights on, 119.
- SEAS, FREEDOM OF THE. Chandler P. Anderson, 65-75.
- SEAS, NEUTRAL RIGHTS UPON THE. Frederic R. Coudert, 58-65.
- SEITZ, DON C. Moral Influences in a Durable Peace, 216-219.
- Self government, right, 172.
- SHERILL, CHARLES H. Equipment for the Post Bellum Period, 219-221.
- SLAYDEN, JAMES L. Disarmament and International Courts Prerequisites to a Durable Peace, 92-100.
- Sovereignty, absolute, 142.
- SOVEREIGNTY AND RACE AS AFFECTED BY A LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Theodore Marburg, 142-146.
- States: equality, 90; fundamental rights, 81; meaning, 182; principles recognized by society of, 90; relations between, 91.
- STATES, ON WHAT PRINCIPLES IS THE SOCIETY OF, TO BE FOUNDED? Henri La Fontaine, 89-92.
- STRAUS, OSCAR S. Two Events that Presage a Durable Peace, 110-113.
- Submarine warfare: evil consequences, 71-72; purpose, 72-73; result, 126.
- Switzerland, national unity, 149.
- Syria: democracy, 153; liberty, 153.
- SYRIA, A MESSAGE FROM. Mrs. Layyah A. Barakat, 153-154.
- Taxation, increases, 27.
- Taxes, export, 37.
- Trade, freedom, 80.
- United States: arbitration conventions, 202; arbitration treaties, 209; citizenship law, 129; coöperation

- between Great Britain and, 50; cost of government, 95; foreign policy, 100; fundamentals of government, 11; international status, 57; Latin American policy, 196; national interests, 200; national policy, 165, 206; opportunities, 21; organization, 157-158; participation in world war, 57; policy, 1; policy of isolation, 43; political organization, 25; reasons for entering war, 40, 154, 185; relations between Latin America and, 220; service in war, 45; treaties, 201; treaty with Nicaragua, 173-174, 204; world policy, 42.
- UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, FOUNDATIONS FOR A DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN THE. Hans von Kaltenborn, 129-131.
- UNITED STATES, THE, AND THE WAR. Samuel T. Dutton, 13-19.
- USHER, ROLAND G. The International Right America Must Champion, 49-57.
- VILLARD, OSWALD GARRISON. The Rights of Small Nations in America, 165-171.
- VON KALTENBORN, HANS. Foundations for a Durable Peace between the United States and Japan, 129-131.
- War: causes, 37, 212, 217; cost, 95; declaration, 187; effect, 39; evil consequences, 98-100; external factors, 34; history of, 146; justifiability, 51; preparedness, 192; prevention, 67, 76; reasons for, 39; subjects of, 211.
- WAR, THE, IN ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND WORLD ORDER. Emily Greene Balch, 28-31.
- WAR, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR MISSION IN THIS. Miles M. Dawson, 10-13.
- WAR, THE UNITED STATES AND THE. Samuel T. Dutton, 13-19.
- WAR TO STOP WAR. John Sharp Williams, 178-185.
- WARFARE, effectiveness, 185.
- Washington, farewell address, 197.
- WICKERSHAM, GEORGE W. Our Compulsory Arbitration Treaties should be Amended, 200-207.
- WILLIAMS, JOHN SHARP. War to Stop War, 178-185.
- WILLIAMS, TALCOTT. The Disposition of Constantinople, 118-123.
- Wilson, President, war message, 201.
- WOOD, HENRY A. WISE. Planning the Future America, 19-23.
- World: federation, 8, 108; international relationship, 113; justice, 212.
- WORLD CONFLICT, THE, IN ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. Walter Lippmann, 1-10.
- WORLD ORDER, THE WAR IN ITS RELATION TO DEMOCRACY AND. Emily Greene Balch, 28-31.
- World peace: means of securing, 39; problem, 209.
- WORLD PEACE, A YEARNING FOR. James M. Beck, 208-216.





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